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Abstract 
In the literature on social movements, elite allies occupy an important place in 
conceptualisations of political opportunity structures. Yet the ways in which elite allyship is 
performed has not been systematically examined and remain under-theorised. In this thesis, I 
seek to remedy these shortcomings in the scholarship and further our understanding of the role 
of elite allyship for social movements. First, drawing on a meta-analysis, I find that elite allies 
are not a strong predictor of policy change favourable to social movements. I then draw on the 
case of violence against women in Morocco in the post-Arab Spring era, to uncover why this 
might be the case. I use content analysis and semi-structured interviews to examine how a range 
of elite actors interact with Moroccan women’s groups and coalitions, and how the latter 
interpret their participation. I find that women’s groups and coalitions in Morocco benefit from 
the presence of a range of elite actors that perform different acts of allyship. These include the 
articulation of claims aligned with those of women’s groups and coalitions, the provision of 
moral resources and the use of double mobilisation. Despite these performances, women’s 
groups and coalitions in Morocco do not perceive many of these actors to be performing elite 
allyship. Rather they see elite allyship as involving the provision of a wide range of resources, 
collaboration with activists and substantial leverage against other elite actors. Moreover, they 
see effective allyship as coming from representative and democratic institutions, rather than 
unelected and unaccountable ones. Thus, both the source of elite allyship and its characteristics 
matter.  
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1. Introduction  
1.1.Thesis Purpose and Contribution  
In this thesis, I seek to develop our understanding of the concept of elite allies and its 
relevance to social movements mobilising for policy change. I do this by first systematically 
examining the influence of the presence of elite allies on policy change, controlling for social 
movement mobilisation. I then draw on the case study of the mobilisation for the 
criminalisation of violence against women in Morocco, to examine the types of resources elite 
political actors provide to activists, the ways in which they represent this issue, and the 
strategies they employ. I finally analyse activists’ perceptions of these actors and performances 
to determine who they view as an elite ally and how they conceptualise elite allyship, thereby 
advancing knowledge of what it means to be an elite ally of a social movement.  
Elite allies are a key dimension of the political opportunity structure (POS) model, which is 
associated with the Political Process (PO) theory, popularised by the works of Tilly (1978) and 
McAdam (1982). In this model, elite allies are treated as a background variable whose mere 
presence is assumed to be beneficial to social movements and protesters (Kitschelt, 1986; 
Brockett, 1991; Kriesi et al., 1995; Marks and McAdam, 1996; Rucht, 1996).1 I challenge this 
conceptualisation and bring out agency to the fore by examining performances of elite allyship 
and how social movement actors interpret them. This is particularly important because despite 
mounting empirical research on the dynamics and outcomes of social movement mobilisation, 
we do not possess a solid understanding what it means to be an elite ally of a social movement 
and how allyship is performed and perceived.2  
                                                             
1 A similar emphasis on elite allies can be found in the related Political Mediation (PM) model 
advanced by Edwin Amenta (Amenta, Caren and Olasky, 2005; Amenta, 2006). 
2 A notable exception is a recent volume edited by Wejnert and Parigi (2016) on the relationship 
between polity, political elites and mobilisation.  
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The POS model has been accused of being too ‘movement-centric’ by relegating other political 
actors to the background (Bosi, 2008, p. 244; McAdam and Boudet, 2012, p. 22). At the turn 
of the century, leading social movements scholars began criticising the discipline’s tendency 
to neglect the various political actors that shape the outcomes of contentious episodes in which 
social movement actors are embedded (McAdam and Boudet, 2012, p. 2).3  
Jasper (2004, p. 5) suggests adopting a strategic interaction perspective that ‘treats protest 
groups and other players symmetrically, instead of reducing the latter to the “environment” of 
the former – a structural trick that reduces the agency of all players except protestors.’ This 
strategic interaction approach to movement dynamics assumes that the key constraints on what 
social movements can achieve are influenced by other actors rather than by structural 
conditions (Jasper, 2015). I draw on this line of thinking in this thesis. However, Jasper’s 
strategic interaction perspective (Goodwin, Jasper and Khattra, 1999; Jasper, 2004) does not 
theorise on the interactions between social movements and other political actors. I hope to 
address this theoretical gap by analysing how elite allyship is performed and which 
performances of elite allyship are perceived by women’s rights activists as amplifying their 
efforts to bring about legal reforms on violence against women in Morocco.  
I look at performances of allyship by elite actors at both the domestic and international level, 
to correct the state-centric bias that is pervasive in the concept of opportunities. For McAdam 
and Marks (1996), social movement analysis has historically been limited to the national arena 
because traditionally power was centralised by the state. Developments such as European 
integration have reduced the state’s monopoly of formal political power, resulting in   changes 
                                                             
3 For criticisms of movement-centric bias in the field see also, McAdam et al. (2001) and 
McAdam and Tarrow(2010).  
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in the structure and locus of interest articulation by various challengers such as social 
movements and interest groups (Marks and McAdam, 1996).  
Given that nations, individuals and flows are interconnected and interdependent in several 
ways, opportunities should not be solely restricted to the domestic sphere. Unlike studies of 
transnational social movements, the empirical literature on domestic social movements does 
not emphasise the potential influence of international factors on domestic-level processes. 4  As 
McAdam points out, this term has come to be ‘almost universally’ associated with the rules, 
structures and dynamics of national political systems since Eisinger first used it in 1973 (2004, 
p. 209). As a corrective, I incorporate in my analysis if and how international elite actors 
perform allyship and their perceived consequences on the activists they seek to support.  
The empirical case selected for this study is the mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence 
against women in Morocco in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.5 I am looking at this case study 
because it is puzzling that the post-Arab Spring period brought to power Islamists in Morocco, 
in the form of the Justice and Development Party (PJD), that introduced a draft bill and a bill 
– albeit unsatisfactory to activists - on violence against women in 2013 and 2016 respectively. 
After slow and stalled progress by the government on this issue between 2012 and 2013 and 
then again between 2013 and 2016, the draft law was subsequently stalled in Parliament in 
2017. This was still the case as of September 2017, at the submission of this thesis, though a 
law was finally passed under a new government in early 2018. We can thus see that different 
elite actors proposed, suspended and ultimately passed the law. It is therefore interesting to 
examine the role of elite actors on this issue and the extent to which they performed allyship to 
                                                             
4 While theoretical works recognise the significance of international factors for domestic social 
movements, empirical studies do not incorporate these insights into their analyses.  
5 Though Morocco did not experience the unrest and far-reaching changes that occurred in 
neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt in late 2010 and 2011, King Mohammed VI introduced some 
political reforms such as a new Constitution and early parliamentary elections in November 
2011.  
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different segments of the Moroccan women’s rights movement. How have different types of 
political elites engaged with domestic activists on this issue? Did the position of political elites 
converge with those of domestic activists? What elite actors did activists benefit from? To what 
extent have these elite actors contributed to supporting and constraining their efforts? How do 
social movement actors view their participation?  Finally, what model of elite allyship do they 
believe amplify their efforts?  
A non-Western case study extends the geographical scope of the field of social movements, a 
field which has based its findings predominantly on Western societies (Poulson, Caswell and 
Gray, 2014). Extending the field of enquiry in this way allows us to better understand the 
relationship between different types of political elites and domestic activists. Moreover, 
political elites at the international level, in the form of inter-governmental organisations such 
as the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and Western governments play an active 
role in the domestic politics of Morocco. This allows me to compare their participation in the 
mobilisation with those of domestic political elites. I focus on the mobilisation for the 
criminalisation of violence against women to extend our understanding of the Moroccan 
women’s movement, as the literature focuses too much on its relationship with the reform of 
the Family Code in the 1990s and 2000s. We thus need to analyse this movement in relation to 
other campaigns it has been involved in, to better understand its relationship with political 
elites. Above all, this campaign contains the elements necessary to explore the relationship 
between social movements, elite actors and policy change: it involves a dynamic social 
movement with a long history, international and domestic political elites, and the introduction 
of a draft bill and for the first time in Morocco, a bill on combating violence against women. 
In the remainder of this chapter I discuss some of these themes to provide an overview of my 
research project. 
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First, I state my research questions. Second, I explain the concept of elite allies, summarise the 
limitations of the literature on the relationship between domestic social movements and elite 
allies, and state how I intent to address them. Third, I define the other concepts central to my 
thesis, notably that of opportunity, social movements and policy change. Fourth, I discuss the 
research design I employ, and provide some information on the data I draw on and how I 
analyse it. Fifth, I describe the case study I draw on to examine my research questions, and 
justify its use. Sixth, I provide an outline of the subsequent chapters in this thesis and the main 
arguments that I developed within each one.  
1.2. Research Questions  
In this thesis, I challenge the assumption that the mere presence of elite allies is a source of 
opportunity for social movements wishing to influence public policy, and suggest looking 
instead at performances of elite allyship. The four questions I ask are as follows: 
1. To what extent is the presence of elite allies a strong predictor of policy outcomes 
favourable to a social movement, when the latter is mobilising? 
2. To what extent do the claims of various political elites align with those of domestic 
activists in Morocco on the issue of violence against women?  
3. Which strategies do these political elites employ and which resources do they provide 
to activists?  
4. To what extent do domestic activists perceive these actors as being elite allies, and 
which type of elite allyship do they think is most conducive to helping them achieve 
their policy goals?  
I draw on the literatures on social movements, political representation and transnational 
advocacy networks to examine these questions. In answering them, I hope to advance our 
understanding of elite allyship to social movements.  
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1.3. Elite Allies, Social Movements and Policy Change  
In this section, I highlight the lack of theorisation of the relationship between social movements 
and elite allies in the literature and clarify how I intend to develop this by drawing on the 
suggestions provided in various research streams.  
1.3.1. The Significance of Elite Allies for the Policy Outcomes of Social Movements  
Since the late 1990s, several reviews have been written on the political outcomes of social 
movements (Giugni, 1998; Amenta, Halfman and Young, 1999; Amenta and Caren, 2004; 
Andrews and Edwards, 2004; Amenta et al., 2010). Though most empirical research on the 
impact of social movements examines the relationship between social movements and policy 
change, only a handful of scholars have thoroughly reviewed this sub-field. Using works 
published between 1990 and 2000, Burstein and Linton (2002) evaluate the relative importance 
of three types of political engagement – political parties, interest groups and social movement 
organisations – on the policy-making process. Uba (2009) extends this analysis by considering 
a greater number of scholarly studies and using a meta-analysis, though she chiefly 
concentrates on the mediating role played by public opinion and the nature of the political 
system. Thus, there is to date no systematic review of which opportunities matter most for 
social movement policy outcomes when these are mobilising, and what is the relative 
significance of elite allies.  
In fact, a few studies cast doubt on the usefulness of elite allies. These find that they are either 
not useful or downright harmful for the social movements they are expected to support (Olzak 
and Uhrig, 2001; Olzak and Soule, 2004; Uba, 2005). I carry out a meta-analysis in Chapter 3 
to systematically analyse the relationship between policy change favourable to a social 
movement, and aspects of the external environment associated with different models of 
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opportunity, including the presence of elite allies, controlling for social movement 
mobilisation. 
1.3.2. Elite Allyship As Performance: Representation, Resources and Strategies   
The literature on social movements does not offer a clear definition of what constitutes an elite 
ally. However, a small number of scholars have provided brief descriptions. According to 
Giugni (2004, pp. 169, 183) elite allies are political allies within institutional arenas, such as 
political parties. In an ideal scenario, elite allies use their power to produce policy changes that 
meet the movement’s aims and demands (Giugni, 2004, p. 183). This is akin to Tarrow’s 
conceptualisation of influential allies. According to Tarrow, influential allies can ‘act as friends 
in court, as guarantors against repression, or as acceptable negotiators on their behalf (2011, p. 
166). Elite allies therefore perform two functions: they occupy positions that allow them to 
influence policy and they also defend the interests of social movements (Giugni and Passy, 
1998; Uba, 2005). In this thesis, I draw on Giugni’s definition of elite allies of social 
movements, as actors ‘who are responsive and who are in a position to be able to reform 
existing policies’ (Giugni, 2004, p. 170). 
In the literature, elite allies are treated as static variables whose mere presence is assumed to 
be of benefit to social movements. One of the four dimensions of political opportunities is ‘the 
presence or absence of elite allies,’ along with ‘the relative openness or closure of the 
institutionalised political system,’ ‘the stability or instability of that broad set of elite 
alignments that typically undergird a polity,’ and ‘the state’s capacity and propensity for 
repression’(McAdam, 1996, p. 27). To identify elite allies of a social movement, scholars draw 
on the extent to which the political leaning of political elites is in line with the goals of said 
movement. Thus, scholars do not measure who performs elite allyship but rather, who could 
be hypothesised to be an elite ally.  
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Social democratic parties are theorised to be potential elite allies of new social movements, 
such as women’s movements, because they appeal to the same middle class constituency 
(Kriesi et al., 1995). However, hypothetical elite allies do not necessarily practice allyship. As 
Giugni (2004, p. 17) points out, there is no evidence to prove that a political party that is 
ideologically or socially compatible with a social movement will naturally support its claims. 
When a left-leaning party, like a social democratic party, is in power it might be less likely to 
support the mobilisation of similarly left-leaning social movements, as it is limited by existing 
policies and other societal forces (Giugni, 2004). If it is in opposition, it might instead be more 
willing to support them, to broaden its electoral base; though this also means that it is not able 
to make policy concessions to them (Giugni, 2004, p. 171). Thus, there is no such thing as a 
natural ally. I draw on the literatures on domestic social movements, transnational advocacy 
networks and political representation to demonstrate that allyship is performative6 and 
hypothesise different ways in which political elites can perform allyship.  
Since the definition of elite allies involves listening and responding to the needs of those to 
whom one is allied to, we could argue that one way of performing elite allyship is through 
political representation. We should expect elite allies to represent the interests of the social 
movement actors whose interests they are advocating for. One way to grasp this representation 
is by analysing the discursive interactions of such actors. Empirically, this means that we 
should expect elite allies to be aligned with the claims and frames used by social movement 
actors (King, 2004). Though powerful political allies are assumed to take up social movements’ 
claims (Giugni, 2004; Tarrow, 2011), this assumption is not systematically tested. I carry out 
                                                             
6 The notion of performance is linked to the philosopher and gender theorist Judith Butler who, 
in turn, was inspired by the philosopher Nietzsche (Salih, 2002). Butler (1990, p. 25) highlights 
the significance of agency when she argues that gender is not something that we are, but 
something that we do: ‘Gender proves to be performance – that is, constituting the identity it 
is purported to be.’ I apply this same broad logic to my argument: rather than speak of elite 
allies, we should speak of the performance of elite allyship.  
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a representative claims analysis (RCA), based on the concept of the representative claim put 
forward by Saward (2006, 2010) to evaluate the extent to which different types of elite political 
actors represent the interests of Moroccan women’s groups and coalitions on the issue of 
violence against women.   
A second way of performing elite allyship is through the provision of different types of 
resources. Elite allies are assumed to be a source of opportunity because they possess certain 
resources that they could potentially mobilise to support social movements (Silver, 1998). 
However, scholars have not fully explored what these resources are, even though a taxonomy 
of four types of resources has been offered by Cress and Snow (1996). They refer to these 
categories as moral, material, informational and human resources. I draw on this taxonomy to 
determine which types of resources different categories of political elites provide to women’s 
groups and coalitions on the issue of violence against women in Morocco, and how these 
activists perceive them.  
Elite allyship does not simply involve representing the interests of domestic social movements 
or provide resources directly to them. I take inspiration from the dominant theoretical 
framework in the literature on transnational advocacy networks - namely the Boomerang 
Pattern put forward by Keck and Sikkink (Sikkink and Keck, 1998; 1999) - and complement it 
with Wu’s (2005) Double Mobilisation model, to suggest that elite actors use their position to 
exert leverage on other elites and collaborate with them to facilitate policy change.   
Keck and Sikkink (1998) developed a theoretical model which argues that there is a boomerang 
pattern in the way that international agents act as an opportunity for domestic social 
movements. Domestic social movements are severely limited by the fact that their governments 
block political and judicial channels, preventing them from mounting a successful campaign. 
Therefore, they may search for non-domestic allies as a means of placing pressure on their 
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government. These networks or organisations target either the repressive government or a third-
party organisation which, in turn, puts pressure on the target state.  
In this theoretical framework, allies employ five political tactics to influence policy change in 
a target state (Keck and Sikkink, 1999). The first two – symbolic and information politics - are 
concerned with the provision of resources to domestic activists and third parties. Symbolic 
politics involves the exploitation of symbolic events, while information politics is concerned 
with providing an alternative source of information (Keck and Sikkink, 1999). The remaining 
three – material leverage, moral leverage and accountability politics – are concerned with the 
target of social movement mobilisation. Leverage politics involves naming and shaming the 
violator state (Keck and Sikkink, 1999). Material leverage involves the linking of cooperation 
with international norms to money, goods or prestige (Keck and Sikkink, 1999). Once a target 
has publicly endorsed said norms, actors within a transnational advocacy network resort to 
accountability politics to expose the difference between discourse and practice (Keck and 
Sikkink, 1999).  
Seeking to relax the contentious bias in Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) boomerang model of 
advocacy, Wu (2005) argues that elite allies also educate, mobilise and collaborate with both 
the target state and domestic social movements. They thus act as a bridge that reduces the 
antagonistic relationship between these opposing actors, improves communication between 
them, and offers new channels of participation. By engaging with the state in a non-
confrontational way through collaborative projects, partnerships and making policy 
recommendations, these actors help change the state’s attitude towards a certain idea. This 
perspective is based on the Habermasian view of power as the ability to obtain goals through 
consensual communication (Habermas, 2000), and suggests that the soft power exercised by 
elite allies allows social movement actors to win the support of state actors for their policy 
goals. In my thesis, I explore to what extent different political elites engage in leverage politics 
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and collaborate with other elites to influence other elites, and what activists think of these. Do 
they conceptualise effective elite allyship as being one which involves engaging in contentious 
or collaborative towards other political elites? 
Elite allyship does not simply involve working on behalf of social movements, but also with 
them. The literature on domestic and transnational advocacy has defined two types of 
arrangements between social movements and their elite allies: coalitions and networks. Social 
movements and their elite allies can form coalitions to pursue a common goal; alternatively, 
while not part of a coalition with a social movement, elite allies can provide support for social 
movements by being part of the same network.  
The particularity of a coalition is shared beliefs and coordination, though there may be 
heterogeneity in views, interests and types of organisations and networks one is part of (Barnes, 
van Laerhoven and Driessen, 2016). Coordination can be strong and involve establishing a 
common plan, or weak and involve only the sharing of information, the monitoring of action 
and the use of complementary strategies (Barnes, van Laerhoven and Driessen, 2016). This is 
like the advocacy-coalition framework model7 put forth in the literature on policy-making. An 
example of an elite-social movement coalition is Almeida and Stearns’ (2004) State Actor-
Social Movement Coalition model.  
Elite actors do not necessarily form coalitions with social movements. As Keck and Sikkink 
(1998) argue, domestic social movements are enmeshed in transnational advocacy networks 
comprised of both elite and non-elite participants. This includes anything from non-
governmental organisations, research and advocacy groups, social movements, foundations, 
trade unions, consumer organisations, intellectuals, inter-governmental organisations, as well   
                                                             
7 This model has been criticised for being mainly applied to North America and Western 
Europe (Henry et al., 2014). 
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as certain branches of government (Sikkink and Keck, 1998). Participants in these networks 
carry out a variety of activities to influence state and non-state actors, including lobbying, 
exerting moral or material leverage, engaging in accountability politics, and sharing and 
distributing information, all with the view of helping develop policy. Unlike allies-social 
movement coalitions, these do not involve a set of actors coordinating their strategies, but are 
more simply a set of actors that are linked by shared values, common discourses and the 
exchange of information and services. They are thus an informal configuration. In this thesis, 
I examine the extent to which elite political actors engage in these two types of relationship 
with activists mobilising for the criminalisation of violence against women in Morocco. 
Similarly to the literature, I take coalitions are being a more effective arrangement than 
networks.  
In sum, there are four ways in which elite political actors can perform allyship to help domestic 
social movements advance their policy goals. These are political representation, the provision 
of moral, material, informational and human resources, the use of leverage and collaboration 
with other elites; and working with movements through coalitions. I describe in Section 1.5. 
how I explore these performances of elite allyship in my thesis.  
1.3.3. Elite Allyship As Perception: The Significance of Social Movements’ Evaluation 
It is not enough to look at the performances of political elites to determine if they can be 
labelled elite allies. We also must draw on social movements’ assessment of their 
performances. Departing from Koopmans’ (1999, p. 102) argument that opportunities are 
context-dependent, and Gamson and Meyer’s (1996, p. 283) assertion that ‘an opportunity 
unrecognised is no opportunity at all,’ I argue that the identification of elite allies and acts of 
elite allyship requires drawing on social movement actors’ perception.  
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It is increasingly recognised that defining opportunities in terms of objective changes in the 
external environment is problematic (Kurzman, 1996; Klandermans, 1997; Suh, 2001; Opp, 
2009; Giugni, 2011). Nonetheless, perceived opportunities remain a neglected area of research 
because scholars assume that objective measures of opportunities are inevitably perceived and 
seized by social movement actors (Giugni, 2011, p. 277). However, opportunities may be 
overlooked or not perceived as such (Giugni, 2011, p. 277).  
An example of the mismatch between objective and perceived opportunities can be found in 
Kurzman’s (1996) analysis of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Kurzman (1996, p. 164) finds 
that individuals interpreted the strength of opposition to the Shah’s regime as a weakening of 
the state when, objectively speaking, the regime was not particularly vulnerable to challenging 
groups. This interpretation led challengers to create opportunities for themselves by courting 
the military and thereby neutralising it. Since opportunities are based on social construction, 
rather than on material facts, I contrast the objective measures of elite allyship I have described 
above with activists’ assessment of them to determine who is an elite political ally and what 
constitutes elite allyship in the mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence against women 
in Morocco.  
1.4. Opportunities, Social Movements and Policy Change: A Clarification 
In this section, I explain what I mean by opportunities and which out of the numerous 
definitions offered I adopt. I do the same for the concepts of social movement and policy 
change. I have not defined these earlier because they each merit a thorough discussion.   
In this thesis, I employ the term opportunity rather than political opportunity structure, which 
is the original concept that has been established by earlier scholars such as Brockett (1991), 
Kriesi et al. (1992), Rucht (1996), and synthesised into McAdam’s (1996) four-dimensional 
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model, which I described above.8 This is because the scholarship has advanced since this term 
was first coined, and models of opportunity have been developed that remedy the structural 
bias of this concept and stress the significance of non-political variables. These include the 
discursive (Koopmans and Statham, 1999), legal (Hilson, 2002), economic (Wahlstrom and 
Peterson, 2006), and supra-national or multi-level (Marks and McAdam, 1996; Della Porta and 
Tarrow, 2005) models of opportunities.   
                                                             
8 The social movement literature is unclear as to whether the political opportunity perspective 
is a theory, a concept, or a general framework. Eisinger (1973), usually credited with first using 
the term ‘structure of political opportunities’ (Giugni, 2009b), does not explicitly label the 
expression, while two early key theorists Tilly (1978) and McAdam (1982) refer to it 
respectively as a component of a general model of collective action or of the political process. 
Many scholars have followed this direction, and are unequivocal that the term (political) 
opportunities, or (political) opportunity structure is essentially a concept, or basic idea that 
belongs to a broader theory; generally called political process theory (Amenta and Zylan, 1991; 
Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Klandermans, 1996; McAdam, 1996; Rucht, 1996; Suh, 2001). 
Others challenge this reading and instead adopt a more holistic view (Banazsak, 1996, p. 28). 
Meyer and Minkoff (2004, p. 1457) speak of a ‘theory’ of political opportunity structure, 
though they use this interchangeably with the word concept, while Zhan and Tang (2013, p. 
383) prefer a more dynamic approach and shorten it to ‘political opportunity theory.’ Lichbach  
(1998, p. 401) suggests instead that the correct term is ‘synthetic political opportunity theory’ 
- which incorporates in addition to political opportunities, mobilizing structures and cultural 
frames. Still others adopt even more disparate labels. For Almeida and Stearns (1998) and 
Shekha (2011), it is a model, whereas Estelles (2010)describes it as a framework; and Kurzman 
(1996) refuses labelling altogether; thereby completely avoiding the dilemma of what term best 
describes the notion of (political) opportunity (structure). This confusion about how this term 
should be conceived is strengthened by the fact that it is sometimes confounded with political 
process theory (Caren, 2007). In their prominent reviews, Meyer and Minkoff (2004, p. 125) 
and Jasper and Goodwin (1999, p. 28) conflate political opportunity with political process. It 
is important to care about semiotics and be linguistically accurate, for the terminology used 
determines the boundaries that need to be set, and therefore guides how much importance 
should be accorded to an idea. The purpose of theories is to explain how and why certain 
relationships result in certain outcomes (Wacker, 1998). Theories describe and explain 
phenomena and make possible generalisations and predictions. If opportunity approaches are 
theories, then one would expect social movement dynamics to be explained above all in terms 
of changes in the level of opportunities (Koopmans, 1999, p. 97). That is, other factors are 
either unimportant or trivial in the absence of opportunities (Koopmans, 1999, p. 97). The same 
is true if opportunities are a framework; a system of assumptions and expectations about 
specific variables and their relationships that is more tentative than a theory (Maxwell, 2013). 
If, the term concept is used to refer to opportunities, the implication is that this is simply an 
abstract idea, and one has to look beyond opportunities to comprehend social movements. 
Given the lack of clarity surrounding opportunities, I follow most scholars of social movements 
in adopting a more conservative view and referring to opportunities as a concept.  
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The concept of opportunity was introduced by political process scholars to offer a more 
comprehensive overview of the impact of social movements than the dominant theory of 
resource mobilisation, championed by McCarthy and Zald (1977). It advances that political 
challengers such as social movements do not operate in a vacuum, but find their characteristics 
fashioned by the political context (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004). It has become so well 
established in social movement studies that it is now used to shed light on practically any and 
all features of social movements, from their development (Oberschall, 1996) to their tactical 
repertoires (Kitschelt, 1986), attributes (Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005) and consequences 
(Piven and Cloward, 1979). If one wishes to predict a social movement’s prospect for 
mobilisation and its outcomes, understand why it promotes specific claims, establishes 
alliances, and employs certain strategies, one should look at variables external to the social 
movement  (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004). 
Despite the popularity of this concept, uncertainty remains with regards to the meaning and 
definition of opportunities, and some scholars lament that the term has become too inclusive 
and ultimately risks explaining nothing at all (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; McAdam, 1996; 
Rootes, 1999; Jenkins, Jacobs and Agnone, 2003). Many definitions of opportunities exist – 
perhaps even as many as there are scholars of social movements – ranging from broad 
explanations (McAdam, 1982; Koopmans, 1999), to more narrow ones (Kitschelt, 1986; 
Tarrow, 2011). Traditionally, the emphasis was on the structural and political features of 
opportunities. Eisinger (1973, p. 25) conceives of opportunities as ‘the degree to which groups 
are likely to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system.’ For McAdam 
(McAdam, 1982, p. 41), a (political) opportunity is ‘any event or broad social process that 
serves to undermine the calculations on which the political establishment is structured.’ 
Meanwhile, Piven and Cloward (1979) highlight the importance of changes in economic, 
social, and political institutions.  
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While it is evident that any process or event can affect movements' ability to affect change, 
such all-encompassing definitions have been criticised for turning the concept into a catch-all 
concept, ultimately stripping it of its theoretical usefulness (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). 
Highlighting the significance of perception, Klandermans (1988) sees opportunities as ‘the 
external environment within which movement participants evaluate how effectively collective 
action can attain desired goals’ (Suh, 2009, p. 50). In a similar vein, Tarrow (1994, p. 85) views 
them as ‘consistent, but not necessarily formal or permanent - dimensions of the political 
environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their 
expectation of success or failure.’ Centring power relations, Kitschelt (1986, p. 57) sees them 
as ‘configurations of resources, institutional arrangements, and historical precedents.’ Brockett 
(1991, p. 254) emphasises the structure of power in the political system, by defining 
opportunities as ‘the configuration of forces in a (potential or actual) group's political 
environment that influences that group's assertion of its political claims.’ Strangely, Koopmans 
incorporates constraints in his definition of opportunity. For Koopmans (1999, p. 96), an 
opportunity is composed of ‘constraints, possibilities, and threats that originate outside the 
mobilising group, but affects its chances of mobilizing and/or realising its collective interests.’  
I synthesise Klandermans’ and Koopmans’ definitions of opportunities and define them as 
‘possibilities that originate outside the mobilising group, but affects its perceived changes of 
mobilising and/or realising its collective interests.’ I drop the terms constraints and threats 
because I find that they make the definition incoherent. I add the notion of perception because 
an opportunity is only one if it is perceived as such.  
Since I am examining the role of elite allies in the mobilisation for the criminalisation of 
violence against women in Morocco, I also need to consider policy outcomes. Social movement 
scholars speak of policy impact to highlight the link between mobilisation and policy-making. 
There is a lack of consensus regarding how impact should be defined and measured. Earlier 
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studies used various taxonomies of impact, such as Gamson’s (1975) fourfold classification, 
wherein a social movement can achieve a full response through the acquirement of new 
benefits: the gaining of acceptance in public discourse, preemption if only the former goal is 
achieved, co-optation if the latter is attained, or full defeat, if neither goals are accomplished.  
This conceptualisation of success has been criticised on a number of occasions, most notably 
by Amenta et al. (1994, p. 681), for limiting new advantages to political access, and failing to 
include the achievement of collective benefits for beneficiary groups. Schumaker (1975) 
sought to add more substance to Gamson’s (1975) typology by subdividing acceptance into 
two dimensions, namely access responsiveness, the ability of a movement to get admission in 
the political system, and agenda responsiveness, the inclusion of the movement’s concerns onto 
the political agenda. In this model, the gaining of new advantages takes three forms. The first 
one is policy responsiveness, defined as the adoption of new policies in light of the movement’s 
demands. The second one is output responsiveness, defined as the execution of new policies 
following adoption. The third one is impact responsiveness, defined as the extent to which the 
movement’s grievances have been alleviated.  
Other typologies have been offered more recently. Giugni et al. (1999) take an alternative 
approach and focus more on whether the outcome directly follows from mobilization or takes 
on an indirect characteristic. In this thesis, I prefer speaking of policy outcomes or policy 
change, as I am not tracing the direct policy impact of social movements. I am instead looking 
at the role played by political elites in mobilisation for policy change.  
Studies on the policy impact of social movements have increased exponentially in the last few 
decades (Uba, 2010, p. 97). Rather than offer yet another look at this question and testing 
models of impact, I prefer advancing our understanding of the role of elite allyship in this 
relationship, which is under-developed. I understand policy change as a change in the political 
agenda, policy enactment, policy implementation and policy repeal. The political agenda is 
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another term for political attention. It refers to ‘the list of subjects or problems to which 
governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those 
officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time’ (Kingdon, 2003, p. 3). Policy 
enactment refers to the passing or successful formulation of policies, such as major legislations 
(Andrews and Edwards, 2004, p. 493). The third stage refers to the execution or enforcement 
of existing policies (Andrews and Edwards, 2004, p. 498). Finally, policy repeal refers to the 
repeal of an existing policy, though this is a less widely studied change than the previous three. 
In sum, policy change is simple a change in view by policy-makers.  
I now turn to defining what I understand by the term social movement, and justify which 
terminology I use to guide my research. At first, it seems logical to use a social movement 
definition among the many that exist, as they all highlight conflict and interactions, which is 
relevant for my theoretical framework. I initially consulted definitions of social movements, 
and came across Diani’s (1992) comparative assessment of the conceptualisation of social 
movements by the most influential authors at the time, namely McCarthy and Zald (1977), 
Touraine (1981), Turner and Killian (1987) and Melucci (1989). Despite their different 
interpretations, Diani (1992, p. 1) managed to find substantial convergence among them, 
allowing him to come up with a definition of social movements as ’networks of informal 
interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organisations, engaged in 
political or cultural conflicts, on the basis of shared collective identities.’ Although definitions 
of social movements remain quite varied and shift between being restrictive and broad, Diani’s 
generalisation still holds (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998; Giugni, 2009a; Tarrow, 2011).  
It is indeed possible to note that broadly speaking, social movements are collective efforts 
based on a shared identity and challenging or resisting the status quo, tough these efforts are 
no necessarily coherent. I use the social movement campaign as my unit of analysis instead 
because it best matches the phenomenon under study. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, 
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the mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence against women in Morocco brings together 
different types of actors, who organise in parallel with each other, rather than with one another, 
and who have different political leanings. In fact, the one thing that brings them together is the 
desire to improve the legislative framework concerning violence against women. My definition 
of a campaign is ‘a thematically, socially, and temporally interconnected series of interactions 
that, from the viewpoint of the carriers of the campaign, are geared to a specific goal’ (della 
Porta and Rucht, 2002, p. 3). 
1.5. Research Design  
In this study, I employ a mixed methods research design that incorporates quantitative and 
qualitative data collection and analysis. Mixed methods have been used in social research for 
a long time because a single research method is restrictive and therefore significantly affects 
knowledge production (Torrance, 2012). I use a combination of a meta-analysis, representative 
claims analysis, and semi-structured interviews with representatives of social movement 
organisations, coalitions and informal groups. Combining these research strategies offers a 
more thorough exploration of my research questions.  
To investigate the extent to which the presence of elite allies is a strong predictor of policy 
outcomes favourable to social movements, controlling for mobilisation, I use a meta-analysis. 
A meta-analysis can be defined as ‘the statistical analysis of a large collection of analysis 
results from individual studies for the purpose of integrating the findings’ (Haidich, 2010, p. 
29). It is the systematic analysis of a body of literature to draw more reliable conclusions on 
the effect of a variable, or a set of variables on an outcome. In my research, I carry out a meta-
analysis of the literature on the policy impact of domestic social movements, to assess the 
extent to which different types of opportunities are consistently associated with policy change 
favourable to a social movement, when the latter is mobilising.  
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To investigate the extent to which claims formulated by various elite political actors align with 
those of domestic activists on the issue of violence against women, and which resources and 
strategies the former use, I use representative claims analysis. Since my conceptualisation of 
opportunities is interactive and dynamic, and focuses on the relationship between elite allies 
and social movements, I need to use a method of data collection that will provide a means of 
mapping out these interactions. Such a method can be found in the form of representative 
claims analysis. This method is a form of content analysis that has been developed by de Wilde 
(2013) to link Saward’s (2006, 2010) theorisation of the representative claim with Koopmans 
and Statham’s (1999) methodology of political claims analysis. 
To examine who domestic activists consider elite allies and what type of elite allyship they 
believe help them advance their policy goals, I draw on semi-structured interviews with 
representatives from women’s rights organisations, groups and coalitions. Semi-structured 
interviews give ‘rich descriptions of people and interaction as they exist and unfold in their 
native habitats’(Gubrium and Holstein, 1997, p. 6). They are a widely-used tool in social 
movement studies (Della Porta, 2014). In contrast to the rigidity of structured interviewing, it 
allows the researcher to delimit the topic under discussion while giving the interviewee some 
flexibility in the discussion (Blee and Taylor, 2002). Thus, it is more suitable for examining 
the perceptions of domestic activists on violence against women in Morocco, while at the same 
time enabling me to gain further information and clarification not obtained from the claims-
analysis, such as the non-public ways in which elite political actors have engaged with activists. 
The interviews are necessary for understanding which actors are perceived as elite allies by 
domestic activists, and which actions they interpret as being acts of elite allyship. I explain 
each of these research methods in subsequent chapters.  
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1.6. Violence Against Women in Morocco  
To explore three of my research questions, I use a single case study. The decision to focus on 
a single case is due to two methodological challenges which my theoretical framework raises. 
Firstly, I examine strategic interaction between different types of actors in this research. 
Second, my theoretical framework is not based on a specific theory, but on a rough set of 
propositions drawn from different literatures. A single case study provides a method of data 
analysis that can address these two methodological challenges.  
Given that the purpose of my study is to analyse the dynamics between different sets of actors, 
a case study approach that uses thick description to address this causal complexity is highly 
suitable. As Yin (1994) argues, case studies help trace linkages through time and enable a 
contextual investigation of a research phenomenon. This is particularly important for 
phenomena where the development of events and actions plays an important role in forming 
explanations (Pettigrew, 1992). Besides, my research is above all exploratory. Not much 
literature exists that theorises the relationship between elite allies and other elite political 
actors, social movements and policy change. According to Eisenhardt (1989), case studies are 
helpful for theory building where existing knowledge is deficient and the focus of the study is 
unusual. A quantitative study would have required a well-specified theoretical model and 
hypotheses regarding how change in the independent variables affects change in the outcome 
variable (Ragin and Rubinson, 2009). While the use of case studies puts limits on generalisation 
and thus hinders hypothesis testing, it facilitates theory development, which is especially useful 
in under-studied areas such as the present one (Ragin and Rubinson, 2009). 
Investigating my research questions in the context of North Africa provides several benefits. 
First, this is an under-explored area in social movement studies. Though various comparative 
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methodological approaches are now employed,9 the field remains largely Western-centric. A 
few key studies such as Uba (2005), and Almeida and Stearns (1998) concentrate on non-
Western countries, but the fact remains that the studies which have guided our knowledge of 
the impact of social movements are based on the United States and Western Europe. Poulson 
et al. (2014) have demonstrated through a content analysis of two prominent social movement 
journals that the field is dominated by the study of Western movements. Researchers on social 
movements are increasingly recognising this geographical imbalance and advocating ‘a 
conversation about what we are doing, how we are doing it and what it is that we are not seeing’ 
(Hayes, 2014, p. 243). I therefore contribute to broadening the scope of investigation and 
exploring the situation in a non-Western region. 
I have selected Morocco because its characteristics provide a suitable testing ground for 
investigating the relationship between international and domestic political elites, social 
movements and policy change. Works on gender and women’s rights activism in Morocco 
agree that reform on women’s rights is the outcome of a combination of domestic and 
international opportunities, combined with advocacy, though with different degrees of 
emphasis placed on each of these factors (Wuerth, 2005; Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2006; Clark and 
Young, 2008; Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009; Bordat, Davis and Kouzzi, 2011). Morocco is a 
semi-closed political system that has long been regarded as ‘an authoritarian state that kept 
people in line by intimidation and abuse’ (Howe, 2001, p. 59). It is also a country whose 
political and economic development has involved international actors and institutions. In the 
1980s, amid an economic crisis, Morocco became the first country in North Africa to be 
                                                             
9 This includes the following: time-series analysis (Agnone, 2007; Giugni, 2007), comparative 
historical analysis (Cornwall, et al., 2007), qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) (Cornwall 
et al., 2007), paired comparison (Stearns and Almeida, 2004), event history analysis (Kane, 
2003), regression analysis (McCammon et al., 2007). Some have even tried to triangulate 
between empirical methods, to test the strength of their hypotheses. Giugni and Yamasaki 
(2009) use QCA to revisit a question answered using time series. 
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embarking on the structural adjustment programmes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank (Layachi, 2000). Furthermore, the EU has long been involved in 
democracy promotion measures in the Mediterranean through schemes like the European 
Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP) Instrument and Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements, and has been using positive conditionality to reward progress (Kausch, 2009; Van 
Hüllen, 2012). 
For instance, to reward Morocco for implementing the ENP Action Plan, the EU offered it an 
additional 75 million euros to carry out further projects under the Democracy and Governance 
Facilities scheme between 2006 and 2010 (Van Hüllen, 2012). Given Morocco’s continued 
collaboration with its EU partners on a range of political, security, and economic issues, and 
its active engagement in the EU’s democracy promotion efforts, it was upgraded to an 
Advanced Status in 2008, to further intensify bilateral and trade relations (Van Hüllen, 2012). 
However, scholars note that the EU has not been actively pushing for reforms, but has been far 
more concerned about meeting its security and economic interests such as controlling migration 
and securing energy supplies (Kausch, 2009; Van Hüllen, 2012). Morocco has been a key ally 
for the West, first as a bulwark against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and more 
recently, as a stable ally in a volatile region (Cavatorta, 2005). 
Besides other states and inter-governmental institutions, civil society groups – especially non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) - have been pushing for more liberalisation. Since the 
political liberalisation of the late 1980s, NGOs have been proliferating in Morocco, though 
they do not all enjoy autonomy vis-à-vis the monarchy or other political parties (Sater, 2002). 
Specific strategies such as the cumulative production of reports, conferences and other 
resources, as well as an effective media offensive, over several years allegedly allowed 
women’s rights activists in Morocco to exert increasing influence (Labidi, 2007). Catalano 
(2010) argues that the contribution of more conventional protest tactics such as marches and 
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petitions that gathered large numbers of people cannot be overlooked. Moreover, whilst the 
monarchy tries to influence human rights discourse, political parties have begun competing 
with associations,10 following the opening of political power to broader segments of society 
(Catalano, 2010). Nonetheless, as political parties are weak and discredited by the population, 
civil society groups have taken on the role of the opposition, and act as the primary instigators 
of change (Cavatorta, 2009).  
Besides advocacy, the changing fortunes of the Islamists – a key domestic opponent of reform 
on women’s rights in Muslim-majority countries - explain why women’s movements in North 
Africa have succeeded in achieving reforms. The weakening of political Islam as a key 
oppositional ideology has traditionally influenced how the political establishment has reacted 
to feminist advocacy, particularly in the early 2000s (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2006; Labidi, 2007). 
For instance, the terrorist bombings in Casablanca in 2003 created an atmosphere of 
apprehension towards Islamism, which has contributed to making politicians and the monarchy 
more receptive to the secular legal reforms proposed by civil society actors (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 
2006). I develop on the relationship between Islamists and the Moroccan women’s rights 
movement in chapter 4.  
Nonetheless, the first bill on violence against women in Morocco was passed after the Arab 
Spring, when the Parti de la Justice et du Développement (Justice and Development Party, PJD)  
came to power. Following uprisings in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt, nationwide protests 
erupted in Morocco on 20th February 2011, calling for an end to corruption, the establishment 
of an independent judiciary, constitutional reforms, and the weakening of monarchical power 
(Maghraoui, 2011, p. 680). King Mohamed VI quickly moved to quell dissent by calling for a 
revision of the Constitution in March 2011 and moving legislative elections forward to 
November 2011. After the elections, the King appointed Abdelilah Benkirane, leader of the 
                                                             
10 In Morocco, civil rights organisations are referred to as associations. 
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PJD as the Chief of Government. Subsequently, the PJD formed a first coalition government 
that lasted until July 2013, and then a second one that lasted until the parliamentary elections 
in 2016.  
During the Prime Ministership of Benkirane, policies on violence against women have been 
introduced. The two most notable measures are the presentation of draft bill 103-3 on violence 
against women in November 2013 by Bassima Hakkaoui, Minister for Development, Women, 
and the Family, and Mustapha Ramid, Minister of Justice, as well as the adoption of a similar 
bill in March 2016 by the Council of Government, the first of its kind in Morocco. 
Subsequently, progress on this issue stalled in Parliament.11 I thus examine the period between 
the legislative elections of 2011 and July 2016, when the bill passed the lower chamber of 
Parliament, to understand the interactions between the political elite in Morocco, domestic 
activists, intergovernmental organisations and other states in the development of this bill.  
1.7. Chapter Outline  
I have introduced the research questions under investigation in this thesis, and the broader 
theoretical and empirical issues at stake with regards to the relationship between opportunities, 
in the form of elite allyship, social movements and policy outcomes. I have spelt out that the 
scholarship on the concept of opportunity suffers from several deficiencies that need to be 
addressed. I thus suggested incorporating perspectives from related literatures to improve our 
understanding of the ways in which a form of opportunity – elite allies – mediates the 
relationship between social movements and policy outcomes. I have also explained the 
rationale for a case study approach, and justified the use of the mobilisation for the 
criminalisation of violence against women in Morocco to explore my research questions.  
                                                             
11 At the writing of this thesis, the bill was still stalled in Parliament, but was passed in February 
2018 under the Prime Ministership of Saadedine Othmani.  
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The concept of elite allyship and its relevance to social movements is explored through the 
remaining four chapters of this thesis, three of which are empirical. Chapter 2 lays out the 
theoretical assumptions that guide this thesis, and which are examined in the subsequent 
chapters. Taken together, these chapters advance our understanding of the interactions between 
elite political actors and social movements, and specifically contribute to our knowledge of 
what it means to perform elite allyship for a social movement.  
In Chapter 2, I draw on the literatures on social movements, TANs and political representation 
to advance some theoretical arguments concerning how elite allies interact with social 
movements to affect their policy advocacy. I argue that there are various ways in which elite 
actors can perform allyship. These include the political representation of social movements’ 
interests through claims-making, the provision of moral, material, informational and human 
resources, collaboration with social movement actors through coalitions, and the use of double 
mobilisation towards other political elites, in the form of leverage and collaboration.  
In Chapter 3, I examine the concept of opportunity through a meta-analysis of 1384 
independent tests from 47 selected articles to test the extent to which dimensions associated 
with different models of opportunity are consistently associated with policy change favourable 
to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. I specifically test the political, discursive, 
legal, socio-economic and supranational models of opportunity. I also assess the relative 
significance of one specific dimension of opportunity – elite allies. I find that most opportunity 
variables, and particularly those measuring hypothetical and actual elite allies, are not 
associated with favourable policy outcomes. I draw on these findings to argue the case for 
looking at the interactions of elite actors with social movements to determine who performs 
allyship and can therefore be a potential source of opportunity. In sum, this chapter examines 
the first research question.  
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Chapter 4 provides an overview of the development of the contemporary Moroccan women’s 
rights movement, to provide some context to the case I analyse in chapters 5 and 6. I describe 
the three waves of the movement and discuss how the rise of Islamism has affected it. I also 
show that important sources of elite allyship came from the King, intergovernmental 
organisations and political parties. These actors performed allyship in different ways. 
Intergovernmental organisations provided moral resources to activists and exerted leverage on 
the Moroccan government. Kings Hassan II and Mohamed VI initiated reforms to the 
Moudawana (Family Code), with Mohamed VI going as far as publicly championing women’s 
rights. Politicians provided moral and material resources. However, the case of the Moudawana 
shows the double-edged nature of elite allyship. Since the King is the highest authority and 
above all other institutions, his support means that reforms on women’s rights can pass with 
little obstruction from other political actors. At the same time, since political parties do not 
have much political power, their support does not result in tangible results for activists. 
However, the involvement of an unelected and unaccountable actor and the bypassing of 
representative institutions reinforce authoritarianism and limit the implementation of new 
policies.  In discussing the mobilisation for the reforms of the Moudawana, I show that activists 
were aware of these difficulties and ultimately switched from appealing to traditional 
representatives to the King, in the face of the rise of Islamism.  
In chapter 5, I draw on representative claims analysis to address my second and third research 
questions. First, I provide an overview of the major groups of actors involved in the debate on 
violence against women in Morocco. This allows me to identify potential sources of elite 
allyship, and to compare these with those identified in my theoretical chapter. I also explore 
the issue of political representation by comparing the extent to which the claims made by 
various political actors align with those of domestic activists. The dimensions I use as the basis 
for comparison are the represented constituencies, the addressee of claims, the policy change 
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advocated, and the justification provided for the claims. I find that there is not much variation 
between the claims articulated by various types of elite actors and women’s rights groups and 
coalitions. I thus find that the following actors perform allyship through representation: the 
Moroccan government, opposition political parties, the Moroccan Parliament, other types of 
politicians, bureaucrats, the judiciary, intergovernmental organisations and foreign 
governments. These categories are broadly in line with those identified in the theoretical 
framework.  
In this chapter, I also examine how elite actors engage with social movements, by analysing 
the resources they provide to them and the strategies they employ towards other political elites.  
I examine who elite allies collaborated with on this issue and what activities they carried out 
between late 2011 and 2016. In terms of arrangement, I find that there is very little contact 
between elite actors and Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions, suggesting that these 
two types of actors engaged on this issue as part of the same network, than as part of a coalition. 
The judiciary, intergovernmental organisations and foreign governments made joint claims 
with women’s groups and coalitions. Support from these actors took the form of co-organising 
campaigns and meetings, and providing funding. With regards to resources, the most frequent 
type was moral, though elite actors also provided some material, human and informational 
support. With regards to strategies, elite actors engaged in both leverage politics and 
collaboration. They thus engaged in double mobilisation, as hypothesised by Wu (2005). 
In chapter 6, I turn to the perceptions of the aforementioned performances of allyship by 
Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions, to determine to what extent they can be 
perceived as such. Based on semi-structured interviews with representatives of Moroccan 
women’s rights groups and coalitions, I find that few of the elite actors discussed above were 
perceived as facilitating mobilisation, and that there was a gulf between the actions of those 
they considered to be their elite allies and what they considered to be effective elite allyship. I 
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also find that activists preferred a model of elite allyship that involves leverage over other 
political elites, collaboration with activists, and the provision of a wider range of resources.  
Finally, I summarise the main findings of my empirical research in Chapter 7, and juxtapose 
them against my expectations, to determine the extent to which they are in agreement. I also 
discuss potential implications for future research, based on the strengths and weaknesses of the 
theoretical framework and research design; and suggest follow up research, such as looking at 
the factors affecting the behaviour of hypothetical and perceived elite allies, and investigating 
why some actors can be perceived as elite allies despite not engaging in effective allyship.  
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2. Elite Allyship and Social Movements: A 
Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I have introduced the concept of opportunity, and explained that 
whilst elite allies form a key dimension of this concept, they have not been thoroughly 
theorised. More generally, I have criticised the tendency of social movements scholars to fail 
to clarify how opportunities, in the shape of elite allies, support social movements and amplify 
their policy advocacy. In this chapter, I offer a remedy to these limitations by integrating 
insights from the literatures on domestic social movements, political representation and 
transnational advocacy networks to clarify the concept of elite allies and the ways in which 
they can act as a source of opportunity. I start by situating the concept of elite allies in the 
literature on social movements and defining it. I then clarify to what extent elite allies have 
been hypothesised to be important, before discussing which kinds of actors could be potential 
sources of elite allyship. I then turn to the ways in which elite allies can amplify the efforts of 
social movements. I end by highlighting the significance of social movements’ perceptions in 
determining who can be called an elite ally and what elite allyship means. Based on the insights 
of various bodies of literature, I argue that performances of elite allyship involve working with 
social movement actors, preferably as part of a formal arrangement such as a coalition, 
providing various kinds of resources, and engaging other political elites in specific ways. These 
expectations guide my empirical analysis. 
2.2. Defining Elite Allies  
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The participation of ‘rational’ individuals, well integrated in society, and active in formal 
politics, in the historic social movements of the 1960s in the West, led to a major re-orientation 
in the study of collective action, and dislocated traditional perspectives that viewed social 
movement participants as irrational, emotional and socially dislocated actors (Canel, 1992). It 
is in this juncture that the the theory of resource mobilisation, which highlights the significance 
of the allocation of goods in the political sphere, emerged as a corrective paradigm (Canel, 
1992). In essence, this perspective shifts the attention away from why individual actors choose 
to join movements, to how movements form and become capable of organising, obtaining 
strategic resources, and using them effectively (Pichardo, 1988, p. 98). It centres the practical 
aspects of social movements, by exploring which resources must be mobilised, what kinds of 
associations must be formed with other groups, and what types of external backing are 
important (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p. 1213). Although there is no agreement on the types of 
resources that are necessary, this perspective introduced a crucial element in social movement 
research: the significance of outside support (Jenkins, 1983, p. 533). 
Not content with the narrow focus of resource mobilisation theory, some scholars developed a 
model that would more powerfully highlight the extent to which the external environment 
conditions the success of social movements. This has resulted in the establishment of the 
concept of political opportunity structure. While this concept has been popularised by McAdam 
(1982) in his examination of the emergence of the civil rights movement in the United States, 
it was first systematically conceptualised by Tilly (1978). Previous scholars had already laid 
the basis for this concept. Lipsky (1970) and Eisinger (1973) stressed the significance of 
institutional features for protest activity. 
Today, this idea has become so well established that it is used to explain everything about social 
movements. Put simply, this concept puts less emphasis on the agency of social movements 
than resource mobilisation theory and advances that political challengers do not operate in a 
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vacuum, but find their characteristics fashioned by the political context (Meyer, 2004, pp. 127, 
128). If one wishes to predict a social movement’s prospect for mobilisation and its outcomes, 
understand why it promotes specific claims, establishes certain alliances, and employs certain 
strategies, one has to look at exogenous variables and step outside of the realm of the social 
movement (Meyer, 2004, pp. 126, 127). These variables are commonly referred to as political 
opportunities. Initially, the term political opportunity structure was widely used, but its 
structural bias has encouraged a turn towards the use of the more flexible terminology of 
political opportunities. Several models emphasising the relevance of discursive, legal, socio-
economic and supra-national opportunities have subsequently appeared, which suggest that 
opportunities need not be political.  
To take into account these developments – which I describe in the next chapter - I simply use 
the term opportunity. Central to the concept of opportunity is the idea that elite allies matter.  
In Chapter 1, I stated that I define elite allies as actors ‘who are responsive and who are in a 
position to be able to reform existing policies’ (Giugni, 2004, p. 170). The concept of elite 
allies overlaps with that of institutional activists.12 Starting from the premise that members of 
the political establishment and social movements are not necessarily distinct entities, Santoro 
and McGuire (1997, pp. 504–5) argue that those actors, such as civil servants and elected and 
appointed state officials, ‘who occupy formal statuses within the government and who pursue 
movement goals through conventional bureaucratic channels’ are institutional activists. In 
other words, they are social movement actors who have access to power and resources and take 
                                                             
12The term ‘tempered radicals’ has also been employed to refer more generally to actors whose 
membership cuts across social movements and other organisations (Meyerson and Scully, 
1995).  
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advantage of their position by pressing for policies that advance the goals of a movement (Wald 
and Corey, 2002, p. 102). 
Santoro and McGuire argue that the two criteria that differentiate between institutional activists 
and other institutional actors are ideology and mobilisation  (1997, p. 505). If a state official 
also belongs to a social movement organisation and is involved in social movement activities, 
we can ascertain that this actor is an institutional activist for a particular social movement 
(Santoro and McGuire, 1997, p. 505). Pettinicchio (2012, p. 502) clarifies that to be considered 
an institutional activist, an actor needs to have some influence over the policy-making and 
implementation process, as well as believe in the cause promoted by a social movement and 
actively work on it, even after the decline of the movement, and without any push from the 
movement. However, institutional activists are constrained by their institutional environment 
and their relationship with social movement actors that mobilise outside the polity is not an 
easy one. Suh (2011, p. 444) illustrates this dilemma by drawing on the case of femocrats. 
Since femocrats simultaneously represent the interests of a women’s movement and those of 
the state, they occupy contradictory identities (Suh, 2011, p. 444). This can result in their 
marginalisation from both institutional actors and a given women’s movement, with the 
potential to stimulate conflict and competition (Chappell, 2003; Suh, 2011). 
What differentiates an institutional activist from an elite ally is the existence of an overlapping 
membership. Thus, in this thesis, elite actors that perform allyship are those actors that occupy 
a position which allows them to directly influence policy-making and implementation and 
represent the interests of social movement actors, but who are not themselves part of a social 
movement organisation. They are alos perceived as representing the interests of social 
movement actors. I go into detail about the significance of perception in the last section of this 
chapter. I now move on to discussing the significance of elite allies for policy outcomes 
favourable to social movement actors.  
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2.3. Elite allies, social movements and favourable policy outcomes 
My research was initially motivated by a desire to understand the link between social 
movement mobilisation and policy change.  Interest in the policy influence of protest activities 
and, more generally, of social movements, began to arouse interest in the 1970s, waned, and 
then picked up again in the 2000s.13 It is perhaps due to this sporadic interest that there is to 
date no comprehensive theory or set of theories connecting social movements and policy 
change (Kolb, 2007).  
The modest evidence that exists is rather mixed. Several empirical works suggest that social 
movements either have little or no direct influence on policy. McAdam and Su (2002) find that 
while the anti-Vietnam war movement had a strong agenda-setting effect, it paradoxically had 
a negligible influence on policy-making. Another study argues that the framing of the Indiana 
Ku Klux Klan allowed it to achieve popularity but simultaneously prevented it from making 
more substantial political gains (McVeigh, Myers and Sikkink, 2004). An analysis of peace, 
anti-nuclear and environmental movements in the United States between 1975 and 1995 
demonstrates that these movements have little or no weight on political decision-making 
(Giugni, 2007). A study of the women’s suffrage movement reveals that legislators are rather 
conservative in their political responsiveness and only react favourably to the demands of 
challengers - such as social movements - that appear powerful (Cornwall et al., 2007). Another 
assessment of a selection of policy-oriented social movements leads its authors to the 
conclusion that such movements are ineffective because their activities are too few and too 
infrequent (Burstein and Sausner, 2005).  
On the other hand, there is a considerable body of literature that shows a strong connection 
between social movement activity and policy outcomes. Yet, there is little if any agreement 
                                                             
13 Many scholars explain that this lack of focus as due mainly to methodological difficulties 
(Kriesi et al., 1995; Giugni, 1998; Amenta et al., 2010). 
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about what factors facilitate this, and how and to what extent. The impact is seen as either 
considerable (Andrews, 2001) or small (Bush, 1992), long-term (Santoro, 2002, 2008; 
McCammon et al., 2007), or short-term (Dixon, 2008), or both (Amenta and Young, 1999b), 
direct and facilitated by the strategies and framing processes of the movement (Bush, 1992), 
or indirect and helped by opportunities (Amenta, 2006), or a combination of all these three 
factors (Burstein and Freudenburg, 1978; Cress and Snow, 2000; Pedriana, 2004). For the 
purposes of my research, I limit my discussion to the relationship between social movements, 
opportunities and policy change. 
Opportunities act as mediating factors between social movement mobilisation and policy 
change (Amenta, Carruthers and Zylan, 1992; Amenta, Dunleavy and Bernstein, 1994; Giugni 
and Passy, 1998; Amenta and Young, 1999a; Cress and Snow, 2000; Kane, 2003).  Burstein 
(1985) shows that legislation on equal employment opportunity was adopted in the United 
States thanks to a combination of changes in public opinion and local mobilisation. Costain 
and Majstorovic (1994) further add that Congressional behaviour on women’s issues is jointly 
influenced by women’ movements, public opinion and media coverage of the issue at hand. 
More generally, opportunity scholars all share as a core assumption that there may not be a 
linear relationship between political mobilisation and policy change. Soule and Olzak (2004) 
find that the impact of social movements on the Equal Rights Amendment was amplified by 
the presence of certain facilitating factors such as sympathetic political and legislative elites. 
As they conclude, ‘policy outcomes are likely to be the result of a number of contingent and 
interactive forces over and above the main effects of movements’ (2004, p. 479).  
Synthesising this growing literature, several reviews have been written to trace the political 
and policy outcomes of social movements. Giugni (1998, 2008) traces long-standing debates 
and developments about the relative significance of internal and external variables, and 
discerns that whereas earlier studies concentrated on movement-controlled variables, the more 
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recent wave of research demonstrates that the political outcomes of social movements are 
conditional and contingent on the presence of facilitating factors in their social and political 
environments (Giugni, 2008, p. 1588). Amenta and Caren (2004) more narrowly focus on the 
conceptual, theoretical and methodological issues of what they consider to be the four major 
pathways through which social movement mobilisation is said to influence state outcomes.  
Amenta et al. (2010) develop this, and through an assessment of 45 relevant journal articles, 
link the degree (strong, modest, weak, none), direction (positive or negative), and path 
(mediated or unmediated) of influence, of different kinds of movements by outcome type 
(structural, multiple policies, single policy, election/inclusion of movement). This systematic 
approach was preceded by Burstein and Linton (2002) who reviewed 53 articles in top 
sociology and political science journals to compare the relative impact of political parties, 
social movement organisations, and interest groups on policy, and determine whether this 
depended on public opinion. Uba (2009) extends this analysis by considering a greater number 
of scholarly studies, using a meta-analysis, and considering the mediating role of the nature of 
the political system alongside the role played by public opinion. While these scholars 
acknowledge the significance of external variables, there is to date no systematic review of 
which types of opportunities matter most for the policy outcomes of social movements. I 
address this lacuna by carrying out a meta-analysis in the next chapter to examine what specific 
types of opportunities are systematically associated with policy change favourable to a 
domestic social movement, when the latter is mobilising.  
An important component of the external context is the presence of elite/ influential allies, 
understood as actors who are part of the polity (Tarrow, 2011). These are particularly important 
as they can use their position to act as brokers between protesting groups and those who hold 
power (Tarrow, 2011). This point is more aptly elaborated in Edwin Amenta’s Political 
Mediation model, which argues that sympathetic elites and state bureaucrats are medium-term 
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sources of opportunities that can facilitate the policy goals of social movement organisations 
(Amenta, Carruthers and Zylan, 1992; Amenta, Dunleavy and Bernstein, 1994; Amenta, Caren 
and Olasky, 2005). Domestic bureaucrats whose mission is consistent with that of social 
movement organisations can be supportive in various ways, from proposing new legislation to 
enforcing laws that would benefit the constituency of a social movement organisation, though 
they should be in a position to implement these (Amenta, Caren and Olasky, 2005, p. 520). 
More generally, social movements benefit from the presence of a regime whose established 
policy orientation and plans are in line with their goals (Amenta, Carruthers and Zylan, 1992, 
p. 314). For scholars studying social movement organisations with left-leaning goals, elite 
allies come in the form of left-leaning figures in government or the overall strength of left-
wing parties (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Kriesi et al., 1995).  
For studies on American social movement organisations, the strength of the Left refers to the 
strength of the Democratic Party. Elite allies can also refer to figures in government that share 
the same characteristics as the mobilising group: when analysing the mobilisation of women, 
elite allies can come in the form of women in the legislature (Htun and Weldon, 2012). 
However, Giugni (2004, p. 171) argues that while the assumption that parties that are 
ideologically or socially closer to a social movement will naturally support their claims has 
good foundation, nothing proves that this happens. Social movements need allies who are 
responsive to their claims and willing to support them in institutional arenas to bring about 
policy change (Giugni, 2004, p. 170). In his comparative study of the structure of political 
alliances of the anti-nuclear, peace and ecology movements in the United States, Switzerland 
and Italy, he does this by looking at the number of public statements by elite figures on issues 
relevant to these movements (Giugni, 2004, p. 172).  
Kriesi et al. (1995) add that elite allies can support social movement organisations (SMOs) in 
two additional ways: by participating in protest events and by providing material resources. 
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However, for left-leaning movements, the extent to which the Left facilitates protests by left-
leaning SMOs depends on whether or not it is inside or outside of government.14 When a left-
leaning party like a Social Democratic Party is in power, it is less likely to support the 
mobilization of similarly left-leaning SMOs, as it is limited by existing policies and other 
societal forces, leading it to make concessions on their electoral pledges (Kriesi et al., 1995, p. 
59). Yet, if it is in opposition, it is more willing to support them to broaden its electoral base, 
though this also means that it is not in a position to make policy concessions to them (Kriesi et 
al., 1995). I discuss these constraints in the following section.  
Amidst the plethora of works that emphasise the significance of elite allies, are studies that cast 
doubt on their perceived usefulness, and find that they are either not useful or downright 
harmful for the social movements they are supposed to support. Soule and Olzak (2004, pp. 
488–9) find that controlling for mobilisation in support of ratification of the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA) in the United States, the percentage of Democrats in the state legislature 
and the percentage of female legislators are both negatively associated with the rate of 
ratification of the ERA between 1972 and 1982. However, there is an interaction effect between 
the percentage of Democrats in state legislature and the presence of the pro-ERA SMO, the 
American Association of University Women (AAUW) in a state (Olzak and Soule, 2004). This 
demonstrates that in each year, the rate of ratification of ERA increases fourfold when both the 
percentage of Democrats in the state legislature and the number of AAUW chapters are high 
compared to when they are at average levels (Olzak and Soule, 2004, p. 490).  
A more recent study by Olzak et al. (2016) finds that pro-environmental legislators were less 
successful at passing environmental legislation favourable to the environmental movement 
                                                             
14 As the literature on far-right movements demonstrates, social movements are not 
necessarily progressive or left-leaning. However, because my thesis focuses on a progressive 
movement, I draw on the literature on similar movements.  
Page 47 of 395 
 
between 1973 and 1996 in the United States Congress than those with a more moderate stance. 
They explain this with reference to the concept of the ‘median voter’ (Olzak et al., 2016), which 
argues that if the supporter of a legislation differs considerably from the median position of 
Members of Congress, they will face more resistance and therefore were less success in getting 
their legislation approved. Thus, the relationship between domestic elite allies, social 
movements mobilisation and policy outcomes is more complex. I untangle this complexity in 
the next chapter, wherein I aggregate findings from quantitative works on the relationship 
between social movements and policy change, to systematically analyse the association 
between several dimensions of opportunity linked to different models of opportunity, and 
policy change, controlling for social movement mobilisation. I now turn my attention to 
identifying potential sources of elite allyship, and expand on the ways in which elite actors can 
support social movements in section 2.6.  
2.4. Identifying sources of elite allyship  
In this section, I describe the different types of domestic and international elite actors that have 
been identified in the literatures on social movements and transnational advocacy as being 
allies. I draw on these bodies of research to develop some expectations on the specific political 
actors that may perform allyship for domestic social movements wishing to bring about policy 
reforms. I also discuss what affects these actors’ performance of allyship. I show that ideology, 
the institutional environment and strategic motivations influence the performance of elite 
allyship. In the next section, I draw on the case of Morocco to further highlight the constraints 
of the institutional environment on elite actors.   
Different potential sources of elite allyship can be found in the literature on domestic social 
movements. On the one hand, we find scholars like Amenta who place a lot of emphasis on 
state agencies and bureaucrats. Drawing on theories of institutional politics, Amenta and Caren 
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(2007) argue that bureaucracies whose mission is aligned with that of a social movement, will 
promote legislation in favour of this group’s constituency. Since these agencies are usually 
under-funded and politically weak (Stearns and Almeida, 2004, p. 480), they have an interest 
in supporting the expansion of state institutions and in meeting the goals of their own bureaus. 
They therefore exploit the mobilisation of like-minded groups to push for greater resources and 
status for themselves (Amenta and Zylan, 1991, p. 252). However, such actors face institutional 
constraints. Quoting Meyer and Rowan (1977), as well as Scott (2014), Harrison (2016, p. 2) 
argues that bureaucrats’ institutional environments not only shape their practices and ideas, but 
also place material constraints on them. Moreover, organisations are not ‘unitary actors 
developing strategic responses to outside pressures,’ but ‘pluralistic entities’ in which 
conflicting institutional demands may be internally represented among staff and thus shape 
organisation practices’ (Pache and Santos, 2010, pp. 456, 459; Harrison, 2016, p. 4). Thus, it 
is not enough to consider if bureaucrats are willing to support social movements, but also if 
they are capable of doing so.  
Besides bureaucrats and state institutions, political parties are also assumed to be a source of 
opportunity. Parties and social movements are closely intertwined and relate to one another in 
many ways. In the words of Zald and Garner (1987, p. 312), ‘movements compete with parties. 
Movements infiltrate parties. Parties spin off movements, either deliberately, or in the process 
of factionalising. Movements appear within parties. Movements become parties.’ Goldstone 
(2003, p. 4) goes as far as saying that parties and social movements are mutually dependent on 
one another: on the one hand, parties rely on social movements to win elections, while on the 
other, social movements cannot succeed and even exist without the sponsorship of political 
parties. The form of support varies from public statements to the provision of material 
resources, and even participation in protest (Giugni, 2004). 
Page 49 of 395 
 
Like bureaucrats, the motivations for political parties to support social movements are both 
ideological and strategic. Firstly, there needs to be some coherence or overlap in the identity 
of a given social movement and political parties. Given that organisations strive to maintain 
internal coherence with respect to their identity, political parties are more likely to support 
those social movements that do not contradict with and in fact, align with their ideological and 
cultural identity (Piccio, 2015). For instance, because there is a close affinity between the 
constituencies of left-wing social movements and left-wing political parties, a political party 
on the left would see a leftist social movement’s mobilisation as supportive of its policy agenda 
(Kriesi, 2014). Furthermore, party members also participate in social movement activities, 
leading to changing attitudes towards the aims of a social movement (Piccio, 2015). However, 
Giugni (2004, p. 171) reminds us that while the claim that parties that are ideologically or 
socially closer to a social movement will naturally support their claims has good foundation, 
nothing proves that this happens. As the case of the anti-globalisation movement demonstrates, 
the rise of a movement can be perceived as a threat to parties that could be potential allies on 
the Left, leading to repression and ‘delegitimisation’ of the movement (della Porta and 
Fillieule, 2004, p. 229). 
The strategic decision of political parties to ally with social movements is due to a number of 
contextual factors. The first factor involves party divisions. According to Hutter and 
Vliegenthart (2016), political parties are more likely to respond to issues taken up by parties 
with whom they share an ideological affinity, as they compete for similar constituencies. For 
instance, in France, when the left was dominated by the Communist party until the end of the 
1970s, the Socialists had to appeal to the working class to tackle the competition of the 
Communists, resulting in them being less reliable allies for the new social movements (Kriesi, 
2007). The second factor involves electoral competition. It has been suggested that parties are 
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more likely to form alliances with social movements in times of electoral instability, as the 
winning of new votes becomes more important (Hutter and Vliegenthart, 2016). 
The final factors concern whether or not the party is in government and whether or not it is a 
mainstream party. According to Hutter and Vliegenthart (2016), because parties in government 
and mainstream parties have to represent and be accountable to the general public, they are 
more constrained than niche and opposition parties in actively supporting social movements 
who represent particular interests. In fact, Kriesi et al. (1995) have found out in their study of 
new social movements in Europe that the Social Democrats were much less reliable allies when 
they were in government. However, when political parties are in government, they can bring 
the movement’s demands in the political system, and if they have a strong position in the 
executive, they can meet those demands, if they are willing to do so (Giugni, 2004, p. 170). 
Social movements also engage in litigation strategies to make their claims. If a number of 
judges are presented with a particular legal claim, they may take one of the following positions: 
uniformly reject the claim, uniformly accept the claim, or be divided among themselves (E. A. 
Andersen, 2005). Therefore, since the perspectives of individual judges affect the progress and 
outcomes of social movement litigation, judicial receptivity, in the form of support by judges 
and members of juries, is important for social movements (Mccammon and Mcgrath, 2015, p. 
131). Activist lawyers can support social movements in various ways, such as helping with 
costs, devising legal strategies and filing legal documents (E. A. Andersen, 2005). Thus, as 
Epp (1998, p. 17) argues, as well as a willing and able judiciary, material support for the 
sustained pursuit of a campaign is also important. Besides judicial actors, state legal aid 
programmes can help with costs, and state institutions responsible for enforcing human rights 
and equality laws can act as strategic litigators (Evans Case and Givens, 2010, p. 225). 
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What the aforementioned discussion leads to is the suggestion that ultimately, the partisanship 
of the political regime or government in general is an important actor (Amenta, Caren and 
Olasky, 2005, p. 521). A new government may wish to strengthen its position by adoption 
policy positions that may be favourable to the constituency of a social movement (Amenta, 
Caren and Olasky, 2005). For instance, a reform-oriented regime where left-wing and centrist 
parties control the government would nurture its ties to pro-social policy groups, benefiting 
leftist social movements (Amenta and Halfmann, 2000, p. 510). Thus, a sympathetic 
government could perform allyship.   
However, it has been argued that relations between mainstream political parties and social 
movements have soured in recent decades, following the behavioural and structural changes of 
political parties (della Porta, 2007). Political parties have evolved from being mass-based to 
professionalised, with a great deal of their efforts dedicated to campaigning to attract the 
median voter (della Porta, 2007). As they have shifted towards the centre of the political 
spectrum, they have become less supportive of social movements (della Porta, 2007). 
In sum, the literature on social movements suggests that there are various types of powerful 
political actors in state institutions that could act as a source of opportunity for social 
movements wishing to influence policy.15  
However, scholars acknowledge that the interests and capacities of these actors influence the 
extent to which these actors can act as allies. Stearns and Almeida (2004) add that the political 
and institutional environment shape the kinds of elite actors that are available as social 
movement allies. They explain that the degree of bureaucratisation and fragmentation of 
                                                             
15 Scholars have also referred to business actors, trade unions, professional associations and 
experts, and religious institutions as potential elite allies for social movements (Van Dyke, 
2003). However, because these actors do not directly influence policy-making, I do not include 
them in my conceptualisation of elite allies.  
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political authority, and the electoral system affect the likelihood that a coalition will form 
between a social movement and state agencies, opposition parties, local governments and the 
courts (Stearns and Almeida, 2004, p. 480).  
First, the more bureaucratised the state apparatus, the more likely there is to exist a state agency 
receptive to the goals of a social movement (Stearns and Almeida, 2004, p. 480). This 
likelihood is strengthened if the function of the agency is to focus on social issues that help 
sustain the institutional credibility of the state, such as healthcare and anti-discrimination 
(Stearns and Almeida, 2004). Second, in a proportional representation system, opposition 
parties compete for constituencies with the dominant party and other opposition parties, 
increasing the incentives to align with a social movement (Stearns and Almeida, 2004, p. 481). 
Third, there is a greater likelihood of coalitions forming between a social movement and local 
government or the courts in democratic states where there is a fragmentation of political 
authority because these institutions are autonomous from the centre (Stearns and Almeida, 
2004, p. 482). 
All in all, we can hypothesise that bureaucrats in state agencies and institutions, as well as 
actors in the legislative, executive and judicial branch are potential sources of elite allyship for 
social movements advocating policy reforms.  
Contrary to the literature on social movements, scholars on transnational advocacy networks 
focus on the significance of international allies. Keck and Sikkink (1998, p. 2) define a 
transnational advocacy network as an assemblage of ‘those relevant actors working 
internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and 
dense exchanges of information and services.’ Keck and Sikkink (1999, pp. 91–2) identify the 
following possible actors in transnational advocacy networks: international and domestic 
NGOs, research and advocacy organisations, local social movements, foundations, the media, 
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churches, trade unions, consumer organisations, intellectuals, parts of regional and 
international intergovernmental organisations, parts of executive and/or parliamentary 
branches of governments. Scholars are increasingly expanding the boundaries of what 
constitutes a transnational advocacy actor, by incorporating such entities as diaspora and 
migrant networks (Werbner, 2002; Weyland, 2005), epistemic communities (Finnemore, 
1993), corporations (Pattberg, 2005), and even religious organisations (Dalacoura, 2001).  
International actors and domestic social movements are linked by a Boomerang Pattern. Risse 
and Sikkink (1999, p. 18) clarify that a Boomerang Pattern emerges when ‘national opposition 
groups, NGOs, and social movements link up with transnational networks and INGOs who 
then convince human rights organisations, donor institutions, and/or great powers to pressure 
norm-violating states.’ Through the provision of access, leverage, information and money, 
these networks amplify the claims of domestic challengers (Sikkink and Keck, 1998, p. 18). 
However, Keck and Sikkink’s diagram of the Boomerang Pattern of TAN influence suggests 
that there are asymmetries of power within TANs: civil society groups such as NGOs provide 
information, while it is essentially intergovernmental organisations and other states that bring 
pressure on the target state (1998, p. 30). Transnational NGOs in Western countries are seen 
as neutral experts on global issues, especially the likes of Amnesty International, Greenpeace 
and Oxfam, which are perceived as ‘independent sources of credible news’ in North America 
and Western Europe (Ron, Ramos and Rodgers, 2005, pp. 557–8). Despite this, NGOs are 
dependent on the willingness of governments and IGOs to work with them, and are given weak 
formal recognition in international institutions, constraining their potential for policy influence 
(Sikkink, 2002, p. 304). They therefore engage in ‘informal exercises of power and influence’ 
(Sikkink, 2002, p. 305). Due to their lack of access to decision-making, I do not consider them 
to be elite actors.  
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Such cannot be said of international institutions. According to Smith (2004, p. 324) states 
increasingly resort to international institutions to address global issues such as human rights, 
peace and the environment, and even sign international agreements on these matters to 
demonstrate their commitment. This means that within these organisations, domestic social 
movements can find allies who uphold their values and are willing to provide symbolic and 
material resources to help them in their advocacy. From a strategic point of view, because such 
organisations lack natural constituencies that can provide them with political support, they 
themselves actively try to build direct links with more marginal groups (Smith, 2004).  
Zajak’s (2014) pathway model highlights international institutions are the driving force behind 
a global governance structure which determines the degree of international institutionalisation 
of a specific issue-area (Risse-Kappen, 1995). As Risse-Kappen (1995, p. 7) argues, ‘the more 
the respective issue-area is regulated by international norms of cooperation, the more 
permeable should state boundaries become for transnational activities.’ In other words, this 
global governance structure legitimises the activities of INGOs and domestic SMOs, thereby 
making the target state more vulnerable to their demands. International norms are diffused 
through formal processes which establish a shared social consensus on certain issues. 
International institutions act as authoritative bodies that reflect these shared norms. In my case, 
the international institution behind the global governance structure on women’s rights, and 
therefore on violence against women, is the United Nations, through specific bodies like UN 
Women and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW).  
Another relevant institution is the EU. While the EU does not have the same level of authority 
as the UN, it is an important player in Morocco. In the 1990s, the EU introduced a systematic 
partnership programme with its Mediterranean neighbours through the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, with a focus on democratisation (Tommel, 2013). In 2005, it introduced the 
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European Neighbourhood Policy, with less emphasis on democratisation, through the events 
of the Arab Spring in late 2010 reverted this shift (Tommel, 2013). As of July 2009, Morocco 
was the largest recipient of EU aid within the European Neighbourhood framework, and 
subsequently achieved advanced status (Kausch, 2009). In fact, scholars claim that political 
reforms in Morocco have been affected by its relationship with the EU (Kausch, 2009). Thus, 
given this prominent role, the EU cannot be ignored of any analysis of Morocco. Given that its 
programmes aim to encourage Morocco to democratise, it can be assumed that it is another key 
transnational ally for domestic SMOs desiring to bring about policy reforms on violence against 
women.  
There are limits to the extent to which international institutions can act as a source of 
opportunity. According to Sikkink (2005, p. 155), environmental and labour movements do not 
seek out the support of international institutions when they face blockage at home, because 
they fear that they will erode the rights they enjoy at home. More generally, how open or closed 
international institutions varies across issues, regions, and time: international institutions in the 
1990s were more open than in the 1960s, those dealing with human rights are more open than 
those dealing with trade, and finally, regional institutions in Europe are more open than those 
in Asia (Sikkink, 2005). Sikkink (2005) offers a detailed model of the interactions between 
domestic and international opportunity structures,16 to demonstrate this. In the first scenario, 
both domestic and international institutions are closed to domestic social movements, resulting 
in low activism and therefore fewer chances of success (Sikkink, 2005, p. 159). In the second 
scenario, a Boomerang Pattern emerges as domestic activists perceive domestic structures as 
                                                             
16 According to Sikkink (2005, p. 157), the domestic opportunity structure refers to ‘how open 
or closed domestic political institutions are to domestic social movement or NGO influence’ 
while the international opportunity structure refers to ‘the degree of openness of international 
institutions to the participation of transnational NGOs, networks, and coalitions’ (Sikkink, 
2005, p. 156).  
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closed and international ones as open, resulting in them seeking out transnational allies to bring 
about pressure on their government.  
In scenario C, both international and domestic structures are relatively open, an inside-outside 
coalition emerges between domestic social movements and transnational actors, with the 
former using transnational activism in a complimentary manner to domestic activism. The 
difference with scenario B is that in this case, domestic social movements prioritise the 
domestic arena and use the international arena when needed. Finally, in scenario D, domestic 
structures are more open than international ones, and domestic social movements are forced 
into the international arena because their governments have signed international agreements 
that have given decision-making power to international institutions (Sikkink, 2005, pp. 163–
4). They therefore engage in defensive transnationalisation and work towards resolving the 
democratic deficit of international institutions (Sikkink, 2005). Thus, international institutions 
are not always perceived as being a source of opportunity, and the extent to which their political 
clout translates into support for domestic social movements varies considerably.  
While international institutions can serve as powerful allies for domestic social movements, 
they remain agents of governments, which ultimately control their budgets, agendas and 
leadership. In fact, because powerful states have substantial influence over these institutions, 
having access to the latter does not directly translates into real influence (Sikkink, 2005). The 
implication is that foreign governments, especially powerful states, are a more powerful 
international ally to domestic social movements. To sum up then, we can hypothesise that 
foreign governments and formal international institutions, in the form of intergovernmental 
organisations, can be potential sources of elite allyship for domestic social movements 
advocating policy reform in their country. At the domestic level, elite allyship comes in the 
form of government, political parties and parliament, bureaucrats or civil servants, and the 
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judiciary. However, as the next section shows, in authoritarian contexts, the sources of elite 
allyship can be radically different.  
2.5. Elite Allyship in Morocco and Institutional Constraints  
In the section above, I have drawn on the literatures on social movements and transnational 
advocacy networks to show that elite allyship comes from representative and democratic 
institutions. In this section, I argue that in authoritarian countries like Morocco, the best source 
of elite allyship comes in the form of the King and his associated networks. Democratic and 
representative institutions such as political parties and parliament are less useful because the 
political and institutional systems limit their power and consequently, the extent to which they 
can act as a source of opportunity. In sum, the institutional environment conditions who can 
perform elite allyship and to what extent.   
Morocco is formally a constitutional monarchy in which the King is the overarching executive, 
through his roles as both the Head of State and the religious leader of the country, or Amir al 
Mu’minin, (Commander of the Faithful) (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012). Terms such 
as ‘authoritarian monarchy’ (Pellicer and Wegner, 2014) or ‘liberalised autocracy’ (Brumberg, 
2002) have been used by academics to highlight the undemocratic nature of the political system 
in Morocco.  
This is does not seem obvious if we look at the formal structure of government. The Head of 
Government is the Prime Minister, aided by a Cabinet of Ministers, though as I mention below, 
these are appointed by the King. Since the mid-1990s, the country has had a bicameral 
parliament, composed of two houses, the lower Chamber of Representatives and the upper 
Chamber of Counsellors (Ketterer, 2001). While the lower chamber is elected through direct 
suffrage, the upper chamber is indirectly elected through local councils, professional 
associations and labour syndicates (Ketterer, 2001). According to article 107 of the 
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Constitution, the judiciary is independent, and the King has the responsibility to guarantee this 
independence (Ruchti, 2012). 
However, the 2011 Constitution clarifies that the King is above all other institutions. As 
political and religious leader, he ensures that the Constitution and Islam, the religion of the 
state, are respected, as well as political institutions and international commitments (Madani, 
Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012). His powers are not checked by any institutions, and criticisms 
of his person are not constitutionally tolerated (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012). His 
functions include the following: appointing the head of government, ministers and 
ambassadors, presiding over cabinet meetings, dissolving parliament, and overseeing the 
armed forces (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012).  
As the King is the Commander of the Faithful, he is the supreme institution in the country 
(Buskens, 2003). Coupled with his status as descendant of the Prophet Mohamed, he acts as a 
spiritual leader tasked with the responsibility of guiding believers and arbitrating on religious 
matters  (Elliott, 2009). This confers him immense legitimacy, and as I discuss in chapter 4, he 
draws on his twin role as political and religious authority to settle debates and act as an arbiter 
between political forces in the country. However, it is important to understand that it is not just 
the person of the King that is important, but the institutions linked to him too. This apparatus 
is referred to as the Makhzen, or the informal alliance between the King and ‘his advisers, 
selected businessmen, high-ranking bureaucrats and tribal chiefs’ (Durac and Cavatorta, 2011, 
p. 57). Given these sweeping powers, I expect the King and the Makhzen more generally, to 
be sources of elite allyship, particularly if we consider the fact that the current King Mohamed 
VI has publicly championed women’s rights.  
Moroccan Kings resort to dividing political forces to maintain their authority. Hassan II who 
reigned between 1961, when his father Mohamed V died, until his own death in 1999, 
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implemented a strategy of divide et impera (Cavatorta, 2007a). This involved co-opting the 
political opposition, forming loyal parties to undermine powerful opponents, interfering in the 
internal affairs of political parties by exploiting tensions, and buying off people (Willis, 2002b). 
Hassan II also repressed those who opposed his authority, by eliminating political opponents, 
imprisoning them, and silencing dissent in general (Cavatorta, 2007a). Sater (2007) refers to 
this style of rule as neo-patrimony, because ultimately, segments of the Moroccan population 
were granted privileges in return for loyalty to the King.  
Mohamed VI came to power in July 1999, and seemingly tried to move away from the overtly 
repressive methods of his father. In August 1999, he announced his support for equality 
between men and women and his commitment to integrating women in society (Buskens, 
2003). Thereafter, he went on to frequently express his support for advancing women’s status 
(Wuerth, 2005). During his reign, he has either initiated or backed several reforms to improve 
the situation of women, notably a new family code in 2004, a new nationality code in 2007 and 
reserved seats for women in parliament in 2002 (discussed in section 2.8. and in chapter 4). 
This has allowed him to present himself as a defender of women’s rights (Cavatorta and 
Dalmasso, 2009).  
He also initiated political and economic changes, in what appears as a move to democratise 
and develop the country. He gave greater powers to elected officials, allowed some degree of 
fairness and freedom in elections, gave Islamists – in the form of the PJD, a chance to 
participate in institutional politics (Cavatorta, 2015). Mohamed VI also freed political prisoners 
and increased freedom of the press and assembly (Cavatorta, 2015). To boost economic growth, 
he initiated reforms in agriculture, energy and tourism, increased ties with the United States 
and the European Union, and countries in sub-Saharan Africa to increase foreign investment 
in the country (Cavatorta, 2015). Despite these measures, the structure of political authority 
did not change, and repression continues. As I show in section 2.8. and in chapter 4 in the 
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context of human and women’s rights, the King still bypasses representative institutions to 
make major changes, makes unilateral decisions and censors speech, a criticism levied at him 
by scholars shortly after his access to the throne (Maghraoui, 2001).   
One way of continuing his father’s authoritarian rule is his use of palace or royalist parties. In 
Morocco, political parties can be divided into three groups: royalist parties, that are established 
by or are loyal to the King, traditional opposition parties composed of long-standing left-wing 
and nationalist groups, and a new political opposition in the form of Islamists, which entered 
the party system relatively recently. In this section, I describe these parties and their ties to 
different segments of the Moroccan women’s rights movement. I then move on to discuss how 
the institutional constraints placed on them have prevented them from helping women’s rights 
activists reform the Moudawana (first referred to as the personal status code, and then as the 
family code) in the 1990s and 2000s.   
Royalist parties have long been a fixture of Moroccan politics, though they have mostly been 
short-lived. After independence, Mohamed V co-opted the clandestine Mouvement Populaire 
(Popular Movement, MP) to offset the dominant Istiqlal (Independence) party (Willis, 2002a; 
Boussaid, 2009). This party was supported by rural Berbers as Istiqlal was predominantly urban 
and Arab (Willis, 2002a). His son Hassan II continued in his path and established a number of 
loyal parties, with varying degrees of success. In 1963, he approved a move by his Minister of 
the Interior to bring together pro-monarchy figures into the short-lived Front de Defense des 
Institutions Constitutionnelles (Front for the Defence of Constitutional Institutions, FDIC) 
(Boussaid, 2009). In 1978, he convinced his Prime Minister and brother-in-law to regroup 
royalist and technocrats into the Rassemblement National des Independents (National Rally of 
Independents, RNI), though this gave rise to a breakaway party a few years later (Boussaid, 
2009). Through another Prime Minister, he created the Union Constitutionnelle (Constitutional 
Union, UC) in the 1980s, though tensions with the PM weakened palace support (Boussaid, 
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2009). Mohamed VI continued in this course with his establishment of Parti Authenticite et 
Modernite (Authenticity and Modernity Party, PAM) to offset the PJD, after the 2007 
legislative elections showed its popularity with the electorate (Dalmasso, 2012). This party was 
founded by the most powerful advisor to Mohamed VI, El Himma, and ran on a populist and 
anti-political party platform (Dalmasso, 2012). However, the overriding goal of royalist parties 
is the protection of the monarchy’s interests and the weakening of political opposition.  
The traditional opposition to royalist parties is composed of the nationalist Istiqlal, the social 
democratic Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (Socialist Union of Popular Forces, USFP), 
and the socialist  Parti du Progres et du Socialisme (Party of Progress and Socialism, PPS) 
(Darhour and Dahlerup, 2013; Pellicer and Wegner, 2014). These parties formed a kutla (bloc) 
in the 1990s, alongside the Organisation de l’Action Democratique et Populaire (Organisation 
for Democratic and Popular Action, OADP), another left-wing party (Willis, 2002a), to resist 
the power of the Makhzen, though as we will see later in this section, their participation in 
politics also depends in them accepting the political authority of the King.17  
A particularity of these parties is that they are closely linked to secular and left-wing 
associations of the Moroccan women’s rights movement, through women’s cells that later 
formed independent associations. The Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc 
(Democratic Association of Morrocan Women, ADFM) was formed in 1985 and grew out of 
the women’s cell of the PPS, while the Union de l’Action Feminine (Union of Feminine Action, 
                                                             
17 Istiqlal started off as the main independence party, and soon after independence, experienced 
a split. In 1959, the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (National Union of Popular Forces, 
UNFP) broke away, and was supplanted by the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires in the 
1970s (Willis, 2002a).  
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UAF) in 1987 developed out of OADP (Sadiqi, 2017a). Istiqlal has an active women’s cell, the 
Organisation de la Femme Istiqlalienne (Organisation of the Istiqlali Woman, OFI).  
However, even though these parties gave birth to women’s rights associations, they have 
proved unwilling or unable to help them reform the Moudawana in the 1990s and 2000s. After 
UAF and associated groups presented a petition for its reform in 1992, political parties refused 
to rally to their cause, because they believed this petition would create difficulties during the 
nascent yet limited political liberalisation introduced by the King (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 
2009). They thus decided to stay away from this debate that was dividing them, to focus on the 
negotiation of power  (Bras, 2007). A few years later, in 1999 a Plan d’Integration pour la 
Femme au Developpement (Plan for the Integration of Women in Development, Plan) was 
proposed by the government of Youssoufi (USFP), with support from parts of the Moroccan 
women’s rights movement (discussed in chapter 4). This Plan – that proposed revisions to the 
Moudawana - was later abandoned as it attracted opposition from the religious establishment 
and political parties. Istiqlal adopted an ambiguous approach, the PJD formed a counter 
initiative to challenge it, RNI and MP expressed support as long as it was in line with Islamic 
law, disagreement surfaced within the USFP, and the PPS decided to retreat from the issue 
(Bras, 2007). The fact that the counter committee created by the PJD brought together Islamists, 
nationalists and leftists shows that opposition to the Plan was not based on political affiliation 
(Ouali, 2008). Worst for secular women’s rights activists, the government decided to not only 
drop the Plan, but also had to delegate the issue of reforming the Moudawana to the King, as 
only he can arbitrate on religious matters (Ouali, 2008). This inability and unwillingness of 
elected officials to help activists forced them to appeal to the King, as we will see in chapter 4 
(Ouali, 2008). 
Political parties’ inability or unwillingness to perform allyship is in great part explained by the 
institutional constraints they face. In the three countries of the Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia and 
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Morocco), political parties need to have official legal recognition to participate in elections and 
sit in representative institutions, a recognition that is not always granted, and can be retracted 
at any moment (Willis, 2002b). One condition of participation is the recognition of the primacy 
of the King (Cavatorta, 2009). Another is the establishment of restrictions on what parties can 
call themselves and pursue (Willis, 2002b). Coupled with the aforementioned interference from 
the monarchy, parties in Morocco occupy a vulnerable place. As the case of the reform for the 
Moudawana shows, the desire to maintain this participation in the political system influences 
their response to the Moroccan women’s rights movement.  
If we look at the case of Islamists, we can see the importance of the recognition of the King for 
participation in formal politics. The Islamist movement in Morocco is divided into two main 
group, those with a foothold in the legal and institutional arena, in the form of the PJD, and 
those without it, in the form of Al Adl wal Ihan (Justice and Charity, Al Adl) (Pellicer and 
Wegner, 2014). The Islamist movement first entered institutional politics in 1997, through the 
election of members of Al Tawhid wa Al Islah (Unity and Reform, Al Tawhid) into the lower 
chamber, after having contested the election through the Mouvement Populaire Democratique 
et Constitutionel (Democratic and Constitutional Popular Movement, MPDC)  (Willis, 1999). 
The MPDC subsequently changed its name to Parti de la Justice et du Developpement (PJD) 
(Willis, 1999). However, it is important to note that the PJD was encouraged by the monarchy 
to take part in multi-party elections – to contain radical Islamism – in exchange for not 
questioning the religious legitimacy of the King and not directly challenging the rules of the 
game (Cavatorta, 2007b). If the PJD accepted this compromise, such was not the case with al 
Adl. Due to its refusal to abide by the rules of the game, Al Adl is officially banned from 
contesting elections, though this does not bother the movement, since it refuses to accept the 
authority of the King and the political system (Willis, 2002a; Cavatorta, 2007b).  
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However, as we shall see in chapter 4, both Al Adl and the PJD are staunch opponents of the 
secular current of the Moroccan women’s rights movement, and supported the establishment 
of women’s cells and associations within their ranks in the mid-1990s to counter them. In 1998, 
the women’s section of Al Adl was established (Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010). Women 
affiliated with the PJD launched in the mid-1990s, two associations – Muntada al Zahra (Forum 
of Zahra, Forum al Zahra) and Tajdid al Wa’I al Nisa’i, known as Renouveau de la Conscience 
Feminine in French (Renewal of Women’s Awareness, RCF) (Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010). 
As chapter 4 shows, these Islamist women’s associations have strongly opposed proposals by 
secular activists to reform the Moudawana, not least because they perceive them to be against 
Islamic principles.  
If political parties suffer from institutional weaknesses, so does the legislature, though 
successive constitutional changes have increased its powers. Morocco’s first parliaments after 
independence acted as an institution that legitimised the monarchy and not challenge it 
(Ketterer, 2001). The 1992 Constitution increased its law making capabilities. This included 
such things as forcing the King to act on bills passed by Parliament within 30 days and 
mandating ministers to respond to the questions of members of parliament (Ketterer, 2001). 
The 2011 Constitution further increased its legislative powers, by enlarging the domain of law 
it can address, allowing it to initiate laws alongside the Head of Government, and giving it at 
least one day per month to examine proposed bills (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012; 
Ruchti, 2012). In terms of government oversight, Parliament can also dedicate one day per year 
to evaluate public policies, ask policy questions to the Head of Government and high-ranking 
officials, and hold the government accountable through the Chamber of Representatives 
(Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012). 
Despite these changes, the legislature is subordinate to the Head of Government and the King. 
The government can refuse the proposals of MPs if these threaten the economy and dissolve 
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the Chamber of Representatives, in concert with the Council of Ministers  (Madani, Maghraoui 
and Zerhouni, 2012). The King’s power over Parliament can be demonstrated by the fact that 
he sets the political and parliamentary agenda in his opening messages to the Parliament, and 
this forms the basis of discussion for MPs (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012). These 
messages cannot be the ‘object of any debate’ (Ruchti, 2012, p. 16).  The King can also dissolve 
the two chambers, has the sole authority to ratify political and military treaties, and can even 
demand Parliament to adopt a new reading of a proposed bill, which cannot be refused (Madani, 
Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012; Ruchti, 2012). 
As if these constitutional limitations are not enough, Parliament also suffers from a lack of 
internal resources, preventing it from carrying out important duties. It lacks adequate 
infrastructure in the form of functioning standing committees, research staff and funding for 
fact-finding missions (Denoeux and Desfosses, 2007). The lack of research staff that could 
provide expert advice and data affects its ability to proactively initiate legislation and suggest 
amendments to bills (Denoeux and Desfosses, 2007). This lack of research staff creates a 
dependence on political parties, which possess such expertise (Denoeux and Desfosses, 2007) 
In sum, there are limits to the power of representative and democratic institutions in Morocco, 
suggesting that they will not be able to perform allyship in a satisfactory manner. Moreover, 
the fact that the King is the higher authority means that getting his support radically affects the 
fortunes of a social movement. Nonetheless, as I show in section 2.8., women’s rights activists 
in Morocco do not always target the support of the King, but also that of Parliament and the 
Prime Minister, because they perceive effective allyship as allyship that does not reinforce 
authoritarianism, but rather encourage democratic decision-making.  
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2.6. Performances of Elite Allyship  
In this section, I discuss the various ways in which political elites can support domestic social 
movements. I argue that they should speak for and with social movements, provide a wide array 
of resources, and exert pressure over other political elites. I first draw on the literature on 
political representation and social movement coalitions to argue that elite allyship involves the 
political representation of social movements and working with them as part of a coalition. I 
then draw on resource mobilisation theory to argue that the provision of moral, material, human 
and informational resources is also important. Finally, I draw on the literature on transnational 
advocacy networks to argue that another way to perform allyship is the use of leverage on other 
political elites and simultaneously working with them. 
2.6.1. Elite Allyship and Political Representation 
Despite recognising the significance of domestic elite allies for domestic social movements, 
the literature on social movements neglects the crucial issue of how elite actors perform 
allyship, and what consequences this has for the mobilisation and policy impact of social 
movements. Whilst Keck and Sikkink (1998) have developed a model clarifying how 
international actors support domestic social movements, their model assumes that the former 
provides support in a way that is satisfactory to the latter.18 Thus, neither literature provides an 
account of the extent to which elite allies represent the policy interests of the social movements 
they support. I draw on recent theoretical developments in the literature on political 
representation to argue that one dimension of elite allyship is the representation  of the interests 
and claims of social movements, and that to measure representation, one needs to evaluate to 
                                                             
18 Though studies on the rights of sex workers and children have confirmed that this is not 
always the case. See for instance Hahn & Holzscheiter  (2013). 
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what extent the claims of elite actors align with those of social movements, through a claims-
making approach.  
The ‘standard account’ of political representation (Urbinati and Warren, 2008, p. 389) ties 
political representation to electoral democracy: elections enable a pre-defined constituency to 
authorise and hold accountable representatives (Kuyper, 2016, p. 209). This constituency is 
delimited by territory and therefore, where one lives determines who one can elect as a 
representative (Urbinati and Warren, 2008, p. 389). 
 This view can be most clearly seen in the literature on TANs, and particularly on the 
relationship between transnational civil society organisations and domestic social movements. 
Even though INGOs act and speak on behalf of disenfranchised groups, they have not been 
elected by them, and there are no democratic structures by which these constituencies can hold 
them to account, which means that INGOs are not legally bound to act in the interests of any 
given community (Collingwood and Logister, 2005). The primary function of 
intergovernmental organisations is to articulate the interests and preferences of their sovereign 
member states. There therefore appears to be no reason to examine their representativeness 
towards social movements. In fact, in the United Nations, the spokesperson for a member state 
may not even have been elected democratically (Rehfeld, 2006, p. 1). 
However, recent years have witnessed a ‘constructivist turn’ in the conceptualisation of 
representation, which calls for a decoupling of representation from election (Näsström, 2015, 
p. 1). In a world where political interaction is not confined to the boundaries of nation-states 
and where there is decreasing trust in political parties, party membership and election turn-out 
in democracies, it makes little sense to restrict the concept of representation to formal political 
participation in a nation-state (de Wilde, 2013, p. 279). Instead, we need a conception of 
representation that is ‘dynamic’, ‘claims-based’ and ‘performative’ (Saward, 2006, p. 299), as 
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representation derives ultimately from events - notably claims – and not by fixed institutional 
presences (Saward, 2010). Indeed, a key point in this perspective is that there is no ‘fixed, 
knowable sets of interests for the represented,’ as these are articulated and defined by 
representatives (Saward, 2006, p. 301; Severs, Celis and Meier, 2013, pp. 433–4). Thus, a 
constituency and its interests are constructed through representative claims (Severs, 2010, p. 
411). This means that anyone can claim to be a representative, though the legitimacy of these 
representative claims ultimately depends on the represented’s acceptance thereof (Severs, Celis 
and Meier, 2013, p. 435). 
Representative claims need to resonate with the audience they are intended for, and accepted 
by them (Saward, 2006, p. 303). Thus, representation is an interactive process whereby 
representatives choose their constituents and the represented choose their representatives, 
through the acceptance, rejection or ignorance of representative claims (Saward, 2010, p. 36). 
Representation is thus ‘an ongoing process of making and receiving, accepting and rejecting 
claims – in, between, and outside electoral cycles’ (Saward, 2010, p. 36). The general form of 
an ideal representative claim is as follows: ‘a maker of representations (‘M’) puts forward a 
subject (‘S’) which stands for an object (‘O’) that is related to a referent (‘R’) and is offered to 
an audience (‘A’)’ (Saward, 2010, p. 36). In other words, the Maker is the claimant, the Subject 
is the claimed representative, the Object and Referent relate to the represented, and the 
Audience is the recipient of the claim. Saward (2010, p. 37) offers the following example to 
illustrate this ideal type of claim: ‘Antiglobalisation demonstrators (makers) set up themselves 
and their movements (subjects) as representatives of the oppressed and marginalised (object) 
to Western governments (audience).’ Representative claims vary along several dimensions: 
singular or multiple, particular or general, implicit or explicit, internal or external (Saward, 
2006, p. 309). In any case, because the object of a representative claim – the potential 
constituency of the claimant – is not seen as being a passive recipient, this claims-based 
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conceptualisation of representation allows us to analyse the extent to which representation is 
democratic in the absence of authorisation mechanisms.  
Still, arguing that representation can take place outside of electoral politics tells us little about 
why elite allyhsip should take the form of political representation at all. However, because elite 
allies are political actors ‘who are responsive and who are in a position to be able to reform 
existing policies’ (Giugni, 2004, p. 170), we should expect some degree of ethical commitment 
towards constituencies whose interests one is advocating for.  
One way to grasp this ethical commitment is by analysing the discursive interactions of such 
actors. Empirically, this means that we should expect elite allies to uphold ‘narrative fidelity’ 
with the claims and frames used by social movement actors (King, 2004). After all, the very 
fact of being an ally necessitates listening and responding to the needs of those to whom one is 
allied. Unfortunately, although it is implied in the literature that powerful political allies have 
a responsibility to take up social movements’ claims (Giugni, 2004; Tarrow, 2011), this 
assumption is not systematically tested. This is all the more unfortunate when it has been shown 
that representatives – understood as makers of representative claims, based on Saward’s 
conceptualisation – may in fact make claims that are not just unresponsive to the needs and 
interests of those they claim to represent, but could potentially be detrimental to them.  
In their study of the representative role of members of Parliament (MPs) of ethnic minority 
origins in the Netherlands between 2002 and 2012, Aydemir and Vliegenthart (2016, p. 74) 
show that such MPs can engage in either ‘suppressive representation’ wherein such MPs ‘adopt 
restrictive framings towards cultural and/or religious rights and freedoms of immigrant 
minorities,’ or ‘supportive representation’ wherein they ‘support cultural and/or religious 
freedoms of ethnic and religious constituencies.’ I thus offer a corrective to the literature by 
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analysing in a systematic way the extent to which different political elites represent the interests 
of social movements.  
2.6.2. Elite Allyship Through Coalitions 
As I have discussed earlier, Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that domestic social 
movements are enmeshed in TANs comprised of both elite and non-elite participants and 
that include anything from NGOs, research and advocacy groups, social movements, 
foundations, trade unions, consumer organisations, intellectuals, inter-governmental 
organisations, as well as certain branches of government. Participants in these networks 
carry out a variety of activities to influence state and non-state actors, including lobbying, 
exerting moral or material leverage, engaging in accountability politics, and sharing and 
distributing information, all with the view of helping develop policy.  
These networks are simply a set of actors that are linked by shared values, common 
discourses and the exchange of information and services. They are thus an informal 
configuration. Moreover, there can be vertical relationships among actors in a network. In 
their Boomerang Pattern of advocacy, Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that weaker actors 
in the network, such as domestic social movements, require the presence of mediators or 
middlepersons in the form of international civil society groups, to make their claims access 
more powerful actors such as governments and inter-governmental organisations. The 
latter can then use their position to exert some leverage on the target of mobilisation. This 
arrangement is similar to the concept of epistemic communities in international relations. 
Haas (1992, p. 3) came up with the concept of epistemic communities to denote ‘a network 
of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area’. TANs are 
not essentially composed of experts, but are arranged in the same informal manner. The 
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relationship between elite allies and social movements in a network is not very dense, 
sustained and formal – it can be seen as being more surface-level, ad hoc, and informal, 
and can be extremely varied, with other actors in the network acting as bridges between 
social movement and elite actors. 
Elite actors can alternatively interact with domestic social movements through coalitions. 
Almeida and Stearns (2004) argue that social movements enter strategic alliances with 
members of the polity who are sympathetic to their cause in order to advance their claims 
and influence the policy process. They term this relationship the State Actor-Social 
Movement Coalition model. In their study of Japanese anti-pollution politics between 1956 
and 1976, they show that the environmental campaign against pollution managed to 
persuade the state to implement a series of favourable reforms in the face of a powerful 
opposition, thanks to the facilitating role provided by their alliance with organisations 
within the state. They argue that the courts, local government, state agencies and opposition 
political parties have on their own, very little influence on the policy-making process, but 
that by joining forces, they managed to overcome their adversaries.  
This is similar to the advocacy-coalition framework model19 put forth in the literature on 
policy-making. This framework has been established to provide a better understanding of 
coalition behaviour and its impact on policy-making and has been applied to social 
movements. Gronow and Yla-Anttila (2016) have used it to examine the role of 
environmental NGOs in Finland’s climate change policy. They explain Finland’s 
‘underperformance’ in terms of the dominance of what they term the Treadmill Coalition, 
composed of business interests, labour unions and state actors, and the weakness of the 
                                                             
19 This model has been criticised for being mainly applied to North America and Western 
Europe. See Nohrstedt, et al. (2014). 
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ENGO-state coalition, which was also the least resourceful, smallest, least linked to other 
coalitions, and not moderate.  
The particularity of a coalition is shared beliefs and coordination, though there may be 
heterogeneity in views, interests and types of organisations and networks one is part of 
(Barnes, van Laerhoven and Driessen, 2016). Coordination can be strong and involve 
establishing a common plan, or weak and involve only the sharing of information, the 
monitoring of action and the use of complementary strategies (Barnes, van Laerhoven and 
Driessen, 2016). Gupta (2014) brings together this literature with the insights of the social 
movement literature to argue that the behaviour and strategies of a coalition are influenced 
by a variety of external factors. Due to the closer ties between actors in a coalition, and its 
horizontal character, elite allyship through participation in coalition is preferable to 
participation in a network.  
In sum, scholars in the social movement literature have identified two arrangements 
between social movements and elite allies: coalitions and networks. Within these 
arrangements, relationships can be horizontal or vertical, deep or surface-level, sustained 
or ad hoc, and formal or informal. In Chapter 5, I investigate which of these two 
arrangement characterise my case study as a means of illuminating the level and nature  of 
contact between Moroccan activists and elite actors on the issue of violence against 
women.  
2.6.3. Elite Allyship and the Provision of Resources  
The literature on social movements assumes that elite allies are a key dimension of political 
opportunity because of the various resources they possess and potentially mobilise to 
support social movements (Silver, 1998). In fact, the core assumption of Resource 
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Mobilisation theory is the assumption that resources are a key determinant of the incidence, 
development and outcomes of social movement activity (Pettinicchio, 2016). But what 
range of resources would elite allies be expected to provide to social movements? Scholars 
have not fully explored what these resources are, how they are used to support social 
movements, and what impact they have. In this section, I draw on empirical studies to 
explore which types of moral, informational, human and material resources they provide. 
I show that despite the emphasis on the provision of material resources in the literature, 
elite allyship also involves the provision of moral and informational resources.  
Cress and Snow (1996) developed a taxonomy which groups resources relevant to social 
movements into four categories: moral, material, informational and human. Moral 
resources refer to external endorsements and include sympathetic support in the form of 
supportive statements by external parties, and solidaristic support in the form of 
participation in collective action of external parties. Informational resources refer to 
knowledge capital relevant for mobilisation and is composed of strategic support, technical 
support and referrals in the form of the provision of personal connections. Material 
resources refer to ‘tangible goods and services’ and include such things as supplies, 
meeting space, office space, transportation, employment and money. Finally, human 
resources denote ‘people who donate resources, time and energy’ and can take the form of 
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audiences, leaders and cadres.20 Below, I discuss moral, informational, and material 
resources.21  
A key moral resource that political and government institutions can provide to social 
movements is legitimacy. Legitimacy can be conferred on social movements through 
issuing supportive statements, but also by attending their events, appointing social 
movement actors to official positions, and providing them with access to and participation 
in government institutions. Political and government institutions can provide legitimacy to 
social movements through issuing supportive statements as, for instance, either 
recommending the introduction of legislation favourable to a given social movement or 
voting for it. In his study of the adoption of English-only law in the United States, Santoro 
                                                             
20 Cress and Snow (1996, p. 1095). A slightly revised taxonomy defines resources in terms of 
four broad categories: moral, cultural, social-organisational, human, and material (McCarthy 
and Edwards, 2004). In this model, moral resources refer to ‘legitimacy, solidary support, 
sympathetic support and celebrity;’ cultural resources are ‘artefacts and cultural products such 
as conceptual tools and specialised knowledge;’ such as certain tactics, organisational models 
and technical or strategic expertise that help social movements perform essential tasks, such as 
establishing an organisation, running protest events, and holding press conferences. Socio-
organisational resources are those resources that aid in social organisation and comprise of 
infrastructures, social networks and (formal) organisations. Human resources are the properties 
of individuals and include labour, experience, skills, and expertise, such as leadership. Finally, 
material resources are ‘financial and physical capital’ like money, property, space, equipment 
and supplies (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p.126). A key improvement of this model is that it 
specifies which types of resources can be obtained through patronage by external allies. 
External moral and cultural resources may take the form of widely respected individuals or 
groups publicly recognising the work or competences of social movement actors, through such 
things as awards and prizes, thereby increasing public confidence in them. External human 
resources could include providing skilled staff or technical help, for specific events for 
instance. External socio-organisational resources could take the form of providing the contact 
details of sympathetic individuals, while external material resources involve grants, donations 
and contracts. However, I stick to the terminology provided by Cress and Snow (1996) as it is 
more straightforward.   
21 While Resource Mobilisation theory hypothesises that external actors also provide human 
resources in terms of audiences and leaders, I have not come across empirical studies that show 
this, and so do not discuss them. This does not mean that such a resource is not provided.  
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(1999, p. 892) identifies Black state legislators who voted against the introduction of such 
a law as elite allies to Latinos and Latino advocacy groups. In the struggle for Black 
suffrage in the United States between 1691 and 1842, state governors who recommended 
bills to legislators, exerted some form of veto power over laws and amendments, or 
influenced the call for conventions to change constitutions, can be seen as elite allies 
(Budros, 2013, p. 385). The introduction of legislative bills is an important moral resource 
because, as Banaszak (1996, p. 84) argues, it indicates that an issue has achieved some 
degree of legitimacy. However, given that in some legislatures, there are relatively few 
consequences to introducing a bill, it can simply be a symbolic gesture designed to placate 
a social movement (Soule and King, 2006). Bureaucrats can also lobby for legislation or 
enforce laws or administrative rulings in favour of the constituency of a social movement 
(Amenta and Halfmann, 2000). The media can be used to display performances of support 
and to thereby show the degree of acceptance of activists’ claims. Political elites can make 
public speeches, such as press conferences and interviews, to signal public support for 
protesters (Giugni, 2004, p. 172).  
Political parties can confer legitimacy on social movements by endorsing the political 
demands of a social movement in their manifesto or other platforms (Amenta and 
Halfmann, 2000; Amenta, Caren and Olasky, 2005). For instance, in the 1980s, the 
Communist party of Italy adopted a revised version of the feminist plan of the women’s 
movement and used it to push for limited reforms in favour of women (della Porta, 2003, 
p. 62). The judiciary can also provide moral resources by formulating decisions that are in 
line with a social movement’s goals (Giugni, 2004, p. 186).  
Elite allyship also involves the granting of legitimacy to a social movement through 
participation in the activities it organises. Kriesi et al (1995) measure the allyship of 
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political parties to new social movements in Western Europe through what they term their 
‘facilitation’ of mobilisation, or participation in protest events, while Cress and Snow 
(2000) operationalise it as the presence of members of city councils to the meetings and 
rallies of social movement organisations. One such instance of facilitation occurred when 
then-senator Barack Obama and other officials spoke at an anti-war rally in 2002 sponsored 
by Chicagoans Against War in Iraq (Heaney and Rojas, 2011). Legitimacy can also come 
in the form of appointing or electing social movement activists to official positions. For 
instance, state agencies may become staffed with social movement activists (Mayer, 2000), 
and activists may be elected to Parliament as a member of a political party (Rao and Cagna, 
2016). 
Another key legitimating resource intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and their 
constituent agencies provide is access, which refers to ‘formal and informal mechanisms 
or procedures for inclusions and participation’ (Sikkink, 2005, p. 157). This can take the 
form of UN agencies such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to providing 
consultative status to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), or allowing them to 
participate in their meetings, or even allowing them to present written recommendations 
(Sikkink, 2005, p. 157). However, such type of access is not provided by international 
financial institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Sikkink, 2005, p.157).  
Elite allyship also involves the provision of informational resources in the form of expertise 
or, more pro-actively, providing logistical support. Political elites have expertise in their 
respective policy area and are embedded in various policy networks. This gives them 
access to important information which they can share with social movements (Pettinicchio, 
2016). They also can offer social movements an effective vocabulary for recruiting 
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members and participants. American state actors generated a framing for the issue of drunk 
driving which activists drew on at the early stages of their mobilisation (McCarthy, 1994). 
Legal experts can persuade social movements to select legal frames and legal repertoires 
to resist challenging views (Pedriana, 2006). An example is the oral dissent of Justice 
Breyer on the court case Parents Involved in Community Schools vs Seattle School District 
No. 1, which inspired local activists and their elected allies to explore more creative ways 
of mobilising (Guinier, 2008). Elite actors can also make their organisational structures 
available to social movements to facilitate mobilisation. In her study of the Italian women’s 
movement, della Porta (2003, p. 61) finds that left-wing political parties allowed the 
movement to use their daily newspapers to make calls for actions/protests, and provided 
other resources to help coordinate mobilisation.  
By far the most studied type of elite resource in the literature is material and, specifically, 
funding. The assumption is that social movements can only exist if they are supported by 
elite funders (Silver, 1998). Funding can come from government, intergovernmental 
organisations, foundations, and corporations. While the literature on Western social 
movements focuses on funding by local government and domestic foundations (Jenkins 
and Eckert, 1986), the literature on non-Western social movements emphasises the role of 
foreign governments and institutions and international foundations (Jalali, 2013).  
Empirical studies show that governments provide quite extensive funding to social 
movements in some countries. For instance, the Canadian government provides 
considerable funding, directly through grants and indirectly through tax reliefs (Corrigall-
Brown and Ho, 2015), while in Spain, the state provides subsidies to feminist groups 
(Valiente, 2003, pp. 40–1). Foundations play an important role in funding identity 
movements (Bartley, 2007). Private foundations have provided funding for the American 
Page 78 of 395 
 
Civil Rights movement and the environmental movement (Jenkins and Eckert, 1986). 
International donors have, though partnership projects, provided funding to help domestic 
SMOs carry out certain initiatives. The European Union funds activities related to activism 
and capacity-building (Hicks, 2004, p. 225). Sometimes, international funders take on a 
more pro-active role. During the Colour revolutions of the early 2000s, European and 
American donors actively encouraged their recipient SMOs to engage in opposition 
movements against their governments (Jalali, 2013). 
While funding provided by elite allies is a key type of support for social movements, the 
potential negative consequences of this funding has been the focus of a heated debate. Two 
hypotheses dominate this debate: The social control hypothesis contends that because 
sponsors prefer to fund professionalised organisations that have moderate goals and 
strategies, they ultimately encourage the de-radicalisation and de-politicisation of social 
movements (Cress and Snow, 1996). The channelling hypothesis agrees that patronage 
encourages the professionalization of social movements; but it claims that, rather than de-
radicalising or de-politicising them, professionalization encourages greater mobilisation 
(Jenkins, 1998). 
In sum, different types of political elites interact with social movements in different ways 
to provide moral, informational, and material resources. I now turn to a consideration of 
the strategies they employ towards other elites to support them in their goals.   
2.6.4. Elite Allyship and Double Mobilisation 
Elite allyship can also involve interacting with other political elites to support social 
movements. The literature on domestic social movements has not focused much on these 
ally-target interactions, but the literature on transnational advocacy has done so. I draw on 
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this body of literature to discuss these interactions. Three strategies can be used to influence 
the target of mobilisation: leverage politics, accountability politics, and double 
mobilisation. Incorporating the works of Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Wu (2005), I argue 
that the final dimension of elite allyship is the use of double mobilisation. 
Leverage and accountability are key strategies that are hypothesised to influence the target 
of mobilisation. As described above, Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) Boomerang Model of 
advocacy maintains that when government violation of, or refusal to recognise, the rights 
of its citizens blocks domestic political and judicial channels and severely limits their 
ability to mount a successful campaign, domestic social movements may search for 
international allies as a means of exerting pressure on their government. These allies then 
target either the local state or third party organisations which can exert pressure on the 
state. If a government remains unresponsive to the demands of a local group, international 
allies can aid that group by voicing their demands in the international arena and, in this 
way, amplify them.  
International allies employ four political tactics to transmit a message to the international 
community and to place pressure on the target state (Keck and Sikkink, 1999). I have 
already introduced these in the introductory chapter, but to reiterate, they consist of 
symbolic, information and accountability politics and leverage. They use leverage politics 
through naming and shaming the violator state; information politics to constitute 
themselves as an alternative source of information; symbolic politics to exploit symbolic 
events; and material or moral leverage to link cooperation with international norms to 
money, goods, or prestige. Finally, once a state has publicly endorsed said norms, they use 
accountability politics to expose the difference between its discourse and its practice. 
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Risse and Sikkink (1999) show, through their five-stage Spiral Model, how leverage and 
accountability strategies work to change state policy. Using the human rights movement as 
an example they argue that, in the first phase, repression may be so high that resource-rich 
actors in a TAN are prevented from acquiring information on the human rights situation in 
the target state, which results in their inability to place the issue on the international agenda. 
Then, in phase two, internalisation ultimately takes place as a result of slightly lessening 
repression, making it possible for a coalition of human rights TAN challengers to start 
lobbying Western states and international organisations regarding the human rights norm 
they would like to see adopted by the target state. However, the latter denies charges against 
it and the validity of the norm itself. In phase three, with international pressure escalating, 
the target state either further escalates repression and risks engendering a popular 
movement or revolution, or makes tactical concessions to ward off criticism. Yet, this is 
also an indication that the target state commits to the norm, albeit rhetorically. In phase 
four, the target state more openly consents to the norm, though there is still a gap between 
discourse and practice.  
Finally, phase five is characterised by long-term rule-consistent behaviour whereby the 
norm becomes fully institutionalised in the target state. Whereas resource-rich actors in a 
TAN are especially useful in the earlier stages by putting the norm-violating state on the 
international agenda by raising awareness of its violations, shaming, and empowering the 
weak domestic movement, the sustained activities of the latter become increasingly 
important in helping the transition from rhetorical responsiveness to norm 
institutionalisation. Elite allies then provide access, leverage, information, and even 
funding to local social movements, while at the same time improving their own 
international image as human rights champions (Sikkink and Keck, 1998). 
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The pressure-compliance assumption at the core of these conceptual models leads Keck 
and Sikkink to ignore the fact that the relationship between the target state and international 
actors need not be contentious. According to Wu (2005), powerful international actors 
collaborate with the target state because not all states are vulnerable to moral pressure and 
material sanctions – something which is not acknowledged by Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) 
Boomerang Pattern. This collaboration involves persuasion, demonstration, research 
collaboration, negotiation and can take the form of project partnerships and policy 
recommendation amongst others. Wu (2005) suggests that TANs educate, mobilise and 
collaborate with both the target state and domestic social movements, and, thus, act as a 
bridge that reduces the contentious relationship between these opposing actors, improves 
communication between them, and offers new channels of participation.  
Based on the Habermasian view of power as the ability to obtain goals through consensual 
communication (Habermas, 2000), this perspective claims that, in addition to using 
leverage to modify the behaviour of the violator state, TANs also mediate its relationship 
with domestic challengers in a more sustainable way. Resentful of TANs because of the 
loss of sovereignty they cause as a result of sates having to make important political 
decisions under external pressure (Hochstetler, 2002), states may be more responsive to 
persuasive techniques which give them a semblance of choice. Wu (2005) calls this 
strategy Double Mobilisation. Chapter 5 looks at how domestic and international elite 
actors attempt to persuade the Moroccan government to change its policy position on 
violence against women through leverage – moral or material, accountability politics – and 
through collaboration.  
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2.7. Perceptions of Elite Allyship 
In this section, I draw on the literature in social movements to highlight the significance of 
perception to judge the performance of elite allyship. I develop on this theme in the next two 
sections when I address the usefulness of elite allyship for social movements in the context of 
Morocco.  
Although opportunities can be external to the movement, their usefulness ultimately depends 
on whether they have been perceived by actors, and how they subsequently act on them.  It 
may be difficult for a social movement actor, with not much access to information, to accurately 
determine changes in power structures and resources (Opp, 2009, p. 169).This means that a 
change in perception of the external environment can elicit different responses, the same degree 
of repression or inclusion can have different effects on a social movement (Opp, 2009, p. 53). 
In a way then, opportunities are ‘made, perceived and seized by movements….Opportunities 
would not have had any impact had they not been seized’ (Klandermans, 1997, p. 167). 
However, it is not always the case that the perception of expanding opportunities encourages 
mobilisation, for activists may well choose to act when they perceive opportunities to be 
contracting (Suh, 2009). For instance, in the 1960s in the United States, the infiltration and 
disruption of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the organisation Students for a 
Democratic Society, may have been a form of deepening repression, but it increased sympathy 
towards the organisation because of the lack of trust in the FBI (Rohlinger and Gentile, 2017, 
p. 14). 
Despite the plausibility of this perspective, this definition is seldom utilised and tested 
empirically, because as Kriesi points out, information about the beliefs of actors is extremely 
difficult to access (Kriesi, 2007). However, this has led scholars to make simplistic assumptions 
and expect actors to know what is best for them, and subsequently behave according to rational 
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principles (Kriesi, 2007). Another difficulty is the fact that social movements systematically 
over-estimate opportunities for mobilisation and influence for strategic purposes (Gamson and 
Meyer, 1996). In the first instance, this allows them to convince potential participants that 
action is desirable because change is possible. They also highlight the risk of inaction and 
exaggerate the windows of opportunities that exist. Activists exaggerate the sense of possibility 
to entice potential recruits. Thus, opportunities may be framed differently than how they are 
actually perceived (Johnston, 2011). Nonetheless, no analysis of the significance of elite 
allyship can be complete without taking into account how recipients of support feel about it. I 
thus look at this aspect in Chapter 6.  
2.8.The Usefulness of Elite Allyship in the Middle East and North Africa  
To understand why social movements in non-democratic settings such as the Middle East and 
North Africa need elite allies for mobilisation and policy change, one needs to understand what 
it means to be a social movement in such settings. In this section, I argue that the social control 
of civil society groups such as social movements, makes it necessary to possess wasta, in the 
form of connections with the regime simply to exist, but also to achieve favourable policy 
change. I explain that relations with the political system allow activists to obtain useful 
resources and avoid repression, allowing them to engage in mobilisation. However, I argue that 
cultivating such relations and working through the system reinforce authoritarianism, and 
sustain activists’ dependence on un-democratic processes to achieve policy change. Thus, 
while support from unelected and unaccountable may be useful for mobilisation, it is also a 
less sustainable opportunity for policy change.  I start this section by providing a brief overview 
of the situation of civil society groups, like social movements, in the MENA and particularly 
in Morocco. I then discuss how working with and through an authoritarian political system 
allows civil society groups to achieve their goals. I subsequently address the unintended 
consequences of elite allies for social movements in authoritarian systems. I show that 
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Moroccan women’s rights activists are aware of the difficulties of drawing on the support of 
the King to achieve their goals. What transpires from this discussion is that while 
unaccountable actors are objectively speaking a better source of opportunity in authoritarian 
contexts, their support is not always perceived as being particularly helpful by activists.  
2.8.1. Civil Society in the Middle East and North Africa  
Though no standard definition of civil society exists, it can be broadly understood as a 
collection of institutions, organisations and individuals that are separate from the family, the 
state and the market, and which advance common interests voluntarily (Anheier, 2004). As 
civil society refers to associations of people that come together for a cause, it includes social 
movements. In the MENA, associational life has historically been restricted by the 
authoritarian nature of states (Bayat, 2013). Since the state controls the political, economic and 
social spheres, there is little space for an autonomous civil society to form (Bayat, 2013). This 
is particularly significant as the lack of a functioning political society22  in the Arab world 
means that civil society is where opposition politics really take place (Cavatorta, 2008). 
This restriction is enforced through laws and policies that place severe constraints on freedoms 
of expression, association and assembly, and through brutal crackdowns of individuals or 
groups that seek to violate these constraints. Reports by international NGOs such as Amnesty 
International and independent watchdogs such as Freedom House, show that little has changed 
after the wave of protests that shook the Arab world in late 2010, and which called for greater 
freedoms. Amnesty International’s most recent report on the region states that offline and 
online freedom of expression is tightly controlled, that authorities still clampdown on human 
                                                             
22 Brumberg defines this as ‘an autonomous realm of self-regulating political parties that have 
the constitutional authority to represent organized constituencies in parliaments’ (2002, p. 64). 
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rights activists, the press, and people from marginalised groups, such as the lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community (2018).  Freedom House’s Freedom in the Word 
report highlights that not only did Middle Eastern regimes keep on repressing dissent, some of 
them introduced even more repressive measures, such as Egypt which adopted a new law in 
2017, to restrict international funding for NGOs (Abramowitz, 2018). 
Morocco’s 2011 Constitution allows freedom of association and assembly. Article 29 of the 
2011 Constitution states that ‘the freedoms of reunion, of assembly, of peaceful demonstration, 
of association and of syndical and political membership [appartenance], are guaranteed’ 
(Ruchti, 2012, p. 10). Article 12 states that ‘the associations of civil society and the non-
governmental organizations are constituted and exercise their activities in all freedom, within 
respect for the Constitution and for the law’ (Ruchti, 2012, p. 7). However, these freedoms 
come with caveats. Article 3 of the 1958 Decree on the Right to Establish Associations forbids 
organisations whose goals are ‘illegal, contrary to good morals, [or which aim] to undermine 
the Islamic religion, the integrity of the national territory, or the monarchical regime, or call 
for discrimination’ (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2017). Moreover, arrests and 
unfair trials are rampant and independent human rights groups are harassed and experience 
restriction in their activities, through the denial of access to planned venues (Human Rights 
Watch, 2017b). Authorities also sometimes refuse to issue registration receipts, which are 
required for organisations to receive funds and carry out financial transactions (International 
Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2017). They even delay issuing the licences necessary for 
domestic fundraising (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2017). This can be 
illustrated through the treatment of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the 
Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (Moroccan Association for Human Rights, 
AMDH).  
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AMDH, the biggest independent human rights organisation, reported that the Moroccan 
authorities directly and indirectly blocked 125 of its activities, such as meetings and 
conferences, since July 2014 (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). It further added that they also 
tried to obstruct the registration of local branches and refuse to issue a receipt, affecting their 
ability to carry out important functions (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). Besides, the Moroccan 
government expelled two researchers from Amnesty International in June 2015, and banned its 
research activities in the country, along with those of Human Rights Watch the following 
September (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). This ‘de facto’ ban on these organisations’ research 
activities was still ongoing as of 2017 (Human Rights Watch, 2017b).  
2.8.2. Managing Authoritarian Constraints  
Associations that are harassed and denied permits and funds in Morocco are those that refuse 
to play by the rules of the game (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). Another strategy employed 
by the Makhzen is to ignore and deny the existence of active and independent associations, 
resulting in associations drawing on patronage politics to achieve their objectives such as 
changing policy (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009).  
For civil society groups in Morocco, close links with power-holders also means being given 
the status of utilite publique (public utility). The Ministry of the Interior – whose appointment 
is influenced by the King - can bestow upon an association this title, allowing it to raise funds, 
receive donations, own assets and benefit from fiscal immunities (Denoeux, 2007). Those that 
are not granted this status can only raise funds through members’ dues, which prevents them 
from raising much money at all (Denoeux, 2007). Other benefits of the label include making 
available venues to hold meetings, funding for activities, and assistance by public officials 
(Denoeux, 2002). However, the granting of this label depends on the presence of executive 
members loyal to the regime in the association and the goals of the association (Denoeux, 
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2002). This means that civil society groups need to establish close links with the regime and 
work with and through the political system, by avoiding to address sensitive topics.  
This use of personal connections in getting the label of public utility shows how significant 
wasta is in the associational sector. Wasta in a term that is specific to Arab societies and 
describes the use of connections to obtain resources that would otherwise be impossible or 
difficult to obtain (Ramady, 2015). Wasta is a derivative noun of the Arabic root wasaat, which 
means centre or middle. It concurrently refers to a process and a person: used in the abstract 
form, wasta is the practice of resorting to an intermediary to achieve ends, while a wasta is the 
person who acts as a go-between to help a party meet its objectives (Cunningham and Sarayrah, 
1993, p. 1). Its associated verb yatawasaat means ‘to steer conflicting parties towards a middle 
point or compromise’ (Cunningham and Sarayrah, 1993, p. 1). Thus, wasta can be either 
intermediary – where the role of the go-between is to mediate and arbitrate between groups of 
people (mainly families and tribes) – or intercessory - where he or she instead intercedes on 
behalf of someone to a third party, to help them obtain resources or acquire an advantage they 
would not normally achieve (Cunningham and Sarayrah, 1993: 8-10). In any case, since wasta 
is a an informal process that bypasses established institutions, it plays a role in sustaining 
unequal access to resources through undemocratic means. It is believed to permeate practically 
all aspects of social life in Arab countries, and influence the outcome of virtually any decision. 
As Farouson (1970: 270) states,  
‘One needs a wasta in order not to be cheated in the market place, in locating and acquiring a 
job, in resolving conflict and legal litigation, in winning a court decision, in speeding 
governmental action, and in establishing and maintaining political influence, bureaucratic 
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procedures, in finding a bride, and in fact, for the social scientist to locate and convince 
respondents to give an interview.’23 
In the context of Morocco, working with and through the system also means appealing directly 
to the King. This strategy has been employed by secular activists within the Moroccan women’s 
rights movements in their campaign for the reform of the Moudawana, as well as by Islamists 
opposing their campaign. As I state in chapter 4, the stalemate reached after the government’s 
presentation of a Plan d’Action National pour l’Integration de la Femme au Developpement 
(National Action Plan for the Integration of Women in Development, henceforth Plan) in 1999, 
led both Islamists and secular women’s rights activists to appeal to Mohamed VI to defend 
their views (Buskens, 2003). Islamists, who were against the Plan believed that only the King 
and the religious establishment had the authority to change family law, whereas secular 
women’s rights activists appealed to him because they felt threatened by Islamists, and the 
government seemed unable to help them (Buskens, 2003). Indeed, after the large protests of 
12th March 2000 pitting Islamists against secular activists, the socialist government of 
Youssoufi decided to create a commission to study some of the proposals of the Plan and 
relegate the reform of the Moudawana to the King, as per constitutional provisions (Ouali, 
2008). 
Even though representative institutions are unable to channel demands, activists do appeal to 
them, though they cannot avoid the risk of the King appropriating the debate. In the early 1990s, 
the Union de l’Action Feministe (Union of Feministe Action, UAF) launched a petition to 
collect one million signatures to pressure Parliament and the Prime Minister to reform the 
Moudawana (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). UAF addressed elected officials rather than the 
King because it wanted the reform to be the outcome of a democratic parliamentary debate, 
                                                             
23 Quoted in Al Ramahi (2008, p. 36). 
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rather than strengthen authoritarianism by appealing to the King, a view shared by many in the 
secular current of the Moroccan women’s rights movement (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). 
Nonetheless, as I discuss in chapter 4, the King drew on his title as Commander of the Faithful 
to arbitrate on this issue and monopolise the debate.  
However, bypassing democratically elected institutions and appealing to the King gets 
controversial policies passed. Not only was the Moudawana reformed in 2004, at the request 
of the King, but so was the Nationality Code a few years later.  Leading associations within the 
secular current of the movement directly addressed Mohamed VI to reform the Nationality 
Code to allow Moroccan women married to non-Moroccan men to pass on their citizenship to 
their children (Yachoulti, 2015). After meeting with a group of Moroccan women married to 
non-Moroccan men who explained the difficulties faced by their children, during a royal visit 
in 2005, the King promised to address the situation (Yachoulti, 2015). True to his words, on 
30th July 2015, during his speech from the throne, he announced that Moroccan women could 
pass on their nationality to children born to non-Moroccan men, and tasked the government 
with submitting proposals to allow this to happen (Yachoulti, 2015). Parliament and the cabinet 
subsequently adopted a draft bill to reform the Nationality Code in 2007 (Yachoulti, 2015). 
Though Moroccan women could not pass on their nationality to their non-Moroccan husbands, 
this was an important achievement, as in Arab and Muslim societies, nationality is transferred 
by the father. Another case in point is the introduction of reserved seats for women in 
Parliament. In 2002, Mohamed VI proposed a new law enshrining this, and Parliament 
subsequently approved it, designating 30 reserved seats for women (Wuerth, 2005). 
 
 
Page 90 of 395 
 
2.8.3. Reinforcing Authoritarianism  
Since reforms that challenge established values can be passed thanks to the King who can 
exploit his role as Commander of the Faithful and descendant of the Prophet, the latter is a key 
potential ally for policy change. However, cultivating wasta and appealing to the King reinforce 
authoritarianism, as I touched upon in the previous section. In her authoritative book on state-
civil society relations in the MENA, Jamal (2007) argues that seeking out the support of public 
officials through informal channels legitimises authoritarianism and clientelism.24 Granted 
state-sponsored associations receive short-term benefits and privileges not accorded to others, 
being clients reduces their autonomy, weakens their relationship with other civil society 
groups, and increases their dependence on non-democratic channels to exist and achieve their 
goals (Jamal, 2007). Their dependence on state resources and benefits means that they are more 
likely to support state-sponsored programmes, even if these are non-democratic (Jamal, 2007). 
In the long-term, this allows authoritarianism to persist. 
For Cavatorta and Dalmasso (2009), the reform of the Moudawana through un-democratic 
means in 2004 poses two important problems, even if women’s rights activists appealed to the 
King. First, the bypassing of elected institutions by an unelected and unaccountable King stifled 
public discussion and prevented political elites from gauging what people thought about the 
proposed reform (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). Second, it led to an unsatisfactory 
implementation of the law, because the Makhzen has little interest in enforcing the legislation, 
since it could stir up opposition and political unrest (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). Thus, the 
king may be more useful as an ally that helps pass policies and laws, rather than an ally that 
helps enforce them. Based on the aforementioned discussion, I expect Moroccan women’s 
                                                             
24 Clientelism is a practice that ‘provides clients with paths to exclusive services and influence 
in return for their support of their patron’ (Jamal, 2007, p. 14).  
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rights activists to nurture relations with both unelected and elected political actors to obtain 
reforms to combat violence against women. I expect them to perceive the King as he is the 
supreme decision-maker. He either initiates reforms or approves them. However, as I have 
mentioned above, some activists care about the mechanisms through which reforms are 
implemented. Thus, I also expect them to appeal to, and look favourably on an alliance with 
parliament, political parties, and the government. It would be interesting to see if in the case of 
combatting violence against women, which is not as controversial as reforming family 
relationships, activists feel the need to involve the King in the debate.  
2.9. Conclusion 
In conclusion, in this chapter, I have described the ways in which elite actors at the domestic 
and international level can act as a source of opportunity for social movements, particularly 
with regards to their policy influence and mobilisation. I have drawn on the literature on 
domestic social movements, political representation and transnational advocacy networks to 
formulate some theoretical questions that I will examine in subsequent chapters.  More 
specifically, I have argued that there are four specific ways in which different types of political 
elites interact with domestic social movements with important implications for their policy 
influence.  
Firstly, they provide symbolic support by speaking on behalf of domestic social movement 
organisations in the public sphere; in other words, by representing their interests to other 
publics. Secondly, they provide moral, material, human, and informational resources, to help 
them survive and have an impact. Thirdly, they can take a more pro-active role and use their 
position to engage with the target of change through to persuade it to change its position on an 
issue-area. Elite actors can also work with social movements as part of networks or coalitions. 
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Finally, to be considered as such, elite allies rely on domestic social movements’ evaluation of 
their performances. I explore these issues in the ensuing empirical chapters.   
Through an exploration of the political system in Morocco and state-civil society relations, I 
have shown that the sources of elite allyship may be different under authoritarian political 
systems. I have argued that in Morocco, the sweeping powers of the King make democratic 
and representative institutions less useful as potential sources of elite allyship, because they are 
constrained in their behaviour and choices. However, I have also touched upon the unintended 
consequences of elite allyship from unaccountable and unelected actors. I have shown that the 
King of Morocco has provided support to Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions, 
particularly in the context of the reform of the Moudawana. However, I have also highlighted 
that his support risks deeping authoritarianism, as he draws on undemocratic means to effect 
change. I have also pointed out that activists in Morocco are conscious of the dangers of support 
from authoritarian institutions, and have attempted at times to appeal to representative 
institutions. As we will see in my case study in chapters 5 and 6, activists do not seek to appeal 
to the King to criminalise violence against women. In fact, the King does not play a major role 
in this debate, unlike the contentions issue of the reform of the Moudawana in the 1990s and 
2000s. Before addressing these issues, I turn to the literature on social movements in my next 
chapter to uncover the extent to which different types of opportunities, and particularly the 
presence of elite allies, influence policy change favourable to social movements.  
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3.Opportunities, Mobilisation and Policy 
Change: A Meta-Analysis 
3.1. Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I have demonstrated that  the concept of opportunity forms a core tenet 
of the political process model, which advances that social movements do not operate in a 
vacuum, but find their characteristics fashioned by the political context (Meyer and Minkoff, 
2004). Uncertainty with regards to the meaning of opportunities has led experts to lament that 
it has become so inclusive that it risks explaining nothing at all (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; 
Jenkins, Jacobs and Agnone, 2003; Kriesi, 2007).   
In addition to this ambiguity and overreaching, Goodwin et al. (1999) have called out the 
structural bias prevalent in most discussions of political opportunities. In their critique, they 
condemn the prominence given to structural variables – ‘factors that are relatively stable over 
time and outside the control of movement actors’ – and the tendency to analyse non-structural 
variables as structural ones (Goodwin, Jasper and Khattra, 1999, p. 29). Amongst other things, 
they suggest paying a greater attention to cultural dynamics and strategic processes, and 
disaggregating opportunities into specific dimensions, to allow for a clearer distinction between 
the different kinds that exist (Goodwin, Jasper and Khattra, 1999, p. 53).  Scholars have since 
attempted to remedy this structural bias by stressing dynamic and/or cultural features in their 
interpretations. More restricted approaches have been developed, such as discursive, legal, 
economic, and supra-national opportunities. 
In this chapter, I examine the explanatory strength of these different models of opportunity 
through a meta-analysis. A meta-analysis is ‘an analysis of analyses’ (GLASS, 1976, p. 4). In 
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this method, the findings of existing studies are integrated and analysed statistically, to provide 
a more precise view of the relationship between different phenomena. By systematically 
analysing existing knowledge, a meta-analysis helps to highlight areas of bias and neglect in 
the literature (Cancela and Geys, 2016). This chapter is concerned with systematically 
analysing the relationship between policy change and aspects of the external environment 
associated with the political, discursive, legal, socio-economic and supranational opportunity 
models, controlling for the presence of social movement mobilisation. This allows me to 
examine how important different types of external factors are for social movements wishing to 
influence policy, and to what extent the presence of elite allies is significant. I do not simply 
examine whether a variable representing an opportunity is associated with policy change, but 
also goes some way towards offering an idea of its potential effect size, by using combined test 
techniques using proxy values, based on whether the outcome is a success, a failure or an 
anomaly; a procedure borrowed from Smets and van Ham (2013) and Geys (2006). I test 
measurements of opportunities in 1384 independent tests from 47 quantitative empirical 
articles published in academic journals in English between 1978 and 2014. My findings show 
that most dimensions of opportunity are not strong predictors of policy outcomes favourable to 
a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. This is particularly true with regards to 
variables measuring the presence of potential or actual elite allies. Despite expectations in the 
literature, elite allies do not seem to be particularly relevant for policy change, controlling for 
social movement mobilisation. 
3.2. Data 
I used three literature search methods to identify relevant sources: 1) database searching, 2) 
citation search and 3) bibliographic screening of review articles on the political and policy 
outcomes of social movements (Figure 1). The review articles include Burstein and Linton 
(2002), Uba (2009), Amenta et al. (2010), Andrews and Edwards (2004), and Giugni (Giugni, 
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1998).  I also searched four relevant databases: Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts 
(ASSIA), International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS), Sociological Abstracts, 
and Worldwide Political Science Abstracts. The text word strategy employed the following 
search terms: (SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OR PROTEST) AND (POLICY OR REFORM OR 
EFFECTS OR OUTCOMES OR IMPACT).  Initially, I screened the title and abstract of all 
retrieved results to identify potentially pertinent articles. I further inspected those kept to 
determine if they met the inclusion criteria. The final sample includes 47 studies (Table 1). 
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Figure 1: Literature Search Diagram25 
 
 
 
                                                             
25 Template adapted from (Moher et al., 2015). 
Figure 1 
Literature Search Diagram  
 
Template adapted from: Moher D, Liberati A, Tetzlaff J, Altman DG, The PRISMA Group (2009). Preferred 
Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: The PRISMA Statement. PLoS  Med 6(6): 
e1000097. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed1000097    
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Table 1: Included Studies 
 
 
Table 1 - Included Studies  
Author  Year  Journal  
Paul Burstein, William Freudenburg 1978 American Journal of Sociology 
Larry Isaac, William R. Kelly 1981 American Journal of Sociology 
Linda L. Fowler, Ronald G. Shaiko 1987 American Journal of Political 
Science 
Edwin Amenta, Bruce G. Carruthers, Yvonne Zylan 1992 American Journal of Sociology 
Alexander Hicks, Joya Misra 1993 American Journal of Sociology 
Theda Skocpol, Marjorie Abend-Wein, Christopher Howard, Susan 
GoodrichLehmann 
1993 American Political Science Review 
Michael Patrick Allen and John L. Campbell 1994 Social Forces 
Edwin Amenta, Kathleen Dunleavy, Mary Bernstein 1994 American Sociological Review 
Nancy K. Cauthen, Edwin Amenta 1996 American Sociological Review 
Scott P. Hays, Michael Esler, Carol E. Hays 1996 Publius 
Richard C. Fording 1997 American Journal of Political 
Science 
Wayne A. Santoro, Gail M. McGuire 1997 Social Problems 
Francisco O. Ramirez, Yasemin Soysal, Suzanne Shanahan 1997 American Sociological Review 
Ryken Grattet, Valerie Jenness, Theodore R. Curry 1998 American Sociological Review 
Edwin Amenta, Drew Halfmann, Michael Young 1999 Mobilization 
David John Frank, Elizabeth H. Mceneaney 1999 Social Forces 
Regina Werum 1999 Social Forces 
Sarah A. Soule, Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, Yang Su 1999 Mobilization 
Edwin Amenta, Drew Halfmann 2000 American Sociological Review 
Kenneth Andrews 2001 American Sociological Review 
Richard C. Fording 2001 American Political Science Review 
David Jacobs, Ronald Helms 2001 Social Forces 
Holly J. McCammon, Karen E. Campbell, Ellen M. Granberg, 
Christine Mowery 
2001 American Sociological Review 
Wayne A. Santoro 2002 Social Forces 
Sarah A. Soule, Susan Olzak 2004 American Sociological Review 
Paul Ingram, Hayagreeva Rao 2004 American Journal of Sociology 
Edwin Amenta, Neal Caren, Sheera Joy Olasky 2005 American Sociological Review 
Brayden G. King, Marie Cornwall, Eric C. Dahlin 2005 Social Forces 
Laurel S Weldon 2006 Political Research Quarterly 
Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro 2006 Latin American Research Review 
Sarah A. Soule, Brayden G. King 2006 American Journal of Sociology 
Jon Agnone   2007 Social Forces 
Anthony S. Chen 2007 American Journal of Sociology 
Marie Cornwall, Brayden G King, Elizabeth M. Legerski, Eric C. 
Dahlin, Kendra S. Schiffman 
2007 Mobilization 
Susan Olzak, Emily Ryo 2007 Social Forces 
Holly J. McCammon, Courtney Sanders Muse, Harmony D. 
Newman, Theresa M. Terrell 
2007 American Sociological Review 
Brayden G. King, Keith G. Bentele, Sarah A. Soule 2007 Social Forces 
Wayne A. Santoro 2008 Social Forces 
Erik W. Johnson 2008 Social Forces 
Susan Olzak, Sarah A. Soule 2009 Social Forces 
Holly J. McCammon 2009 Mobilization 
Erik W. Johnson, Jon Agnone, John D. McCarthy 2010 Social Forces 
Art Budros 2011 Mobilization 
Stefaan Walgrave and Rens Vliegenthart 2012 Mobilization 
Mala Htun, S. Laurel Weldon 2012 American Sociological Review 
Art Budros 2013 Sociological Perspectives 
Justin Peter Steil, Ion Bogdan Vasi 2014 American Journal of Sociology 
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When carrying out the literature search for this meta-analysis, it quickly became evident that 
as Giugni (2004, p. 20) notes, ‘the field is not as empty as several observers have maintained.’ 
I applied some restrictions. In terms of the nature of the sources, this consisted in including 
only peer-reviewed journal articles published in English. Given the selectivity of journal 
publishers, using peer-reviewed materials gives some assurance that the research is of sufficient 
academic standard. For pragmatic reasons, I considered only one type of source and one 
language. Reviews on the subject demonstrate that a great majority of the works are authored 
by American scholars and communicated mainly via articles (Burstein and Linton, 2002; Uba, 
2009). Thus, it can safely be assumed that a significant proportion of relevant studies is not 
overlooked.   
The analysis of only peer-reviewed works has been argued to cause bias, due to the ‘file drawer’ 
problem, a term coined by Rosenthal (1979) to suggest that statistically non-significant findings 
are less likely to be published. However, studies conducted by Dalton et al. (2012) to check 
this assumption, demonstrate that selecting only peer-reviewed works for meta-analyses does 
not inflate results and does not undermine the validity of conclusions drawn by such types of 
analysis.  
A second condition in the research involved the use of studies that draw on quantitative 
methods. This is because qualitative investigations do not allow an appreciation of the 
statistical significance of explanatory variables, and do not therefore, allow comparisons across 
studies to be made, making them unsuitable for a meta-analysis.  
Third, I only included positive policy change for social movements, again for the sake of 
comparability, as the factors that are associated with favourable and unfavourable policy 
changes may not necessarily be the same.  
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Fourth, a crucial aspect for consideration was the inclusion of models containing at least one 
explanatory variable measuring an aspect of the external environment, in conjunction with 
variables measuring protest activities. This is because my study is only interested in the 
relationship between opportunities and policy change under the presence of mobilisation.  
Fifth, the sample only includes opportunity variables for which there is some information on 
their expected relationship with policy, based on the literature.  I placed this limitation to ensure 
that there is reasonable confidence that a given variable measures a dimension of opportunity.26 
Finally, included in the sample are only those studies with enough information on the level of 
statistical significance used, and on the operationalisation of variables, to help with hypothesis 
testing. Further, only independent relationships are included, not interaction effects, to help 
determine the independent impact of variables on policy. 
3.3. Method 
I use a meta-analysis of relevant quantitative works in this chapter because it can help 
determine which model(s) and dimension(s) of opportunity have the greatest explanatory 
power, and highlight biases and neglects in the literature. A meta-analysis is an analytical 
method that uses statistical methods to integrate findings from different independent and 
comparable studies to offer a more objective review of the literature than traditional, narrative 
approaches (Egger and Smith, 1997). Contrary to a literature review, a meta-analysis allows us 
to quantify the impact of an independent  variable on a given outcome, and thereby understand 
which variables contribute to systematic differences across and within studies (Imbeau, Pétry 
and Lamari, 2001).  
                                                             
26 Because of this limitation, I did not include the following control variables: time, mayor-
council government and environmental degradation. 
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Since the studies in this sample employ different statistical estimations, I use a simplified meta-
analytical technique borrowed from Imbeau et al (2001), Geys (2006), and Smets and van Ham 
(2013), and which involves vote counting and combining tests. Vote counting is used to 
calculate the success rate of a hypothesis and involves counting the number of times a given 
hypothesis is a success, a failure, or an anomaly. Each test of a hypothesis is assigned a 
category. A test is a success (+1) if the coefficient is statistically significant and in the expected 
direction, a failure (0), if the coefficient is in the expected direction but is not statistically 
significant, or an anomaly (-1) if the coefficient is statistically significant, but follows an 
unexpected direction (Geys, 2006).  
For each hypothesis, the modal category is established, depending on whether or not most tests 
of this hypothesis are successes, failures or anomalies (Geys, 2006). Finally, the success rate 
is calculated by dividing the number of successful tests by the total number of tests of a given 
hypothesis (Geys, 2006).  The higher the success rate, the higher the confidence in a hypothesis. 
In this research, this means that the higher the success rate of an opportunity variable, the higher 
the confidence that it has a significant and positive association with policy change favourable 
to a social movement.  
This procedure is not just calculated at the test level, but also at the study level. This is because 
since one study can include multiple tests, the outcomes of tests cannot be taken as being 
independent of one another (Imbeau, Pétry and Lamari, 2001; Geys, 2006; Smets and van Ham, 
2013). To do this, each test within a study is assigned a weight, and this is used to establish the 
modal category and the average success rate of the study (Imbeau, Pétry and Lamari, 2001; 
Geys, 2006; Smets and van Ham, 2013). To summarise, the following equation is used to 
calculate the success rate at the test and study level:  
Success rate = (successes/number of tests) *100  
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Since the success rate does not help determine the effect size of a variable, I follow previous 
scholars (Imbeau, Pétry and Lamari, 2001; Geys, 2006; Smets and van Ham, 2013) in using a 
simplified ‘combined test’27 to obtain a proxy measure of the average effect of an independent 
variable on an outcome variable based on test statistics. This involves initially calculating the 
proxy effect size for each test, by assigning a weight of +1 if the test is a success (i.e. the 
relationship is significant and in the expected direction), a weight of 0 if the test is a failure 
(i.e. the relationship is in the expected direction but not significant), and a weight of -1 if the 
tests is an anomaly (i.e. the relationship is significant but in another direction). I use the 
following formula to calculate the proxy effect size at the test level: 
r = (successes-anomalies)/number of tests  
The average effect size for each independent variable across the sample is calculated using the 
following formula: 
rav= Σri/number of studies  
This formula gives a value between +1 and -1 and a one sample t-test is undertaken to measure 
if it is statistically different from zero. This value measures by how many units of standard 
deviation the outcome variable changes if the independent variable changes by one standard 
deviation. It thereby allows us to determine if an independent variable has a statistically 
significant effect on an outcome variable.28 In this analysis, the significance level is taken to 
                                                             
27 Combined tests refer to procedures that involve statistically summarising the results of 
different tests by drawing on significance levels or weighted test statistics (Wolf, 1986). 
28 For more information on this approach, see Imbeau et al. (2001), Geys (2006) and Smets and 
van Ham (2013). 
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be at least p < 0.05,29 as this is the cut-off most commonly used in the studies under 
investigation. Since the average effect size is a standardised measure, it can be used to compare 
magnitudes.  
3.4. Measurement of Concepts  
In this meta-analysis, I group opportunity variables based on whether or not they form a 
dimension of the following models: a) political, b) discursive, c) legal, d) socio-economic, or 
supra-national level.30  I operationalise the different dimensions of opportunities, types of 
mobilisation strategies, and stages of the policy-making process with guidance from the 
literature on social movements and I describe them in the empirical section.   
The outcome variable of interest is change in policy. However, as policy change is measured 
in relation to the issue at hand, it is not possible to combine and compare results using these 
precise measurements.31 Thus, I disaggregated policy change into four categories - agenda-
setting, policy passage, policy implementation and policy repeal. The first one refers to 
commitment, or the ‘list of items which decision-makers have formally accepted for serious 
                                                             
29 Scholars in various disciplines have begun moving away from using the p value as an 
indication of statistical significance, towards other methods, such as using confidence intervals 
(Gardner and Altman, 1986; Johnson, 1999). However, since different papers report different 
additional measures of statistical significance, I use instead their common denominator – the p 
value. 
30 The full breakdown is detailed in the codebook in the appendix. 
31 I have selected these categories because the dependent variables used in the studies fit nicely 
into them. I do not assume in this research that there is a linear relationship between these 
stages, nor that these are the only or the most important stages of the policy-making process.   
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consideration’ (Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1976, p. 126), and includes hearings, bills, and roll call 
votes (Theriault and Shafran, 2013, p. 57). The second refers to the enactment or successful 
formulation of policies, such as major legislations (Andrews and Edwards, 2004, p. 493). The 
third stage refers to the execution or enforcement of existing policies (O’Toole, 2000; Andrews 
and Edwards, 2004, p. 498). Finally, policy repeal refers to the repeal of a policy harmful to a 
social movement.  
In terms of mobilisation, I take institutional and non-institutional protest as being two different 
forms of political persuasion, which are differentiated from one another with regards to their 
engagement with the political system. Whereas I conceptualise the first as being a strategy that 
emphasises bargaining and negotiation, I conceptualise the second as being a more disruptive 
way of voicing concerns, such as demonstrations (Rucht, 2001, p. 126). Since it is not always 
possible to directly measure protest activity on an issue, scholars sometimes draw on 
membership to social movement organisations to measure social movement activity. Such 
measures are also used as representing social movement mobilisation.  I constructed a 
codebook, inspired by Smets and van Ham’s (2013) to describe the characteristics of the 
sampled tests and studies, and clarify how the independent variables are grouped (see 
Appendix).   
3.5. Sample Overview  
Table 1 suggests that the systematic analysis of the relationship between opportunities, 
mobilisation and policy change is a recent phenomenon, as most studies in the sample were 
published in the 2000s. Most of this analysis was published in top sociology journals (Table 2).  
This over-representation of sociology journals is in line with criticisms that the literature on 
social movements suffers from a lack of engagement with a broader body of related 
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disciplines.32 Additionally, despite not restricting the sample, studies predominantly come from 
top American journals, which is also in line with the assessment of existing literature reviews 
(Burstein and Linton, 2002; Amenta and Caren, 2007; Amenta et al., 2010).  
Furthermore, in the same vein as a preceding meta-analysis by Uba (2009), findings on this 
subject matter are largely based on the American experience, with very few attempts at cross-
national comparisons, despite greater calls for such approaches (Giugni, 1998).  
Women’s issues are particularly well represented, with twelve out of 47 studies focusing on 
them. The least represented issues are those focused on pensioners, peace and LGBT+ people, 
which account for less than three studies each. With regards to policy change, the modal 
category is policy passage, followed by policy implementation and agenda-setting.  Based on 
Table 2, the socio-economic opportunity model is the most widely used one, followed by the 
discursive, political, legal and supra-national opportunity models. Thus, despite the political 
opportunity model being the first one to be popularised in the literature on social movements, 
it is not the one that is the most systematically analysed.   
 
                                                             
32 See the Fall 2013, Spring and Fall 2014 issues of Critical Mass Bulletin, the newsletter of 
the Section on Collective Behaviour and Social Movements of the American Sociological 
Association. 
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Table 2 - Sample Description  
Aspects  Tests Studies 
Issue  Ecology/environmental  219  6 
Labour 106 5 
Pension 24 2 
Civil Rights 270 11 
Women 465 12 
Peace/Anti-war 2 1 
LBGT+ 6 1 
Welfare 259 8 
Several 33 1 
Total  1384 47 
Geographical Location  North America 1139 42 
South America 13 1 
Europe 33 1 
Asia 0 0 
Africa 0 0 
Oceania 0 0 
Cross-regional  199 3 
Total 1384 47 
Dependent Variable  agenda setting 249 12 
policy passage 715 24 
Policy implementation  408 19 
Policy repeal  12 1 
Total  1384 56* 
Theoretical 
Framework 
Political Opportunity 
Model 
276 33 
Discursive Opportunity 
Model 
376 41 
Legal Opportunity 
Model 
210 28 
Socio-economic 
Opportunity Model 
397 33 
Supra-national 
Opportunity Model 
125 15 
Total  1384 150* 
Mobilisation Membership 487 21 
Non-institutional protest 216 8 
Institutional protest 39 4 
Several 642 20 
Total 1384 53* 
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3.6. Empirical Findings  
This section outlines the basic assumptions behind each model of opportunity and the findings 
of the meta-analysis. I do not report findings for opportunity variables that are included in two 
or one studies, as this low number did not allow a one sample t-test to be carried out on them 
(Smets and van Ham, 2013). 
3.6.1. The Political Opportunity Model  
The dimensions of the political opportunity model relate to political institutions, and 
specifically to the degree of access to the political system. A general conceptualisation has been 
offered by McAdam (1982, p. 41), for whom a political opportunity is ‘any event or broad 
social process that serves to undermine the calculations on which the political establishment is 
structured.’ In this section, I look at the following dimensions hypothesised to affect access to 
the political system: the party of the executive, the degree of political openness, election year, 
electoral competition, the ruling political party, whether or not politicians share the same socio-
economic status as that of protesters, the presence of open political parties, administrative 
capacity, and endorsement of a social movement or protesters by political figures. The results 
of the meta-analysis for these variables are presented in Table 3.  
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Note: *** = statistically significant at the 99% level, ** =  statistically significant at the 95% 
level.  
 
 
Table 3 - Political Opportunity Model  
 
Variable  Success 
(1) 
Failure 
(0) 
Anomaly 
(-1) 
Modal 
Category  
Success 
Rate  
Effect 
size  
P 
value 
Executive (left) Tests 
(54) 
9 43 2 Failure 16.67 .13 *** 
Studies 
(9) 
1 8 0 Failure 11.11 .09  
Political Openness Tests 
(36) 
23 13 0 Success 63.89 .64 *** 
Studies 
(8) 
5 3 0 Success 62.50 .59 *** 
Electoral Competition Tests 
(31) 
7 22 2 Failure 22.58 .16 *** 
Studies 
(12) 
1 10 1 Failure 8.33 .12  
Election Year  Tests 
(30) 
20 6 4 Success 66.67 .53 *** 
Studies 
(5) 
3 1 1 Success 60.00 .25  
Government (left) Tests 
(26) 
9 16 1 Failure 34.62 .31 *** 
Studies 
(9) 
1 8 0 Failure 12.50 .20 ** 
SES Politicians Tests 
(24) 
9 15 0 Failure 37.50 .38 n/a 
Studies 
(6) 
1 5 0 Failure 16.67 .25  
Open Political parties Tests 
(13) 
5 8 0 Failure 38.46 .38 *** 
Studies 
(4) 
1 3 0 Failure 25.00 .33  
Administrative 
Capacity  
Tests 
(10) 
9 1 0 Success 90.00 .90 *** 
Studies 
(3) 
2 1 0 Success 66.67 .83 ** 
Political Endorsement Tests (7) 1 6 0 Failure  14.29 .14 *** 
Studies 
(3) 
0 3 0 Failure .00 .08  
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Executive and Government (Left)  
A left-wing or progressive executive is theorised as being a key ally in power (Olzak and Ryo, 
2007), though this is due to the literature’s focus on left-wing social movements. The 
predominance of studies focusing on US-based social movements means that this is measured 
as the presence of a Democratic president in this sample. Democrats are hypothesised as being 
liberal on key social issues, and therefore as being generally more sympathetic to rights-
focused social movement, such as women’s rights movements (Soule et al., 1999), civil rights 
movements (Santoro, 2008), environmental movements (Johnson, 2008; Johnson, Agnone and 
McCarthy, 2010). Based on these expectations, I hypothesise that the years in which a 
Democratic president - or one coming from a left-wing part - is in power as having a significant 
and positive effect on policy change, controlling for said movement’s mobilisation.  
Much like a left-wing executive, a left-wing government is hypothesised to have a positive 
influence on policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. 
Again, due to the dominance of American-based social movements, the measure of government 
that is used in this sample is Democratic party dominance in both the legislative and the 
executive branches of government. In general, whether it is seen as being a centrist or a left-
wing party (Cauthen and Amenta, 1996, p. 430), the Democratic party is argued to be ‘reform-
oriented’ (Amenta, Caren and Olasky, 2005). I thus expect that governments controlled by left-
wing or progressive parties to be positively associated with policy change.  
With regards to left-wing executive, Table 3 shows that this variable is the most widely tested 
one, appearing in 54 tests in 9 studies. However, the modal category is failure and the success 
rate at the test and study levels is below 20%. The average effect size is only 0.13 at the test 
level and 0.09 at the study, but also only statistically significant at the test level. Two tests are 
anomalies and suggest that the presence of a non-left-wing executive may be associated with 
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policy change favourable to a social movement. This suggests that controlling for social 
movement mobilisation, the presence of a left-wing executive does not have an influence on 
policy change favourable to a social movement.  
Similarly, with regards to left-wing government, the modal category is failure. Out of 26 tests, 
16 are failures, whereas out of 9 studies, 8 are failures, which is also reflected in the fact that 
there is a large difference between the success rate at the test level and the success rate at the 
study level. Moreover, while the effect size is relatively small – at 0.31 at the test level and 
0.20 at the study level - it is statistically significant at both levels. 
The fact that a left-wing government or executive does not act as a source of political 
opportunity lends credence to the idea that because parties in government and mainstream 
parties have to represent and be accountable to the general public, they are more constrained 
than opposition and niche parties in actively supporting social movements (Hutter and 
Vliegenthart, 2016). 
Political Openness 
Political openness refers to the level of democratisation, and is hypothesised as encouraging 
social spending (Amenta, Carruthers and Zylan, 1992; Amenta and Halfmann, 2000). It is 
based on the premise that political openness is driven by a willingness to expand democratic 
rights (Cornwall et al., 2007). It is also based on the belief that the expansion of welfare 
provision follows the expansion of social and political rights (Fording, 2001). Functioning 
democratic institutions encourage political representatives to support social support to citizens 
(Cauthen and Amenta, 1996, p. 429). Thus, I hypothesise a significant and positive relationship 
between political openness and policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for 
mobilisation.  
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The meta-analysis shows that political openness appears in 36 tests in 8 studies, most of which 
are successes. The success rate is relatively high, nearing 64% and 63% at the test and study 
level respectively, and the effect size is statistically significant and moderately large, at 0.64 
and 0.59 at the test and study levels respectively. We can thus deduce that political openness 
is a good predictor of policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for 
mobilisation.  
Electoral Competition 
Competitive elections are hypothesised to be associated with the passage of progressive public 
policies because they encourage greater debate, which in turn increases voter interest and 
turnout (Olzak and Soule, 2004). Since a wide variety of interests are represented, politicians 
face more political uncertainty, and therefore try to court mass support and champion policies 
that are more inclusive (Skocpol and Abend-Wein, 1993; King, Bentele and Soule, 2007). In 
fact, politicians will particularly try to appeal to pressure groups and consider new issues and 
interests (King, Bentele and Soule, 2007). Therefore, greater levels of electoral competition 
can be expected to be associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, 
controlling for mobilisation.  
In the meta-analysis, electoral competition is included in 31 tests within 12 studies. The modal 
category is failure because out of these, 22 tests and 10 studies are failures. The success rate is 
22.58% at the test level, and significantly lower at the study level, at 8.33%. Additionally, the 
effect size is low, and stands at 0.16 and 0.12 at the test and study level respectively, though it 
does not appear to be statistically different from zero in the latter case. It can thus be deduced 
that electoral competition is not a good predictor of policy change, under the presence of social 
movement mobilisation.  
Election Year  
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Scholars expect increased attention towards social issues during an election year because 
politicians want to be (re)-elected (Agnone, 2007). They therefore try to portray themselves 
favourably to the electorate and try to satisfy public pressure (Ibid). Legislative activity, 
especially that concerning bill or law passage, therefore increases during an election year 
(Johnson, Agnone and McCarthy, 2010). It is thus possible to expect election year to be 
positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for 
mobilisation.  
In my meta-analysis, election year appears in 30 tests and 5 studies and the modal category is 
success. The success rate is relatively high at both the test and study level – at 66.7% and 60.0% 
respectively. However, the effect size at the test level is roughly twice as large than the effect 
size at the study level, with the former being 0.53 and the latter being 0.25, and only statistically 
significant at the test level. Overall, the results confirm the hypothesis, and consequently, 
election year is a good predictor of policy change favourable to a mobilising social movement.  
SES Politicians  
Politicians who belong to the constituency of a social movement are assumed to be more 
receptive to its claims. Elected female officials are argued to support pro-women policies, such 
as the Equal Rights Amendment (Soule et al., 1999; Olzak and Soule, 2004; Weldon, 2006). 
Elected Latino officials are hypothesised to be potential allies of pro-immigrant policies in the 
United States (Steil and Vasi, 2014). Therefore, we can hypothesise that there is a positive 
association between the presence of politicians who share the same socio-economic status as a 
movement and policy change favourable to said movement, controlling for mobilisation.  
In the meta-analysis, this hypothesis is examined in 24 tests within 6 studies. However, the 
modal category is failure, with 15 tests and 5 studies being failures. The success rate is not very 
high, at 37.5% at the test level and 16.67% at the study level. The effect size is equally low, at 
Page 112 of 395 
 
0.38 and 0.15 at the test and study level respectively. These findings challenge the assumptions 
of the literature and suggest that the presence of politicians who share the same socio-economic 
status of a social movement are not supportive of policy change that is good for them. This 
failure could be linked to the institutional environment which places material constraints on 
institutional actors, or their strategic decisions. As I have discussed in the theoretical 
framework, elite actors’ support for social movements is influenced by their ideology, the 
constraints on their behaviour, or their unwillingness to use their privileged position to help 
them.  
Open Political Parties  
Patronage-oriented political parties are argued to be negatively associated with progressive 
public policies. This is because they are biased towards individualistic and discretionary 
policies than social programmes (Amenta, Carruthers and Zylan, 1992; Cauthen and Amenta, 
1996). Such parties are said to be closed to social programs (Cauthen and Amenta, 1996). It 
can thus be expected that open political parties, which are not patronage-oriented, to have a 
positive effect on policies favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.  
This variable is examined in 13 tests within 4 studies in my meta-analysis. The modal category 
is failure, as 8 tests out of 15 and 3 studies out of 4 are failures. Both the success rate and the 
effect size are relatively small. The former is 38.46% and 25.00%, while the latter is 0.38 and 
0.33 at the test and study level respectively. Thus, there is no positive and significant 
relationship between the lack of patronage-oriented parties, or the presence of open parties, and 
policy change favourable to a social movement.  
Administrative Capacity  
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The strength of public administration is argued to influence the ability of implementing policies 
(Amenta and Halfmann, 2000). More specifically, bureaucrats who work on an issue aligned 
with the interests of a social movement may even try to advance their goals (Ibid). However, 
such actors can only do this successfully in political systems where there are centralised 
political institutions and a strong state organisation (Ibid: 506). We can thus expect 
administrative strength to have a positive and significant association with policy change 
favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.  
This variable is only examined in 10 tests and 3 studies, and these are overwhelmingly a 
success. The success rate is 90% at the test level and 66.67% at the study level. The effect size, 
which is about 0.9 and 0.8 at the test and study level respectively, is statistically significant and 
therefore different from zero. We can thus claim that administrative strength is a strong 
indicator of policy change.  
Political Endorsement  
Political endorsement is a direct measure of the presence of elite allies, for it refers to politicians 
and political parties that publicly endorse a social movement. It is present in 7 tests and 3 
studies, though the modal category is failure. Six tests and all 3 studies are failures. The effect 
size is 0.14 and 0.08 at the test and study level respectively, though it is only statistically 
significant at the test level. This suggests that political endorsement is not a strong predictor of 
policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. This suggests that 
the presence of actual elite allies is not a strong predictor of policy change favourable to a social 
movement, controlling for mobilisation. 
3.6.2. The Discursive Opportunity Model  
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Koopmans and Olzak (2004, p. 202) suggest that our attention should turn towards the 
discursive opportunity structure, or ‘the aspects of the public discourse that determine a 
message’s chances of diffusion in the public sphere,’ which includes media attention. 
According to Koopmans (2004), the diffusion of messages and ideas influences the interaction 
between social movements and the political establishment. The political establishment reacts 
to protests if and as they are portrayed in the mass media, while protesters get cues on 
opportunities and constraints through the media’s relaying of information on the reaction of 
third parties and their targets (Ibid). In this section, I look at whether or not there exists a 
supportive political agenda or policy, a weak counter-movement, supportive public opinion 
towards a social movement’s goals, media attention to the policy issue at hand. I also look at 
the popularity of left-wing and progressive ideas among the public, and the ideology of the 
state. The results of the meta-analysis are presented in Table 4.  
Page 115 of 395 
 
 
Note: *** = statistically significant at the 99% level, ** =  statistically significant at the 95% 
level.  
Agenda/Policy (Supportive) 
Previous policy change and attention favourable to a social movement may signal that there is 
political interest in an issue affecting a social movement (Soule et al., 1999, p. 244). Policy-
making is a process and not an event that occurs at one specific moment in time (King, 
Cornwall and Dahlin, 2005). It is the result of an accumulation of small changes over time. 
Thus, previous attention to an issue paves the way for greater change, though some scholars 
Table 4: Discursive Opportunity Model  
Variable Success 
(1) 
Failure 
(0) 
Anomaly 
(-1) 
Modal 
Category  
Success 
Rate  
Effect 
size  
P 
value 
Agenda/Policy 
(supportive)  
Tests 
(117) 
62 42 13 Success 52.99 .42 *** 
Studies 
(15) 
7 7 1 Failure 46.67 .46 *** 
No/Weak 
Counter-
movement  
Tests 
(81) 
19 55 7 Failure 23.46 .15 *** 
Studies 
(14) 
2 10 2 Failure 14.29 .11  
Public Opinion 
(favourable)  
 
Tests 
(80) 
16 60 4 Failure  20.00 .14 *** 
Studies 
(14) 
3 11 0 Failure  21.43 .21 ** 
Media 
Attention  
Tests 
(47) 
17 29 1 Failure  36.17 .34 *** 
Studies 
(7) 
2 5 0 Failure  28.57 .26  
Political 
influence 
(left/liberalism) 
Tests 
(30) 
15 13 2 Success  50.00 .43 *** 
Studies 
(12) 
4 8 0 Failure 33.33 .45 ** 
State Ideology 
(left/liberal)   
Tests 
(9) 
3 6 0 Failure  33.33 .33 *** 
Studies 
(3) 
0 3 0 Failure  .00 .36 ** 
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claim that this may simply be a symbolic gesture to discourage more tangible changes 
(Cornwall et al., 2007, p. 243). Despite this disagreement, we can hypothesise that the presence 
of a supportive policy or political agenda is positively associated with policy change favourable 
to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.  
The meta-analysis shows that this variable is examined in 117 tests within 15 studies, which 
indicates a strong attention to the existing policy climate in analyses of the relationship between 
opportunities, social movements and policy changes. As 62 tests out of 117 and 7 studies out 
of 14 are successes, the modal category is success. The success rate is about 53 and 47% at the 
test and study levels respectively. The effect size is less than 0.5, even though it is statistically 
significant and different from zero at both levels. Thus, a supportive agenda or policy is 
somewhat positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, in the 
presence of mobilisation, especially when tests are looked at independently and not aggregated 
by study.  
No/Weak Counter-Movement  
Counter-movement activity, and particularly repression by opponents, is said to affect the 
calculations of policy-makers, though opinion is divided on the direction of this relationship. 
On the one hand, are scholars of the American civil rights movement who argue that white 
violence against Black civil rights activists made policy-makers and the general public 
sympathetic towards the latter, though they argue that this was only true when there was 
national attention towards the issue (Andrews, 1997; Santoro, 2008). On the other hand, are 
those scholars who argue that counter-movement activity decreases a movement’s chance of 
achieving favourable policy change because powerful opponents can weaken public support 
for the movement (Olzak and Ryo, 2007). Since counter-movements take many forms and may 
engage in counter-framing and funding opposing views, rather than inflict physical pain on 
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protesters, which is more socially unacceptable, I adopt the second perspective and hypothesise 
that the existence of no or weak counter-movement activity has a positive influence on policy 
change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.  
In my sample, counter-movement activity is examined in 81 tests within 14 studies. The modal 
category is failure, as 55 tests out of 81 and 10 out of 14 studies are failures. The success rate 
is 23.46% at the test level and 14.29% at the study level, and the effect size, which is less than 
0.5 at both levels, is moderately small. However, it is only statistically significant at the test 
level.33 Thus, a weaker counter-movement is not necessarily a strong predictor of policy change 
favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.  
Public Opinion (Favourable) 
Democratic representation theory argues that political officials are rational actors who are 
attentive to public opinion because their position depends on it (Agnone, 2007). Failure to 
respond to public preferences may jeopardise a politician or a political party’s chances of re-
election (Chen, 2007). A wealth of empirical material has been gathered by political scientists 
to demonstrate that public opinion influences policy-making (Jacobs and Shapiro, 1994).We 
can then deduce that public opinion on a policy issue affects political decision-making on it. 
One can thus hypothesise a positive and significant correlation between favourable public 
opinion on an issue relevant to a social movement and policy change favourable to the goals 
of said movement. 
                                                             
33 In my meta-analysis, there is a pattern of finding significant results at the test level but not 
at the study level. This must be due to the differences in sample size, which is always smaller 
at the study level. 
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In my sample, 80 tests in 14 studies examine the relationship between favourable public 
opinion and favourable policy outcomes. However, the great majority are failures, and the 
success rate is quite low, at both the test and study level (20% and 21.43% respectively). While 
the effect size is small – at 0.14 and 0.21 at the test and study level respectively - it is 
significantly different from 0. We can thus safely assume that favourable public opinion is not 
a strong predictor of favourable policy outcomes, controlling for mobilisation.  
Media Attention  
The mass media focuses public attention on an issue, and therefore affects the policy-making 
process by raising its salience (Agnone, 2007; Johnson, Agnone and McCarthy, 2010). Based 
on empirical evidence, Walgrave and Vligenthart (2012, p. 134) conclude that ‘it is a matter of 
days before political actors adjust their attention and adopt media issues.’  
In my sample, 47 tests in 7 studies examine the relevance of this variable. Out of these, 29 tests 
and 5 studies are failures, making failure the modal category. The success rate is 36.17% and 
28.57% at the test and study level respectively. However, the effect size, which is 0.34 0.26 at 
the test and study level respectively, is only statistically significant in the first case. We can 
thus deduce that media attention is not a strong predictor of policy outcomes favourable to a 
social movement, controlling for mobilisation.  
Political Influence (Left/Liberalism) 
The popularity of the Left or progressive political parties among the electorate could be argued 
to represent a discursive opportunity for left-wing social movements. This is because support 
of left-wing parties signifies receptivity to left-wing ideas in general. We can thus expect that 
greater support of the Left among the electorate to be positively associated with policy 
outcomes favourable to (left-wing) social movements, controlling for mobilisation.  
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Thirty tests in 12 studies examine this variable in my sample, though its influence is difficult 
to ascertain. At the test level, there is only a marginal success rate, with 13 tests being failures 
and 15 being successes. At the study level, the overall success rate is 33.33%. Overall, the 
modal category is a failure, as 8 studies are failures and 4 are successes. The effect size is 
statistically significant and not that small, standing at 0.45 at the test level and 0.33 at the study 
level. Thus, the influence of left-wing or progressive ideologies in society is not a strong 
predictor of policy outcomes favourable to a progressive social movement, controlling for 
mobilisation.  
State Ideology (Left/Liberal) 
The final dimension of the discursive opportunity model is state ideology, which is a measure 
of potential elite allyship. Whereas the previous variable looks at the ideology of the citizenry, 
this one looks at the ideology of politicians and parties. Since there are degrees of variations in 
political leaning within parties, it is helpful to look at the specific ideology of political actors. 
I expect left-wing or liberal states or politicians to be positively associated with policy 
outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.  
In my meta-analysis, state ideology is examined in 9 tests and 3 studies. The modal category 
is failures, with 6 tests and 3 studies being failures. At the study level, there are no successes, 
resulting in a success rate of 0%, while the success rate at the test level is 33.33%. The effect 
size is statistically significant at both levels, though it is quite small – at 0.33 and 0.36 at the 
test and study level respectively. We can thus deduce that favourable state ideology is not a 
strong predictor of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for 
mobilisation. This reinforces my earlier finding that the presence of potential or actual elite 
allies is not as relevant as assumed to be. 
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3.6.3. The Socio-Economic Opportunity Model  
Incorporating the literature from corporate social responsibility, Wahlstrom and Peterson 
(2006) argue that the structure of economic institutions, as well as economic actors, are 
important factors in their own right, and need to be clearly distinguished from the concept of 
political opportunities. Whilst they recognise that ‘the specific contents of the EOS [Economic 
Opportunity Structure] have still to be elaborated’ (Wahlstrom and Peterson, 2006, p. 372), 
they nonetheless come up with a tentative typology composed of five dimensions. These are: 
the availability of cognitive and economic resources, the multiplicity of stake seekers/holders 
(allies), the capacity for counter-mobilisation, the vulnerability of the target to pressures from 
the movement, and the consistency between the goals of the movement and their target 
(dependency) (Wahlstrom and Peterson, 2006, pp. 372–3).  
In this section, I look at the presence of women in workforce and education, spending on 
relevant policy issues, domestic productivity, the level of unemployment, the degree of ethnic 
and racial diversity, net profit, the percentage of the population in the secondary industry, 
national income, population density, the crime rate, the degree of ethnic and racial equality, the 
level of poverty, the age distribution of the population, and the degree of urbanisation. The 
results of the meta-analysis for variables associated with this model are presented in Table 5.  
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Note: *** = statistically significant at the 99% level, ** =  statistically significant at the 95% 
level. 
Table 5- Socio-economic Opportunity Model 
Variable  Success 
(1) 
Failure 
(0) 
Anomaly 
(-1) 
Modal 
Category  
Success 
Rate  
Effect 
size  
P 
value 
Women in 
Workforce/Education 
Tests 
(55) 
8 46 1 Failure 14.55 .13 *** 
Studies 
(9) 
2 7 0 Failure 22.22 .25  
Spending (relevant vs 
other)  
Tests 
(51) 
27 19 5 Success 52.94 .43 *** 
Studies 
(6) 
3 2 1 Failure  50.00 .39 ** 
Domestic Productivity Tests 
(41) 
7 33 1 Failure  17.07 .15 *** 
Studies 
(5) 
1 4 0 Failure  20.00 .18  
Unemployment  Tests 
(32) 
11 19 2 Failure 34.38 .28 n/a 
Studies 
(7) 
5 1 1 Success 71.43 .62 ** 
Ethnic/Racial Diversity  Tests 
(20) 
0 12 8 Failure  .00 -.40 *** 
Studies 
(6) 
0 4 2 Failure .00 -.30  
Net Profit (=revenue) Tests 
(7) 
3 4 0 Failure  42.86 .43 *** 
Studies 
(5) 
2 3 0 Failure  40.00 .40  
% Secondary Industry  Tests 
(20) 
1 19 0 Failure  5.00 .05 *** 
Studies 
(3) 
0 3 0 Failure  .00 .17  
National Income Tests 
(19) 
13 6 0 Success 68.42 .68 *** 
Studies 
(10) 
6 3 0 Success 60.00 .61 *** 
Population Density  Tests 
(18) 
11 2 5 Success 61.11 .33 *** 
Studies 
(6) 
2 2 2 Failure  33.33 .00 n/a 
Crime Rate (low) Tests 
(18) 
11 7 0 Success 61.11 .61 *** 
Studies 
(4) 
2 2 0 Failure 50.00 .50  
Ethnic/Racial Equality  Tests 
(14) 
12 0 2 Success  85.71 .71 *** 
Studies 
(3) 
2 0 1 Success 66.67 .33  
Poverty  Tests 
(10) 
6 4 0 Success 60.00 .60 *** 
Studies 
(4) 
1 3 0 Success 25.00 .50  
Age  Tests 
(7) 
4 1 2 Success 57.14 .29 *** 
Studies 
(3) 
1 1 1 Failure 33.33 .22  
Urbanisation  Tests 
(5) 
3 2 0 Success 60.00 .60 *** 
Studies 
(3) 
1 2 0 Failure  33.33 .67  
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Women in Workforce/Education, Ethnic/Racial Equality, Ethnic Racial Diversity   
Socio-demographic changes are relevant for the relationship between social movement 
mobilisation and policy outcomes in various ways. First, the political inclusion of a social 
movement’s constituency in society could be argued to be positively associated with policy 
outcomes favourable to said movement. This is because it suggests that decision-makers have 
committed to improving the situation of said constituency. Thus, higher levels of racial and 
ethnic equality may be associated with policy outcomes favourable to progressive social 
movements, especially those pertaining to immigrants or ethnic minorities.  
Moreover, the achievements of members of a constituency may encourage decision-makers to 
grant them more rights. For instance, increasing proportions of women in the labour force, and 
specifically in areas traditionally perceived as men’s realms, have been argued to have 
persuaded decision-makers to extend rights to women (Cornwall et al., 2007).  
Finally, ethnic or racial diversity may be particularly useful for policies related to minority 
rights, because of two mechanisms. Contact theory argues that interactions with members of 
an out-group increase positive attitudes towards said group, as it decreases stereotypes and 
prejudice (Sturgis et al., 2014). Greater levels of ethnic diversity also mean that there is a higher 
number of potential supporters of policy favourable to ethnic minorities.  
The modal category for the proportion of women in the workforce or education is failure, with 
46 failures out of 55 at the test level, and 7 failures our of 9 at the study level. The success rate 
and the effect size are rather small at both levels. The success rate is only 14.55% and 22.22% 
while the effect size is 0.13 and 0.25 at the test and study level respectively. The latter is only 
statistically different from zero at the test level. Thus, the proportion of women in the workforce 
or in education is not a strong predictor of policy outcomes favourable to social movements.  
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Ethnic and racial equality and diversity are examined in fewer studies. The former constitutes 
14 tests in 3 studies, while the latter constitutes 20 tests in 6 studies. Ethnic and racial equality 
is a success in 12 tests and an anomaly in 2 at the test level. At the study level, it is a success 
in 2 studies and an anomaly in one. The modal category is therefore success. The success rate 
and the effect size are rather high at both levels. The success rate is 85.71% and 66.67% while 
the effect size is 0.71 and 0.33 at the test and study level respectively, though it is only 
statistically significant at the test level. We can draw from these findings that ethnic and racial 
equality is positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to a social movement.  
In contrast, the modal category for ethnic and racial diversity is failure. Out of 20 tests, 12 are 
failures at the test level, while the proportion is 4 out of 6 at the study level. The success rate 
is zero at both the test and study level, while the effect size is -0.4 and -0.3 at the test and study 
level respectively, though this is only statistically significant at the test level. This suggests that 
at the very least, there is not a positive and significant association between ethnic and racial 
diversity and policy outcomes favourable to social movements, which in this sample is 
composed of progressive social movements.  
Spending (Relevant vs Other) 
Based on assumptions about the relevance of the current agenda and policy – described above 
– we can expect the level of spending on an issue to be positively associated with policy 
outcomes on said issue, controlling for mobilisation. Drawing on theories of policy 
incrementalism, it could be argued that spending signifies political interest in, and commitment 
to said issue, and this spending could lay the groundwork for more radical policy changes. On 
the other hand, spending on competing issues would thwart further policy development on the 
policy issue of interest.  
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In this meta-analysis, spending is examined in 51 independent tests within 6 studies. The modal 
category is success, with 27 out of 51 tests and 3 out of 6 studies being successes. The success 
rate is 52.92% and 50.00% at the test and study level respectively. The effect size is 0.43 and 
0.49 at the test and study level respectively, and is statistically significant on both occasions. 
Thus, existing spending on a policy area is positively associated with policy outcomes on said 
area, controlling for mobilisation.  
National Income, Domestic Productivity, Net Profit  
The richer the state, the better its ability to adopt policy favourable to a social movement. 
Richer states can afford to spend resources on social issues affecting the electorate. We can 
thus hypothesise that all three measures of a state’s economic development – national income, 
domestic productivity and net profit – are associated with policy outcomes favourable to a 
social movement, controlling for mobilisation.  
National income is the most examined dimension across studies. It accounts for 19 tests in 10 
studies. Domestic productivity accounts for 41 tests in 5 studies, while net profit is examined 
in 7 tests within 5 studies. While the modal category for national income is success, it is failure 
for both domestic productivity and net profit. Thirteen tests out of 19 and 6 studies out of 10 
are successes for national income. For domestic productivity, 33 tests out of 41 and 4 studies 
out of 5 are failures. For net profit, 4 tests out of 7 and 3 studies out of 5 are failures. 
With regards to the success rate, it is the highest for national income, while it is the lowest for 
domestic productivity. At the test level, the success rate is 68.42%, 42.86% and 17.07% for 
national income, net profit and domestic productivity respectively. At the study level, the 
success rate is 60.00%, 40.00% and 20.00% for national income, net profit and domestic 
productivity respectively. Turning to the effect size at the test level, it is .68, 0.43 and 0.15 for 
national income, net profit and domestic productivity respectively. It is statistically significant 
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at the 99% confidence level. At the study level, it is .61, .40 and 0.18 for national income, net 
profit and domestic productivity respectively, though it is not statistically significant in the 
latter two cases. In sum, national income is a strong predictor of policy outcomes favourable 
to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, while other measures of economic 
development are not.  
Percentage Secondary Industry  
The proportion of the workforce in manufacturing industries is one of the several measures of 
the class composition of a society used in my sample, though it is the only one that appears in 
3 or more studies. It is expected to be positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to 
a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. This is because people in manufacturing 
industries belong to lower social classes. They therefore are more likely to support progressive 
policies, especially in the presence of mobilisation.  
In the sample, the proportion of the labour force in manufacturing industries is examined in 20 
tests within 3 studies, though these are overwhelmingly failures. Nineteen independent tests 
and all 3 studies are failures. The success rate is 5% and 0% at the test and study level 
respectively. The effect size is extremely small at the test level, standing at 0.05, though it is 
statistically significant. At the study level, it is slightly higher and stands at 0.17, though it is 
not statistically significant. Thus, the proportion of people employed in manufacturing 
industries is not a good predictor of policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling 
for mobilisation. 
Crime Rate (Low) 
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A low crime rate can be hypothesised to be positively associated with policy outcomes 
favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. This is because higher crime 
rates direct attention and resources towards law and order.  
In the meta-analysis, crime rate is examined in 18 tests within 4 studies. The modal category 
at the test level is success, while it is failure at the study level. Seven tests out of 18 and 2 
studies out of 4 are failures. The success rate is moderately high, standing at 61.11% at the test 
level and 33.33% at the study level. The effect size is 0.61 at the test level and 0.50 at the study 
level though it is only statistically significant at the test level. Thus, lower crime rates have an 
ambivalent effect on policy outcomes, controlling for mobilisation.  
Poverty, Unemployment, population density, age    
Poverty, unemployment, population density and age all measure the size of the needy 
population, which is hypothesised to be positively associated with policy outcomes favourable 
to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. This is based on the premise that politicians 
are more likely to adopt social democratic policies where they are in high demand in society.  
Poverty is examined in 10 tests within 4 studies. Age is examined in 7 tests within 3 studies. 
Unemployment is examined in 32 tests within 7 studies. Population density is examined in 18 
tests within 6 studies. Age and population density are successes at the test level and failures at 
the study level, while the opposite is true for unemployment. For age, 4 tests out of 7 are 
successes, while it is 11 tests out of 18 for population density, and 6 tests out of 10 for poverty. 
On the other hand, 19 tests out of 32 are failures for unemployment. With regards to the study 
level, the modal category is mostly failure. One study out of 3 is a failure for age, while it is 2 
out of 6 for population density, and 3 out of 4 for poverty. In contrast, for unemployment, the 
modal category at the study level is success, with 5 studies out of 7 being successes.  
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The success rate at the test level is 57.14%, 61.11%, 60.00%, and 34.38% for age, population 
density, poverty and unemployment. The success rate at the study level is 33.33% for age and 
population density, while it is 25% for poverty and 71.43% for unemployment. With regards 
to the effect size at the test level, it is .29, .33, .60, and .28 for age, population density, poverty 
and unemployment respectively, and is statistically significant in the first three instances. At 
the study level, the effect size is .22, .00, .50 and 0.62 for age, population density, poverty, and 
unemployment respectively, though it is only statistically significant at the study level for 
unemployment. Thus, poverty appears to be a good predictor of policy outcomes favourable to 
a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. In contrast, the other three dimensions have 
an unclear influence on the dependent variable.   
Urbanisation 
Urbanisation is a measure of modernisation. Since modern state are richer and have more 
capacity, it can be argued that higher levels of urbanisation encourage policy outcomes 
favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.  
In this meta-analysis, urbanisation appears in only 5 tests within 3 studies. The modal category 
is success at the test level, with 3 out of 5 tests being successes, and a failure at the study level, 
with 2 out of 3 studies being failures. The success rate is 60.00% at the test level and 33.33% 
at the study level. The effect size is .60 and .67 at the test and study level respectively, though 
it is only statistically significant in the first instance. Urbanisation thus has an unclear 
relationship with policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for 
mobilisation, though this lack of clarity could be due to the different sample size at the test and 
study levels.  
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3.6.4. The Legal Opportunity Model  
Explaining that democratization has encouraged the revitalization of national and supranational 
courts, and that these have consequently become active participants in the policy-making 
process, Wilson and Cordero (2006) prefer instead to shift attention towards the legal 
opportunity structure, which is argued to consist of both structural and contingent factors, 
thereby reflecting perspectives within the political opportunity structure approach (Hilson, 
2002). According to Andersen (2005), dimensions of legal opportunity are no different than 
those typically used in the political opportunity model, and include access to the formal 
apparatus of the law on a particular claim, the configuration of power among decision-makers 
with regards, the nature of alliances and conflicts surrounding a claim, and the availability of 
relevant legal and cultural frames.  
In this section, I look at the existence of supportive laws, the proportion of legislators that 
belong to a left-wing political party, and the presence of supportive legislators. The results of 
the meta-analysis for variables associated with this model are presented in Table 6.  
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Note: *** = statistically significant at the 99% level, ** =  statistically significant at the 95% 
level.  
Law (Supportive)  
Since current legislation and policy is contingent on previous decision-making, it could be 
argued that previously enacted laws supportive of a movement’s goals act as a legal opportunity 
(Agnone, 2007). This is based on the idea that cost and benefits calculations encourage policy-
makers to make small, incremental policy changes rather than one large one (Rajagopalan and 
Rasheed, 1995). This results in the incrementalistic development of public policy. As such, we 
can expect existing favourable laws as being positively associated with policy outcomes 
favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.  
The meta-analysis shows that 84 tests in 14 studies examine the relationship between existing 
laws and policy. However, the modal category is failure, as 57 tests and 10 studies are failures. 
Table 6 - Legal Opportunity Model  
 
Variable Success 
(1) 
Failure 
(0) 
Anomaly 
(-1) 
Modal 
Category  
Success 
Rate  
Effect 
size  
P 
value 
Law (supportive) Tests 
(84) 
26 57 1 Failure  30.95 .30 *** 
Studies 
(14) 
4 10 0 Failure  28.57 .21  
Partisanship of 
Legislators (Left) 
Tests 
(56)  
16 37 3 Failure  28.57 .23 *** 
Studies 
(12) 
3 8 1 Failure  25.00 .32 ** 
Supportive 
Legislators 
Tests 
(31) 
30 1 0 Success 96.77 .97 *** 
Studies 
(3) 
2 1 0 Success 66.67 .67  
Court Decisions 
(positive) 
Tests 
(12) 
3 9 0 Failure  25.00 .25 n/a 
Studies 
(5) 
2 3 0 Failure  40.00 .40  
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The success rate is relatively low, standing at 30.95% at the test level and 28.57% at the study 
level. The effect size is also relatively small and stands at .30 and .21 at the test and study level 
respectively, though it is only statistically significant in the first instance. Thus, existing 
supportive laws are not a strong predictor of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, 
controlling for mobilisation.  
Partisanship of Legislators (Left) and Supportive Legislators  
Much in the same way as for the partisanship of government and the executive, we can 
hypothesise that the presence of lawmakers from a left-wing or progressive party is positively 
associated with policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. 
We can also hypothesise that legislators who actively support the goals of a social movement 
are positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to said movement. In sum, these two 
variables capture the presence of potential and actual elite allies in the legislature.  
In the meta-analysis, 56 tests and 12 studies are concerned with the partisanship of legislators. 
However, the modal category is failure at both levels, with 37tests and 8 studies being failures. 
The success rate is 28.57% and 25.00% at the test and study level respectively. Though the 
effect size is statistically significant at both the test and study levels, it is relatively small, and 
is .23 and .32 in these two instances respectively.  Supportive lawmakers are examined in 31 
tests within 2 studies, and the modal category is success, as in this sample, 30 tests and 2 studies 
are successes. The success rate is relatively high and stands at 96.77% and 66.67% at the test 
and study level respectively. The effect size is .97 at the test level, which is relatively close to 
1, but it is only .67 at the study level.  
Comparisons between these two measures of elite allyship may not be useful, as one is 
examined in a significantly smaller number of cases. Nonetheless, based on these results, we 
can say that the presence of supportive legislators is a strong predictor of policy outcomes 
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favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, though the same cannot be said 
of the presence of left-wing legislators.  
Court Decisions (Positive) 
Court decisions favourable to a social movement may draw political attention on an issue and 
signal legislative support to the movement (Santoro, 2002). In a way, this could be a measure 
of indirect elite allyship in the legal arena.  We can thus expect positive court decisions to be 
positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for 
mobilisation.  
The findings suggest that this dimension of legal opportunity is not widely looked at, as it only 
appears in 12 tests within 5 studies. The modal category is failure, as 9 tests and 3 studies are 
failures. The success rate is 25% at the test level and 40.00% at the study level. The effect size 
is .25 and .40 at the test and study levels respectively, and is not statistically significant. This 
challenges the afore-mentioned hypothesis. Positive court decisions are therefore not a strong 
predictor of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.  
3.6.5. The Supra-national Opportunity Model  
Finally, another set of scholars, many influenced by Europeanisation theories, emphasise that 
opportunities exist on multiple levels. Marks and McAdam (1996) argue that the historical 
rationale for limiting social movement analysis to the national arena emanates from the fact 
that traditionally, power was centralised by the state. Yet, with the advent of transnational 
governance systems such as the European Union, which are engendering the erosion or decline 
of the nation-state, such a restrictive approach no longer makes sense (Ibid). Tarrow (2005, p. 
26) argues that more generally, it is transnationalism, which he defines as ‘a dense, triangular 
structure of relations among states, non-state actors, and international institutions, and the 
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opportunities this produces for actors to engage in collective action at different levels of this 
system,’ which allows expanding opportunities for social movements.  
In this section, I look at whether or not the change is taking place during a period of war or 
conflict. It also looks at the existence of a movement supportive policy or law in neighbouring 
states, and the existence of a supportive regional or global ideology. The results of the meta-
analysis for variables associated with this model are presented in table 7.  
 
Note: *** = statistically significant at the 99% level, ** =  statistically significant at the 95% 
level.  
War Period  
War is an opportunity for progressive social movements for three different reasons. First, 
during wartime, politicians enjoy high levels of public support (Campbell and Allen, 1994, p. 
171), perhaps due to the imperative to rally behind the state in times of conflict. Thus, there is 
weakened challenge to social policies that would benefit a left-wing social movement from 
counter-movements (Ibid). Second, involvement in the war effort from a social movement may 
Table 7 - Supra-national Opportunity Model  
 
Variable Success 
(1) 
Failure 
(0) 
Anomaly 
(-1) 
Modal 
Category  
Success 
Rate  
Effect 
size  
P 
value 
War Period  Tests 
(61) 
39 13 9 Success  63.93 .49 *** 
Studies 
(9) 
4 4 1 Failure 44.44 .28  
Supportive 
Policy/Law in 
Neighbouring States  
Tests 
(24) 
13 11 0 Success 54.17 .54 *** 
Studies 
(8) 
3 5 0 Failure 37.50 .47 ** 
Supportive 
Regional/Global 
Ideology  
Tests 
(19) 
11 8 0 Success 57.89 .58 *** 
Studies 
(3) 
1 2 0 Failure  33.33 .39  
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make it more appealing to politicians (Budros, 2013, pp. 385–6). Third, as war is justified in 
terms of democracy and human rights, decision-makers become confronted with an untenable 
position, that makes them more receptive to the claims of a social movement: claiming to fight 
for moral values while restricting them at home (Ibid). We can thus hypothesise that (hot or 
cold) war years are positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to a social 
movement, controlling for mobilisation.  
In this meta-analysis, war is examined in 61 tests within 9 studies. While the modal category 
is success at the test level, it is failure at the study level. The success rate is 63.93% and 44.44% 
at the test and study level respectively. The effect size is .49 at the test level and .28 at the study 
level, though it is only statistically significant in the former. Based on these findings, it can be 
argued that war period is a good predictor of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement 
only at the test level, controlling for mobilisation.  
Supportive Policy /Law in Neighbouring States, Supportive Global/Regional Ideology  
Theories of policy diffusion34 argue that policy innovation in a locality is positively associated 
with previous policy innovation in another locality, particularly a close one. For instance, the 
adoption of a law in a state increases the likelihood that neighbouring states will adopt a similar 
policy (Chen, 2007). This suggests that there is a contagion effect among neighbouring 
legislatures (Cornwall et al., 2007). Based on this body of literature, it can be expected that 
supportive policies and laws in neighbouring states and a global or regional ideology supportive 
                                                             
34 Policy diffusion can be understood as ‘processes (rather than outcomes) that might result in 
increasing policy similarities across countries, hence leading to policy convergence’ (Knill, 
2005, p. 766). 
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of a policy, are positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, 
controlling for mobilisation.  
In this meta-analysis, supportive policies and laws in neighbouring states constitute 24 tests in 
8 studies, while a supportive global or regional ideology is examined in 19 tests within 3 
studies. The modal category for both variables is success at the test level and failure at the study 
level. The success rate at the test level is 54.17% and 57.89%, while at the study level it is 
37.50% and 33.33% for supportive policy or law in neighbouring countries and supportive 
regional or global ideology respectively. The effect size at the test level is .54 and .58, while at 
the study level it is .47 and .39 for supportive policy or law in neighbouring countries and 
supportive regional or global ideology respectively. Based on these observations is that 
supportive policies and laws and a supportive regional or global ideology are not strong 
predictors of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.  
3.7. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have employed a meta-analysis to systematically analyse the association 
between different dimensions of opportunity linked to different models of opportunity, and 
policy change, controlling for social movement mobilisation. I have done this to determine 
systematically which models and dimensions of opportunity have the greatest explanatory 
power. I have also done this to assess how relevant elite allies are for policy-making on an issue 
relevant to a social movement. I wanted to test the assumption that the presence of elite allies 
is a source of opportunity for social movements. I have found out that neither potential nor 
actual elite allies are strong predictors of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, 
controlling for mobilisation. This finding puts into question the veracity of the claim that social 
movements benefit from the presence of allies in power. In the next few chapters, I consider in 
more detail the relationship between elite allies and social movements, through a case study of 
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the mobilisation for legislative reforms on violence against women in Morocco, to better 
understand exactly what the former contributes to the latter. 
Based on an examination of the proportion of successful relationships within each model, 
almost all models fail to be strong predictors of policy change favourable to mobilising social 
movements. Out of the 9 dimensions included in the political opportunity model, 3 (33%) are 
positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for 
mobilisation, at both the test and study level. Out of the 6 dimensions included in the discursive 
opportunity model, 2 (33%) are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social 
movement, controlling for mobilisation, though only at the test level. Out of the 14 dimensions 
included in the socio-economic opportunity model, 3 (21.4%) are positively associated with 
policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, at both the test 
and study levels. A further 3 (21.4%) are also positively associated with favourable policy 
change, at either the test or study level. Out of the 4 dimensions included in the legal 
opportunity model, 1 (25%) is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social 
movement, controlling for mobilisation, at both the test and study levels. Out of the 3 
dimensions included in the supra-national opportunity model, 2 (66%) are positively associated 
with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, though only 
at the test level.  
Out of these models, the dimensions of opportunity that are significantly associated with 
favourable policy change at both the test and study levels are: political openness, election year, 
administrative capacity, spending, national income, ethnic/racial equality, poverty, and 
supportive legislators.  Of these, the success rate at both the test and study levels is above 50% 
for political openness, administrative capacity, national income, poverty, and supportive 
legislators. The effect size is statistically significant at both levels for political openness, 
administrative capacity, spending, national income, and ethnic or racial equality. These 
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findings question the significance of opportunities for social movements mobilising for policy 
influence, though they highlight the relevance of structural opportunities, at a time when 
dynamic opportunities are becoming increasingly popular in studies of social movements. The 
next chapter begins my case study of the Moroccan women’s rights movement and its 
campaign to criminalise violence against women. I use this case study to show the importance 
of looking at agency, by focusing on performances of allyship, rather than the presence of elite 
allies, to understand why elite actors may not be a good source of opportunity for social 
movements.  
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4.Elite Allyship, Islamism and The 
Moroccan Women’s Rights Movement  
4.1. Introduction 
In this section, I trace the ways in which the contemporary women’s rights movement in 
Morocco has evolved, and the relationship it has had with political elites and Islamists.35 I 
borrow Fatima Sadiqi’s division of the movement into three distinct waves, as we can see major 
turning points in its life and circumstances in the 1940s, 1980s and 2000s (2017b). I show that 
the movement focused most of its efforts on reforming the Moudawana, in the face of fierce 
opposition by Islamists and the religious establishment. In this context, they have principally 
benefited from the support of the monarchy, as King Mohamed VI, in his role as arbiter, 
initiated the most extensive reform on this matter. Besides the King, elite allyship came in the 
form of intergovernmental organisations, as the second wave of the movement benefited from 
the UN’s focus on women’s rights. IGOs were particularly useful in exerting leverage over the 
Moroccan government. Figures from left-wing parties also provided moral support by 
championing the causes of secular activists. However, their lack of clout encouraged secular 
activists to appeal to the King. 
4.2. The First Wave: Confronting Patriarchal Nationalists  
In this section, I discuss the first wave of the Moroccan women’s rights movement. This wave 
was between the 1940s and 1970s, and consisted of upper class Moroccan women that had ties 
                                                             
35 Since not all actors that mobilise through women’s organisations in Morocco do not identify 
as feminists, I follow Amy Young Evrard (2014) in speaking of the Moroccan women’s rights 
movement rather than the Moroccan feminist movement in this thesis.  
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to nationalist figures. Though their early demands were influenced by nationalist priorities and 
Islam, some of their claims defied social norms. I show that nationalists provided a platform 
for the ideas of women’s rights activists, but their patriarchal values and turn to Islam restricted 
the discourse these activists could have. As we will see in the next section, this limiting effect 
of political elites ultimately led activists to form their own independent associations. 
The contemporary Moroccan women’s rights movement developed when Morocco was a 
French protectorate (1912 – 1956).36 It began as a secular movement that consisted of educated, 
urban, upper-class women linked to the national liberation movement through male relatives 
(Sadiqi, 2008a, p. 457, 2017a). At first, these educated women discussed gender issues in the 
nationalist press through the publication of articles on education and women’s legal rights. It 
was not until the mid-1940s that the first women’s political associations were formed. The 
elites of the Moroccan liberation movement allowed some space for women’s issues because, 
anxious to challenge France’s construction of Moroccan women, they promoted legal and 
educational reforms for women within an Islamic legal system (Wyrtzen, 2016, p. 220).  
The Union of Moroccan Women, the woman’s section of Istiqlal (Independence) – the main 
party calling for independence – was formed in 1944 (Naciri, 2003, 2014). The women’s 
association Akhawat al-Safa (Sisters of Purity), was established in 1946, and stemmed from 
                                                             
36 In the Treaty of Fez of 30th March 1912, France pledged to ‘protect’ Morocco, turning the 
latter into a protectorate (‘French Protectorate Established in Morocco’, 1912) . Another Treaty 
was subsequently signed between France and Spain on 27th November 1912, delegating 
Spanish protection in the north and south, with France remaining the main protecting power 
(‘Treaty Between France and Spain Regarding Morocco’, 1913). On 2nd March 1956, France 
ceded its control (Ismael, 1986). Spain followed suit, and ceded its northern and southern 
protectorates on 7th April 1956 and 1st April 1958 respectively (Ismael, 1986).  
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the rival Parti Democratique de l’independence (Democratic Independence Party) (Wyrtzen, 
2016). These women mobilised for women’s education, independence and provided support to 
the families of nationalist victims (Sadiqi, 2017a). Their goals were influenced by the ideology 
of Moroccan nationalists. With regards to education, Modern Standard Arabic was promoted 
to challenge French, while with regards to belief systems, Islam was promoted to challenge 
French modernity (Sadiqi, 2017a). In fact, Shari’a, or Islamic law, played an important role as 
a symbol of national identity (Buskens, 2003). Different factions of the independence 
movement were drawn to it because it acted as a bulwark against the legal pluralism promoted 
by France, and which divided the territory into areas administered by Islamic law, or into areas 
administered through Berber customary law (Buskens, 2003) 
In the face of the Islamisation of political discourse, Akhawat al-Safa issues  in 1946 a public 
document, called Al Wathiqa (The Document) containing a list of secular  legal demands, 
which ushered in the era of the first wave of the Moroccan women’s rights movement (Sadiqi, 
2017a). These demands included the abolition of polygamy, as well as dignity at home and in 
the public sphere (Sadiqi, 2017a). The strategies of members of this organisation included 
writing press articles, and holding public speeches and private or public meetings (Sadiqi, 
2008a). As these first organisations assumed that independence would bring about their 
emancipation, they did not accord much importance to challenging the status of women in 
Morocco (Sadiqi, 2008a).  
However, the post-independence period witnessed the legalisation of the subordination of 
women to men in Morocco through the Moudawana (Personal Status Code). Nationalists had 
decried France’s promulgation of the Berber Dahir (decree) ever since its promulgation in 1930 
(Wyrtzen, 2016). This decree had sought to keep the Berber people distinct from Muslim Arabs 
by stating that the former were to be administered by their own customary law and tribal 
councils in their areas, while the latter were to be subject to Islamic law (Hart, 1997). From 
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that date onwards, family law became a recurring topic of discussion, and most nationalist elite 
favoured the application of a uniform Islamic family law (Charrad, 2001). Leaders of the 
independence movement, such as the founder of Istiqlal Allal Al Fassi, sought the Islamisation 
of the legal system of Morocco, and to this end, Berber customary law was abolished, and 
Islamic law became codified in the Moudawana (Buskens, 2003).37 
 At the request of the King, Mohamed V, an all-male committee composed of ulemas (religious 
scholars), legal figures and ministers elaborated a Moudawana, inspired by the Maliki school 
of Sunni Islam, between 1957 and 1958 (Harrak, 2009). Its central tenets included the 
establishment of wilaya (tutorship) for marriage, the supremacy of the husband over the wife, 
the obedience of the wife towards the husband, the wife’s right to maintenance, the right of the 
husband to divorce through unilateral repudiation, the right of the husband to marry up to four 
wives, and the wife’s right to initiate divorce under certain conditions (Harrak, 2009). In 
addition, the minimum age for marriage was set at fifteen for girls and eighteen for boys, though 
judges could grant exemptions (Charrad, 2001; Harrak, 2009). This conservative Moudawana 
reflected King Mohamed V’s alliances. At the onset of independence, he had found valuable 
allies in the form of the rural elite who held patriarchal ideas (Charrad, 2001). 
As soon as the Moudawa was introduced, calls for its reform ensued. Attempts were made in 
1961, 1962, 1965, 1970, 1974, 1979, 1981 and 1982 (Harrak, 2009). However, all of them 
failed (Buskens, 2003). In 1965, an official commission was established to correct 
shortcomings in the Code (Buskens, 2003). The project fell through after one meeting. A royal 
commission was set up in 1981 to prepare a draft amendment, though it never reached 
Parliament (Buskens, 2003). In 1986, a draft Pan-Arab Personal Status Code proposed by the 
                                                             
37 The Jewish community retained its own family law and courts, and Christians were not 
bound by the polygamy and repudiation tenets of the Islamic Moudawana (Buskens, 2003).  
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Council of Arab Ministers of Justice, also failed to lead to any change in the existing 
Moudawana (Buskens, 2003). To channel women’s demands, the government established 
official women’s organisations. In 1969, it launched the Union Nationale des Femmes 
Marocaines (National Union of Moroccan Women, henceforth UNFM), an official women’s 
group to represent Moroccan women (Naciri, 2014). In 1971, the Association Marocaine de 
Planning Familial (Moroccan Association of Family Planning, AMPF) was created, to advance 
the state’s policy on family planning (Naciri, 2014). Thus, Moroccan women were restricted 
to official structures to express themselves (Naciri, 2014). 
This restriction, coupled with the political liberalisation of the mid-1970s meant that women 
increasingly began organising themselves through political parties (Naciri, 2003). From 1975 
onwards, the political climate became more open towards opposition political parties, 
encouraging the latter to resume their activities, including trying to recruit more women within 
their ranks (Naciri, 2014). However, this increasing integration within left-wing political 
parties such as Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires, Parti du Progres et du Socialisme, and 
Organisation de l’Action Democratique et Populaire (Organisation for Democratic and Popular 
Action, OADP), meant that initially, women gave priority to democratic ideals, rather than 
gender equality (Naciri, 2014).  
On the other hand, international developments such as the United Nations (UN) Decade for 
Women between 1975 and 1985 and the proclamation of the Convention Against all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979, encouraged discussion on the status of 
women in these political parties (Naciri, 2003). Themes such as the liberation of women, their 
legal status, and their political representation, were raised by women, though the Moudawana 
was treated differently, depending on the degree of autonomy they had vis-à-vis their political 
parties, and their dedication (Naciri, 2003). This established two trends within the Moroccan 
women’s movement. On the one hand are those who managed to navigate their partisan and 
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feminist identities, and on the other are those who were strictly loyal to their political 
organisation (Naciri, 2003). Besides political parties, women also mobilised within the Union 
Nationale des Etudiants du Maroc (National Union of Moroccan Students, henceforth UNEM), 
a powerful union that trained and recruited university students for left-wing political parties 
(Naciri, 2014). This resulted in the entry of young university-educated women in left-wing 
political parties (Sadiqi, 2017a). However, the two failed military coups in the early 1970s 
resulted in increasing authoritarianism and repression, which in turn increased militancy within 
left-wing organised groups (Sadiqi, 2017a).   
4.3. The Second Wave: Confronting the rise of Islamism  
In this section, I discuss the second wave of the Moroccan women’s rights movement. This 
wave emerged in the 1980s and lasted until the end of the 1990s. This era was characterised by 
the rise of Political Islam – or Islamism38 - in the Middle East and North Africa. This 
development affected the Moroccan women’s rights movement in two ways. On the one hand, 
Islamists acted as a fierce counter-movement, challenging the discourse and goals of secular 
women’s rights activists. On the other hand, some women became attracted to their discourse 
on Islam, leading to the establishment of an Islamist current within the Moroccan women’s 
rights movement. In this wave, an unlikely source of opportunity came in the form of King 
Hassan II, who initiated limited reforms to the Moudawana. Political parties proved unwilling 
to rally behind secular women’s rights activists both in terms of reforming the Moudawana, 
and passing the national plan to integrate women in society. In the face of rising Islamism, the 
                                                             
38 Islamism is a concept difficult to entangle, as there are many dimensions to it. In this thesis, 
I adopt Valentine Moghadam’s definition and see it as ‘a movement of movements’ whose 
basic goal is ‘the establishment or reinforcement of Islamic laws and norms as the solution to 
economic, political, and cultural crises’ (Moghadam, 2013a, p. 99) 
Page 143 of 395 
 
first socialist government of Youssoufi proved unable to pass the plan. It delegated the question 
of reforming the Moudawana to the new King, Mohamed VI.  
If the 1960s and 1970s were marked by the integration of women activists within political 
parties and unions, the 1980s witnessed the creation of a multitude of independent women’s 
associations. Noting that affiliation to political parties reduced women activists’ margin of 
freedom, the second generation of the Moroccan women’s rights movement organised itself 
into autonomous structures. In 1985, was born the Association Democratique des Femmes du 
Maroc, which developed out of the PPS (Sadiqi, 2017a). This was followed in 1987 by Union 
de l’Action Feminine39, which developed out of the OADP (Sadiqi, 2017a). In the 1990s, three 
other big feminist associations were established, notably, Association Marocaine des Droits 
des Femmes (Moroccan Association for Women’s Rights, henceforth AMDF) in 1992, the 
Ligue Democratique des Droits des Femmes40 (Democratic League for Women’s Rights, 
LDDF) in 1993, and Jossour, Forum des Femmes (Jossour, Women’s Forum, Jossour) in 1995 
(Naciri, 2014). Since the 1980s, other feminist associations have been established, in different 
geographical locations, and with different areas of specialism (Naciri, 2003). To this day, even 
though most women’s associations are in big cities such as Casablanca, Rabat, a host of smaller 
associations now exist in more remote cities and towns, to tackle the problems specific to those 
areas.  
Thanks to foreign criticism and pressure, the political and intellectual climates became more 
liberalised at the end of the 1980s (Buskens, 2003). Not only did it become more acceptable to 
                                                             
39 The association is now called Union de l’Action Feministe (Union of Feminist Action). 
40 The association has since become a federation, and has been rebranded the Federation de la 
Ligue Democratique des Droits des Femmes (Federation of the Democratic League for 
Women’s Rights, henceforth FLDDF).  
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advocate for the reform of the Moudawana, it also became possible to draw on international 
conventions and therefore use secular arguments rooted in human rights (Buskens, 2003). 
These early organisations enjoyed the support of international organisations such as the UN, 
which had launched a worldwide effort to promote women’s rights (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2006). 
Thanks to pressure by Moroccan women’s rights groups, the government was constantly asked 
to send official delegates to address women’s issues at UN meetings, such as those of the UN 
Decade for Women in Mexico City between 1975 and 1985 (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2006). The 
first World Conference on Women took place in Mexico City in 1975, followed by one in 
Copenhagen in 1980, and Nairobi in 1985 (Friedman, 2003). These conferences were important 
for three reasons. First, they focused attention on women’s legal status and tasked states with 
guaranteeing women’s human rights (Friedman, 2003). They also turned discrimination against 
women into a global problem that should be a subject of discussion within all states (Friedman, 
2003). Finally, they resulted in the formation of several international non-governmental 
organisations, such as the International Women’s Tribune Centre and the International 
Women’s Rights Action Watch, which became avenues for the global institutional expression 
of women’s rights (Friedman, 2003). After the UN Decade for Women, Morocco ratified 
CEDAW in August 1993, though with reservations to Articles 2 and 16 about marriage and the 
woman’s ability to pass on her citizenship, as they conflicted with Morocco’s Moudawana 
(Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2006).  
Besides exploiting these international opportunities, women activists took to academic and 
journalistic writing to condemn the condition of women in Morocco (Naciri, 2006). Feminist 
magazines such as 8 Mars (8th March) and Kalimat (Word) were created in the 1980s, and 
argued that there was nothing natural about gender roles and the sexual division of labour 
(Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2006). Other publications were later established, such as Femmes du Maroc 
and Citadine in French, and Nisaa min al Maghreb (Women of Morocco) in Arabic (Naciri, 
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2006). These successfully allied feminist writings with commercial awareness. In the same 
period, academic writings by Fatema Mernissi and Leila Abouzeid began calling out the 
exclusion of Moroccan women from politics and economics, and the disregard for women’s 
issues in the post-independence period (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2006). Mernissi remains an 
important feminist figure in Morocco, thanks to works such as The Veil and the Male Elite: A 
Feminist Interpretation of Islam (1992), which helped establish a reformist feminist current in 
Morocco. Academics also set up regional and national research groups to complement their 
feminist writings. Academic research on women was further enhanced in the 1990s, research 
centres on women, as well as graduate degree programmes in gender and women’s studies were 
created in public universities in Rabat, Fes and Meknes (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2006). 
These activists did not just dedicate themselves to women’s issues, but also addressed human 
rights causes in general. Women contributed to setting up women’s sections in the first human 
rights organisations in Morocco. Such was the case with the Association Marocaine des Droits 
Humains (Moroccan Association of Human Rights, AMDH), and the Organisation Marocaine 
des Droits Humains (Moroccan Organisation for Human Rights, OMDH), established in 1979 
and 1988 respectively (El Bouhsini, 2015). Moroccan women have participated in a range of 
social and political issues, from social development, to democratisation, which has resulted in 
the visibility of women’s issues in the public sphere (El Bouhsini, 2015).  
Nonetheless, the focus of the second generation of the Moroccan women’s rights movement 
remained the improvement of the Moudawana. The first large-scale mobilisation occurred in 
March 1992, during International Women’s Day, when in coalition with other associations, 
UAF presented a petition to collect one million signatures to pressure Parliament and the Prime 
Minister to reform it, and guarantee legal equality between men and women (Cavatorta and 
Dalmasso, 2009). UAF had launched this petition in 1990, at a time when the government was 
seeking to reform the Constitution and political institutions (Wuerth, 2005). In 1994, ADFM 
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launched in collaboration with Collectif 95-Maghreb Egalite41 (Collective 95-Maghreb 
Equality, henceforth Collectif), a template Family Law, based on universal human rights values 
(Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010). 
Islamists strongly opposed UAF’s petition, while secular political parties accused the women’s 
rights movement of hindering the nascent political liberation in Morocco through this challenge 
(Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). Islamists and the religious establishment more generally, 
challenged this campaign through a counter-petition opposing any changes to the Moudawana 
(Wuerth, 2005). This counter-petition was circulated in mosques, that were under the authority 
of the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs (Elliott, 2009). The Ministry also 
encouraged mosque preachers to attack the campaign (Elliott, 2009). A fatwa (a non-binding 
religious pronouncement) was also issued, by professor of Islamic jurisprudence associated 
with the Islamist organisation Al Islah wal Tajdid (Reform and Renewal), calling participants 
heretics that should be killed (Wuerth, 2005).  
King Hassan II appropriated this divisive issue, and in his 20th August 1992 speech, stipulated 
that modifying the Moudawana was a royal prerogative and that it was his responsibility as 
Amir al Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful), to interpret and implement religion (Ouali, 
2008). He created a commission composed of male ulemas and judges to address the demands 
of women activists, and provide recommendations (Ouali, 2008). Subsequently, the King 
announced changes to certain articles of the Moudawana, which would have for effect of 
modestly increasing women’s agency with regards to marriage, polygamy and divorce  (Sadiqi, 
2008a). Changes included amongst others, allowing a woman over the age of 21 to have a 
                                                             
41 This group had been formed in 1992 by women’s associations and academics, to campaign 
for equality between men and women in the three Maghreb countries: Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia (Mahfoudh, 2014).  
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marriage contract without a tutor, allowing a woman to refuse her husband to take other wives, 
and obliging a husband to present his case for divorce in front of notaries and his wife (Sadiqi, 
2008a). These limited changes were disappointing to women’s rights activists in Morocco, 
though they also suggested that laws rooted in religion could be opened to public debate (Sadiqi 
and Ennaji, 2006).  
An Islamist counter-movement restarted in the late 1990s, when the women’s rights movement 
benefited from a political opening to renew its fight to reform the Moudawana. This political 
opening was the alternance (alternating) government established by Hassan II in 1998. Hassan 
II decided to integrate longstanding opposition parties into the political system (Cavatorta and 
Dalmasso, 2009). As such, a deal was reached, allowing the King to retain significant executive 
prerogatives, and simultaneously affording the chance to govern to opposition parties, some of 
which were left-wing and linked to women’s associations (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). In 
March 1999, this government presented a plan to improve the position of women in Morocco, 
the Plan d’Action National pour l’Integration de la Femme au Developpement (National Plan 
of Action for the Integration of Women in Development, henceforth the Plan) (Elliott, 2009). 
The drafting of this Plan had involved the participation of women’s associations such as 
ADFM, AMDF and UAF, with funding from the World Bank, and was based on CEDAW, 
which Morocco had ratified with reservations in 1993 (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009; Elliott, 
2009). 
The Plan identified four areas to improve on. These were literacy, reproductive health, the 
integration of women in economic development, and the strengthening of women’s legal status, 
with changes in the Penal Code, the Nationality Code, and the Moudawana (Buskens, 2003).  
These proposed legal changes were supposed to combat violence against women, allow women 
to grant nationality to children they had with foreign partners, and grant women better rights 
in marriage, child custody and divorce (Buskens, 2003; Elliott, 2009). The two left-wing parties 
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in government – the PPS and the USFP – supported the Plan. Istiqlal, the third main partner in 
government, was more ambiguous (Buskens, 2003). Istiqlal’s stance on religion was more 
conservative, as it draws inspiration from Allal Al Fasi’s Salafi approach (Buskens, 2003).  
The religious establishment strongly opposed the Plan. On the one hand, was an officially 
unrecognised Islamist group, Al Adl wal Ihsan (Justice and Charity), which opposed the Plan 
because it felt that the suggested reforms were coming from the West, rather than from within 
Islam (Wuerth, 2005). The Parti de la Justice et du Developpement (Party of Justice and 
Development, henceforth PJD) - which had split from Harakat At Tawhid Wal 
Islah,/Mouvement de l’Unicite et de la Reforme (Movement of Unity and Reform, henceforth 
MUR) in 1997  (El Sherif, 2012) – organised an important demonstration through a specially 
devised committee for the protection of the family (Bras, 2007). Strong opposition also came 
from the Minister of religious foundations and Islamic affairs, Abdelkebir M’Daghri Alaoui. 
Alaoui claimed the Plan opposed Islamic law, and charged a commission of ulemas to write a 
report against the Plan  (Buskens, 2003).  
These tensions culminated into two opposing marches on 12th March 2000, after the Plan was 
announced. The March for Women was organised by women’s associations such as UAF and 
ADFM, and supported the Plan, whereas the march against the Plan took place in Casablanca, 
and was organised by the PJD and Al Adl (Elliott, 2009). Though both marches each 
outnumbered over 200, 000 participants,  the one organised by the Islamists against the Plan 
was bigger (Wuerth, 2005; Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). Eventually, the Plan was 
withdrawn by Mohamed VI, who had now become King, upon the death of his father Hassan 
II, in 1999. Scholars argue that the Plan was withdrawn because of this deadlock, and the show 
of force by Islamists and conservative figures in the political system (Sater, 2007; Cavatorta 
and Dalmasso, 2009). Nonetheless, individual elements of the Plan were adopted by some 
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government ministries, while a royal commission was charged with addressing proposals 
related to the Moudawana (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009).  
Islamists were a strong reactionary force because Islamism had become a popular global 
ideology in the 1980s. According to prominent feminist scholar and activist, Valentine 
Moghadam, the emergence of Islamist movements in the Middle East and North Africa is 
linked to socioeconomic developments in the region (1991). Industrialisation and urbanisation 
meant that beginning in the 1960s, women were experiencing a dramatic improvement in 
education and on the job market, increasing their visibility and participation in the public sphere 
(Moghadam, 1991).This development was occurring alongside a debt crisis, and its 
concomitant economic hardships. By 1977, Morocco was in substantial debt, following a 
period of extensive foreign borrowing (Seddon, 1989). Between 1983 and 1992, it aggressively 
pursued economic liberalisation, through structural adjustment programs, aided by the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Maghraoui, 2002).  
Morocco’s attempt to stabilise the situation in the 1980s did not do much to improve rising 
unemployment and the deteriorating conditions of the urban poor (Seddon, 1989). 
Unsurprisingly, this created a lot of discontent, which was expressed through frequent public 
demonstrations and strikes (Seddon, 1989). Together, women’s increased visibility in the 
public sphere and the economic crisis resulted in young unemployed men flocking to Islamist 
movements, under the belief that economically active women were robbing them of 
opportunities (Sadiqi, 2014b). As Moghadam states, support for Islamist movements comes 
from lower social classes, and the first generation of the educated middle class (1991). On the 
other hand, the upper middle class and the aristocracy tends to be found in liberal or left-wing 
groups (Moghadam, 1991). 
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However, modernisation and socioeconomic changes cannot single-handedly explain the rise 
of Islamism.42 This development was aided by the geopolitical context.  The end of the Cold 
War, with the fall of the Soviet Union and the associated weakening of communist parties in 
the developing world left a political and ideological vacuum, which Islamists populist leaders 
and discourses could fill (Moghadam, 1993). Since the 1960s and 1970s, regimes in the MENA 
region had sought to prop up Islamist parties to neutralise the growth of left-wing parties, 
resulting in the spread of Islamic ideas and education (Moghadam, 2003).  
Besides challenging the discourse of secular women’s rights activists, Islamist groups have 
also successfully managed to enlist women within their ranks, to act as a counter-movement. 
Women’s cells were introduced in Islamist parties by women. In 1998, Nadia Yassine created 
a women’s section in Al Adl, which had been founded by her father Sheikh Abdesalam Yassine 
(Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010). Women affiliated with the PJD also launched in the mid-
1990s, two associations – Muntada al Zahra (Forum of Zahra, Forum al Zahra) and Tajdid al 
Wa’I al Nisa’i, known as Renouveau de la Conscience Feminine in French (Renewal of 
Women’s Awareness, as RCF) (Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010). Forum al Zahra is a network 
of 113 associations throughout Morocco, which work on women’s issues and on the family 
(Forum al Zahra, 2016). It believes that the most effective way to ensure respect for women’s 
rights, is to improve their status within the family (Forum al Zahra, 2016). RCF is focused on 
preserving Islamic identity and authenticity and strives to make sure that women’s rights are 
in line with Shari’a (Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010). 
                                                             
42 This is a simplification of the complexity of the rise of Islamism in the Middle East and 
North Africa. As Moghadam notes, various approached have been offered, from a historical, 
cultural, global, or even sociological standpoint, amongst others. See Moghadam (1993). 
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Islamism not only appeals to men from lower social classes, but also to young educated women 
from poorer social milieus (Naciri, 1998). Universities have been controlled by Islamists from 
the 1990s onwards, replacing left-wing parties (Naciri, 1998). This was the result of a crisis in 
the educational system and rising graduate unemployment, and the ensuing creation of a social 
class of disaffected youth with little trust in traditional political institutions (Naciri, 1998). It 
could be argued that in the face of this social and economic crisis, some women chose to ally 
themselves with Islamist political groups to get protection in exchange for being submissive 
and respectable; a passive strategy of resistance that  is referred to as a ‘patriarchal bargain’ 
(Kandiyoti, 1988).  
4.4. The Third Wave: Confronting Fragmentation 
In this section, I turn my attention to the third wave of the Moroccan women’s rights movement. 
The third wave began in the 21st century, and can be characterised by even more fragmentation 
within the movement, because in addition to the divide between seculars and Islamists, groups 
that were until now marginalised, such as the youth and Amazigh women, started their own 
associations43 and networks. It is thus difficult to speak of a unified Moroccan women’s rights 
movement. What had started off as a relatively coherent movement turned into a cluster of 
groups that do not necessarily mobilise together on similar issues. In this wave, tensions 
between Islamists and secular women’s rights advocates increased. In the light of strong 
opposition to the reform of the Moudawana, secular activists appealed to the new King, 
Mohamed VI, in his role as arbiter. Mohamed VI also introduced other reforms, such as the 
                                                             
43 In Morocco, local civil society organisations are referred to as ‘associations’. As 
demonstrated in this chapter, several women’s organisations use the term ‘association’ in their 
name.  
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nationality code and the women-friendly Constitution of 2011. However, these were not 
introduced through democratic means.  
The aforementioned tensions between Islamist groups and secular women’s rights activists 
over the Plan continued unabated into the twenty-first century, as the Moudawana was still on 
the agenda. After the proposal of the Plan, then Prime Minister, Youssoufi, created a 
commission to study some parts of the Plan and solicited the arbitration of the new King 
Mohamed VI, with regards to reforming the Moudawana to (Ouali, 2008).  This decision was 
supported by all political actors, from Islamists to left-wing figures in government (Bras, 2007). 
In fact, Islamists and secular women activists appealed to the King to intervene on the matter 
in his role as Commander of the Faithful, except followers of Adl, who reject the authority of 
the monarchy (Buskens, 2003; Mir-Hosseini, 2007). 
Mohamed VI subsequently received a coalition of women’s rights organisations called the 
Spring of Equality, and established a consultative commission in 2001 to reform the 
Moudawana (Bras, 2007; Elliott, 2009). This commission was composed mostly of ulemas and 
conservative judges, in addition to three women, a progressive lawyer, and figures loyal to the 
monarchy (Bras, 2007). Not only did the King include representatives of women’s rights 
organisations in this royal commission, he also took counsel from additional women’s rights 
organisations (Wuerth, 2005).   
The first report of the commission came out in 2002, albeit with disagreements (Bras, 2007). 
The King subsequently replaced the head of the commission with a reliable ally – the former 
head of Istiqlal, M’hammed Boucetta – in January 2003, and communicated his desire to adopt 
the recommendations of the commission in 10th October 2003, during the Fall session of 
Parliament (Wuerth, 2005; Bras, 2007; Elliott, 2009). A few months later, the parliament voted 
in favour of the reforms, and in October 2004, at the Fall session of Parliament, Mohamed VI 
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promulgated a new Family Code through a royal decree (Elliott, 2009; Murgue, 2011). As the 
King in Morocco is not only the Commander of the Faithful, but also a descendant of the 
Prophet Mohammed, it is necessary to make legal changes within an Islamic framework 
(Wuerth, 2005). Consequently, Mohamed VI made sure to justify the reforms with Islamic 
arguments (Wuerth, 2005).  
Besides the King, secular women’s rights activists drew on Islamic rhetoric to campaign for 
the reform of the Moudawana, though this was influenced by the rising power of the Islamists. 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, Islamists were the only credible political force, and 
could mobilise at least five hundred thousand people (Ouali, 2008). Not only were Islamists 
represented in Parliament through the Justice and Development party, they were also supported 
by more semi-clandestine movements, such as Adl (Ouali, 2008). However, the turning point 
was the show of force of Islamists in Casablanca in 2000, as it made secular women’s rights 
activists tone down their secularism and base their arguments on a re-interpretation of Islamic 
legal sources (Elliott, 2009). This use of Islam to counteract Islamists was complemented with 
coordination at the international level. In May 2000, women’s associations in Morocco, 
Belgium, Spain, France and the Netherlands met to establish a support network for the Plan 
(Ouali, 2008). In 2003, the regional network, Collectif Maghreb-Egalite published a guide for 
equality in the family in the Maghreb, which sought to demonstrate that it is possible to arrive 
at a reform that is in line with Islamic law, international law, and the evolution of society  (Bras, 
2007).  
While the secular segment of the women’s rights movement Islamised its discourse, Islamists 
moderated theirs. Islamists still mobilised against modernisation and secularism, which owing 
to Morocco’s past as a protectorate of European powers, perceived them as instruments of 
Westernisation (Ouali, 2008). However, rather than reject any reform of the Moudawana, 
Islamists called for culturally sensitive changes (Elliott, 2009). Members of Adl argued that a 
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truly Islamic order gives rights to women, and the representative of the women’s section, Nadia 
Yassine even welcomed the proposals of the King, on the grounds that it was influenced by an 
intelligent re-reading of the sacred texts (Bras, 2007). This moderation could be due to 
Islamists’ weakening power after terrorist attacks and their threat to the inclusion of Islamists 
in the political arena. On 16th May 2003, deadly terrorist bombings by Jihadists took place in 
Casablanca, prompting decision-makers to see the need for social, political and legal reforms 
(Ouali, 2008). This weakened Islamists, as their inclusion in the political system had depended 
on their ability to act as a bulwark against Islamic terrorism (Bras, 2007). Anxious about their 
image, they halted their public opposition to the reform and did not hold public demonstrations 
when the King made his speech in October 2003 to recommend a new Family Code 
(Moghadam and Gheytanchi, 2010). Secular women activists not only benefited from the 
weakening power of Islamists, they also used this event to get back at their opponents (Sadiqi, 
2008b).  
Regardless of Islamists’ moderation of their discourse, the debate over the Moudawana was 
made within an Islamic framework, and opposing camps disagreed more over whose 
interpretation was more legitimate. While secular women activists accused Islamists of being 
ignorant on Islamic tradition, Islamists accused them of substituting the Moudawana with 
pieces of legislation inspired by different Islamic schools of thought, and taken out of their 
context (Bras, 2007).  
Ultimately, the new Family Code reached a middle ground between religious and secular 
segments of Moroccan society. It contained several provisions that satisfied secular women’s 
rights activists. These included the end of male guardianship, mutual responsibility for the 
household, the use of a judge for marriage contract or dissolution, the regulation of divorce 
through new laws and a family court, the establishment of the minimum age for marriage to 18 
for both boys and girls, the sharing of assets after a divorce, and the right to child custody to 
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women upon re-marriage (Ennaji, 2016). Thus, not only did the Code increased women’s rights 
in marriage and divorce, its abolition of male guardianship allowed them to carry out civic 
duties as free and autonomous agents. Women no longer needed male authority to exercise a 
job, become member of a trade union or a political party, or even to travel (Ouali, 2008). 
Scholars note that the Code contain many restrictions and loopholes that dilute its value. It still 
maintains four important institutions: polygamy, divorce through repudiation, separation by 
compensation and unequal inheritance between men and women (Ouali, 2008; Sadiqi, 2008b). 
Referring to articles 231, 235 and 236, Elliott (2009) argues that fathers are still considered to 
be the legal representatives of children and are entrusted with managing the affairs of the 
household, including religious education. Furthermore, articles 80, 102 and 194 encourage the 
notion of complementarity in obligations, while article 20 allows a legal tutor to marry off girls 
before the age of 18 (Elliott, 2009). Sadiqi (2008b) adds that the Code is essentially about 
married women and leaves out single women, as well as those who are not Moroccans, but 
married to Moroccans.  
This reform of the Moudawana is perceived by Eddouarda and Pepicelli (2010) to be part of 
Mohamed VI’s strategy of state-sponsored Islamic feminism. After the 2003 Casablanca 
bombings, Mohamed VI transformed religious institutions, by encouraging the recruitment of 
women to positions of authority, to stop radicalisation and control the religious sphere 
(Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010). This led to the feminisation of religious professions in the 
2000s. Female academics were invited in religious circles to discuss religion, and in 2006, the 
Ministry of Islamic Affairs recruited several female preachers and theologians (Eddouada and 
Pepicelli, 2010). For Wuerth (2005), Mohamed VI’s commitment to improving the situation of 
women in Morocco had more to do with satisfying external actors. Wuerth (2005) argues that 
free trade agreements with the United States and the European Union contained clauses that 
called for the improvement of social and economic issues.   
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Regardless of the reasons for this reform, the fact remains that very little had changed on the 
ground, due to cultural traditions, lack of access to information, and lack of democracy and 
development. More specifically, women are prevented from invoking their rights because male 
judges hold conservative values that prevent them from applying the Code, the reforms are 
poorly known in some areas, such as rural ones, patriarchal values are deeply ingrained in 
society, and women suffer from social injustices and higher rates of illiteracy than men (Sadiqi, 
2008b; Ennaji, 2016). Ignorance about the new Family Code and its content is attributed to the 
lack of a nationwide campaign to educate all sectors of society about it, and the fact that the 
media reports official news in modern standard Arabic, which many Moroccans are not fluent 
in (Elliott, 2009).  
The secular segment of the third wave of the Moroccan women’s rights movement did not limit 
its campaigning to the reform of the Family Code, but drew on a wide range of strategies to 
mobilise for various goals. The Ligue Democratique pour les Droits des Femmes (Democratic 
League for Women’s Rights)44 carried out a campaign since 2002 to encourage women to vote 
for legislative candidates that supported their claims, which culminated in several political 
parties including their demands on their platforms (Ouali, 2008).  
Two other nationwide efforts include the campaigns to end sexual harassment and to introduce 
quotas for women in politics. In 2001, female parliamentarians from the main political parties, 
such as Istiqlal, USFP, PPS and MP, established a network to campaign for a quota system 
(Sater, 2007). They sought to insert this goal in the electoral reforms proposed by Driss Jettou, 
who was Minister of the Interior at the time (Sater, 2007). With regards to sexual harassment, 
                                                             
44 The League has since expanded and now incorporates various organisations. It is now called 
the Federation de la Ligue Democratique des Droits des Femmes (Federation of the 
Democratic League for Women’s Rights). I henceforth refer to it as the Federation in this thesis.  
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women have drawn on new technologies to mobilise for their right to occupy the public sphere 
(Monqid, 2012). Online platforms, such as blogs and social networks like Facebook, have 
allowed women to provide a collective voice to speak out against the violence they face 
(Monqid, 2012).  
The Democratic Association organised events, including an online petition to the Prime 
Minister, to pressure the government to withdraw its reservations to CEDAW and to ratify the 
optional protocol (Ouali, 2008).  This effort was part of a regional campaign called Equality 
Without Reservations, which was officially established in 2006 in Rabat, and brought together 
women’s rights organisations from Arab states, to call on governments all reservations to 
CEDAW, to fully commit to non-discrimination (Moghadam and Gheytanchi, 2010).  
The secular Moroccan women’s rights movement was also involved in another regional 
campaign, called Arab Women’s Rights to Citizenship. This campaign started on 8th March 
2002, under the supervision of the Lebanese NGO, the Collective for Research and Training 
on Development-Action (Habib and Abou-Habib, 2003). The aim was to pressure Arab states 
to commit to Article 9 of CEDAW, which calls for women to be granted nationality rights on 
the same terms as men (Habib and Abou-Habib, 2003). The campaign particularly called for 
women to be able to pass on their nationality to their children and husbands, if their husbands 
are from a different nationality (Habib and Abou-Habib, 2003). 
These campaigns were followed by favourable policy and legal changes. In May 2002, the 
government of Youssoufi approved a proposal backed by the King, to have reserved seats for 
the legislative elections of September 2002 (Sadiqi, 2008b).The Labour Code was reformed in 
2004 and included articles that made sexual harassment in the workplace a serious misconduct, 
and increased maternity leave (Ouali, 2008). A new nationality code was passed in January 
2007, which enabled Moroccan women married to foreign husbands to pass on their nationality 
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to their children (Sadiqi, 2010b). However, this does not extend to those married to non-Muslim 
men and those married abroad (Sadiqi, 2010b). In December 2008, Mohamed VI stated that 
Morocco would lift its reservation to CEDAW, and in particular, articles 2 and 16, which 
respectively call for gender equality in national legislation, and to eradicate discrimination 
against women in the family (Elliott, 2009).  
The watershed moment for the Moroccan women’s rights movement was the Arab Spring, as 
it led to a series of events that radically changed the political environment, and brought with it 
great opportunities, but even greater challenges. The Arab Spring refers to a series of protests 
that shook the Middle East and North Africa, in late 2010, following the self-immolation of 
Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, in protest at the injustices he was suffering 
(Ajami, 2012; Moghadam, 2013b). The protests spread to Morocco in February 2011, during 
which was born the 20th February Movement, which included civil society actors, such as 
women’s rights associations, youth groups, and left-wing groups (Moghadam, 2013b). On that 
day, several thousand people rallied on the streets in cities and towns across Morocco, to 
demand political and economic changes, such democratic institutions, better access to jobs and 
higher wages, and the recognition of Tamazight as a national language (Salime, 2012). To 
provide logistic support and legal advice to the movement, left-wing political parties, trade 
unions and human rights organisations set up a National Council of Support (Salime, 2012).  
Mohamed VI quickly moved to quell dissent by calling for a revision of the Constitution in 
March 2011 and early legislative elections were held in November 2011 (Madani, Maghraoui 
and Zerhouni, 2012; Ruchti, 2012). After the elections, the King appointed Abdelilah 
Benkirane, leader of the Party of Justice and Development, as the Chief of Government, as 
Article 47 of the 2011 Constitution requires the King to appoint a Head of Government from 
the largest party in Parliament (Ruchti, 2012). Subsequently, the PJD formed a first coalition 
government, composed of the conservative Istiqlal Party, the royalist Mouvement Populaire 
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(Popular Movement Party, henceforth PM), and the leftist Progress and Socialism Party (PPS). 
Following the resignation of Istiqlal from the ruling coalition in July 2013, a new coalition 
government with the centre-right National Rally of Independents (NRI) was approved by the 
King in October 2013 and lasted until the parliamentary election of October 2016, which saw 
the re-appointment of Benkirane as Chief of Government.  
A royal commission was established for the constitutional changes. The Constitution did not 
change the King’s role as powerful arbiter between the various political forces in the country 
(Bergh and Rossi-Doria, 2015). The King also retains his royal prerogatives. He is still the 
Commander of the Faithful and the Head of State, and is not accountable to any other institution 
(Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012). He appoints the head of government and the 
ministers, presides over Cabinet meetings, has the power to dissolve parliament, commands 
the armed forces, and appoints ambassadors (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012).  
Despite this, the Constitution contains many positive changes, such as the recognition of 
Tamazight as an official language, advanced regionalisation, and a consultative council on 
youth issues  (Bergh and Rossi-Doria, 2015). Other notable changes of relevance to the 
women’s rights movement include participatory governance, commitment to parity between 
men and women, and the harmonisation of national legislation with international conventions. 
The Constitution promotes participatory governance through an enlargement of the scope of 
civil society actions and the development  of  participatory  mechanisms.  Article 12 states that 
civil society groups and non-governmental organisations can operate freely, as long as they 
respect the Constitution and the law, and ‘may not be dissolved or suspended by the public 
powers except by virtue of a decision of  justice’ (Ruchti, 2012). It further states that they  must 
‘conform to democratic principles’ and encourage them to contribute in  ‘the  enactment, the  
implementation and the evaluation of the decisions  and the initiatives [projets] of the elected 
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institutions and of the public powers’ (Ruchti, 2012).  Article  13  calls  on  public  authorities  
to  work  towards  the  creation  of ‘instances  of  dialog  [concertation],  with  a  view  to  
associate  the  different social actors with the enactment, the implementation, the execution and 
the  evaluation of the public policies’ (Ruchti, 2012). Article 14 declares that citizens have the 
right to present motions on legislative issues, while Article  15 states that  citizens have the 
right to present petitions to public authorities (Ruchti, 2012).  Article  27  states  that  citizens  
have  the  right  to  access  information  held  by  public  administration,  elected  institutions  
and  other  public  services,  while  Article 139 calls on regional councils to develop 
participatory mechanisms (Ruchti, 2012).  
Article 19, is of greater relevance to the Moroccan women’s movement, as it calls for parity 
between men and women, and the creation of an Authority for parity and equality to this effect. 
According to this article: 
‘The man and the woman enjoy, in equality, the rights and freedoms of civil, political, 
economic, social, cultural and environmental character, enounced in this Title and in the other 
provisions of the Constitution, as well as in the international conventions and pacts duly ratified 
by Morocco and this, with respect for the provisions of the Constitution, of the constants 
[constantes] of the Kingdom and  of  its  laws.  The State works for the realization of parity 
between men and women. An Authority for parity and the struggle against all forms of 
discrimination is created, to this effect’ (Ruchti, 2012).  
Finally, the preamble of the Constitution states hat Morocco has as one of its objectives, ‘To  
comply  with  the  international  conventions  duly  ratified  by  it, within the framework of the 
provisions of the Constitution and of the laws of  the Kingdom, within respect for its immutable 
national identity, and on the publication of these publications, [their] primacy over the internal 
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law of the country, and  to harmonise in consequence the pertinent provisions of national 
legislation’ (Ruchti, 2012). 
When the PJD won a plurality of the votes in the 2011 elections, it quickly moved to appoint 
to government positions, women who belonged to Islamic associations. The only woman in the 
first Benkirane cabinet was Bassima Hakkaoui, who was appointed as Minister of Solidarity, 
Women, Family and Social Development. Hakkaoui had been a parliamentarian for the PJD, 
and belonged to RCF (Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010). This association’s aim with regards to 
women’s rights is to ‘preserve authenticity and Islamic identity’ and make sure that they 
conform with Islamic law (Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010). Another woman who worked for 
the ministry for relations with Parliament and civil society in this cabinet, was the president of 
Forum al Zahra.  
4.5. Towards Fragmentation 
After the Arab Spring, the secular branch of the Moroccan women’s rights movement 
frequently resorted to coalitions and networks as mobilisation strategies. A prominent coalition 
is the Printemps de la Dignite (Spring of Dignity), which though formed before the Arab 
Spring, in 2003, garnered momentum in the years that followed it (Initiative pour la Protection 
des Droits des Femmes, IPDF 2016). It took shape a few years later, under the leadership of 
the AMDF, ADFM, Association Marocaine de Lutte contre la Violence Faite aux Femmes 
(AMVEF), and FLDDF (Printemps de la Dignite, 2010).  From 2010 onwards, it expanded to 
include other women’s rights associations (Printemps de la Dignite, 2010). As of 11th February 
2016, the coalition was composed of 24 associations (IPDF, 2016). A representative of the 
coalition affirmed in an interview that, upon realising that the problem was the whole justice 
system, its initial goal of wanting to reform of the criminal code expanded to a more 
comprehensive goal of reforming all relevant legislation (IPDF, 2016).  
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Two other major coalitions are the Coalition Civile pour l’Application de l’Article 19 (Civil 
Coalition for the Implementation of Article 19, Coalition Civile) and the Printemps Feministe 
pour la Democratie et l’Egalite (Feminist Spring for Equality and Democracy, Printemps 
Feministe). The first one brings together female journalists, as well as associations 
campaigning for women’s rights and the rights of the Amazigh people, and fights for the 
implementation of Article 19 of the Constitution, described above (Moho, 2014). The second 
one describes itself as an alliance of women’s rights’ associations, which convened on 16th 
March 2011, to constitutionalise equality between men and women in political, economic, civil 
and cultural rights (Printemps Féministe pour la Démocratie et l’Egalité, 2011). Added to these 
coalitions is ANARUZ, a national network for centres of listening and legal advice, that was 
established in April 2004 (Sadiqi, 2010a). It is composed of centres that provide psychological, 
social and legal assistance to women victims of domestic violence, to help them cope with their 
situation (Sadiqi, 2010a). The network also organises training seminars and campaigns to raise 
awareness of domestic violence (Sadiqi, 2010a).  
Soon enough these collective efforts experienced tensions and splits, leading to instances of 
parallel mobilisation on similar issues. The Printemps de la Dignite witnessed the exit of four 
actors: AMVEF, UAF, Jossour, and FLDDF. This departure is a result of grievances about its 
leadership and organisation. According to a representative for Jossour, a key reason for leaving 
the coalition was the existence of ‘manipulation’ and ‘hegemony’ by a specific entity (2016). 
AMVEF left because it disagreed with the internal organisation of the coalition, as well as its 
inability to handle being part of the coalition and independently pursuing its goals as an 
association (2016). A representative of UAF in Agadir declared in an interview that key 
grievances were the lack of a democratic process, and monopoly over the decision-making 
process (2016). According to them, ‘We cannot call for democracy and be un-democratic in 
our actions’ (2016). The rabat section of FLDDF similarly pointed to management and 
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communication problems as reasons for leaving, but also added that they left because the 
coalition expanded into areas that were not within its expertise, weakening their activities 
(2016).  Though some interviewees maintained that they still have good relations with the 
coalition and participated in some events with them, one admitted that in March 2016, these 
four organisations were organising a press conference to react to the draft law on violence 
against women, in parallel to the one planned by the Spring of Dignity (UAF Rabat, 2016).  
Through an interview with a representative of El Amane in Marrakesh, I also learnt that parallel 
mobilisation could also be driven by geographical marginalisation and the character of 
associations. This organisation chose to mobilise independently on violence against women, 
with a coalition of ten regional field organisations because it disagreed with the project 
presented by the Spring of Dignity, and preferred to present an alternative one based on their 
grassroots work (2016).  According to this organisation, the Spring was mostly composed of 
associations based in Rabat and Casablanca that were more into carrying out lobbying activities 
than working with women on the ground (El Amane, 2016). 
Besides regional associations, young women also formed their own structures because they 
were not given a voice in mainstream organisations. A young female representative of Collectif 
Aswat, an LGBT association that also mobilises on women’s rights, shared that older 
associations dominate lobbying efforts, and that when they recruit young feminist women, 
these are not given any decision-making power, and are instead expected to follow the direction 
and vision of the association (2016). Moreover, this representative complained that they were 
not given access to their activities because according to them, these networks and coalitions 
care more about consolidating their position than opening to others and fear relinquishing their 
power (Collectif Aswat, 2016).  The establishment of the Union Feministe Libre (Free Feminist 
Union, UFL) in 2016 confirms these fears. According to a representative of this association, 
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forming an independent NGO was the most effective way of getting the voice of young women 
heard within the women’s rights movement (2016).  
Finally, organisations dedicated to the plight of Amazigh women have also been established, 
with close links to Amazigh networks and organisations. A representative for Voix de la 
Femme Amazighe (Voice of the Amazigh Woman, henceforth VFA), argued that associations 
focused on women from this specific ethnic group were needed because despite being doubly 
oppressed, they are overlooked by human rights organisations, including those focusing on 
women’s rights (2016). According to this informant, despite inviting civil society actors to their 
events, only those with some sort of relationship with the Amazigh cause turn up, whereas their 
association shows solidarity with other marginalised groups (2016). This allegation of 
marginalisation is backed up by feminist and Amazigh scholar, Fatima Sadiqi. According to 
Sadiqi, the new century – and particularly the period after the Arab Spring - has witnessed the 
emergence of Amazigh feminist organisations to address issues of language, culture, identity 
and ruralness that were neglected by mainstream women’s rights’ associations (Sadiqi, 2016).  
Despite this fragmentation, these networks and associations have all focused their efforts on 
combating violence against women in the post-Arab Spring era. As chapters 5 to 7 demonstrate, 
these actors have mobilised both for legal reforms on violence against women broadly-
speaking, and also campaigned for more specific changes, such as the decriminalisation of 
abortion, the repeal of article 475 of the Criminal Code, that allows a rapist to escape prison by 
marrying his victim, the fight against sexual harassment and domestic violence. Furthermore, 
though Sadiqi states that strategies of mobilisation in this era have included cyber feminism, 
scholarship and journalism (2017b), my case study shows that public meetings, such as press 
conferences, have also been prominent. 
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4.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have traced the development of the Moroccan women’s rights movement. I 
have shown that what started as a unified and coherent secular movement turned into a larger, 
yet fragmented and dispersed one, with the entry of new categories of women, such as the 
youth and Amazigh women. Its development has been affected by the political strength of 
Islamists, which not only directly opposed secular activists by staging counter-protests, but 
also indirectly challenged them through Islamist women’s associations. I have also shown that 
the secular current of the movement has consistently exploited political opportunities to 
advance its key goal of reforming the Moudawana. It has also sought to reach out to both 
national and international elite actors, such as inter-governmental organisations, political 
parties and the King of Morocco. Besides seeking the support of powerful actors, activists drew 
on a variety of mobilisation strategies, such as petitions, demonstrations, journalism, 
scholarship, and conferences. Nonetheless, given the prominence of Islam in Morocco, secular 
activists do not directly challenge religion, and in fact, draw on it to make their case.  
I have also discussed the role of political elites and the ways in which they have engaged with 
women’s rights activists. I have shown that the King has played a major role in women’s rights 
issues in Morocco. The Moudawana been introduced and changed by successive kings. In 
contrast, representative institutions has played a lesser role, either due to a lack of will or a lack 
of capability.   
In the first wave, nationalists allowed women’s rights activists to address women’s issues on 
their platform. However, this material support was hindered by the fact that the political 
discourse during the independence movement increasingly became Islamised. Furthermore, the 
focus on independence also meant that there could not be enough focus on gender equality. In 
the post-independence period, women’s rights activists benefited from the moral support of 
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intergovernmental organisations, as international discourse began addressing women’s 
liberation. IGOs. In spite of this, the political parties that these activists belonged to were not 
always receptive to their goals, and made it difficult for them to navigate their political and 
feminist identities.  Political parties were therefore less useful as a source of elite allyship.  
The restrictions placed on women’s rights activists within political parties encouraged the 
formation of independent women’s associations in the second wave of the movement. This era 
witnessed increasing international pressure on Morocco to liberalise, resulting in the 
acceptability of secular discourse to advance women’s rights. Furthermore, thanks to the 
championing of women’s rights by the UN, women’s issues were put on the agenda and 
Morocco eventually ratified CEDAW to combat gender discrimination. More importantly, the 
second wave saw the first major mobilisation for the reform of the Moudawana. Political parties 
proved unwilling to support the cause, though King Hassan provided limited reforms on this 
issue in 1993. Furthermore, political parties also proved unwilling to rally behind the national 
plan proposed by the government in the late 1990s, in spite of the increased liberalisation of 
the political system. When the first socialist government entered politics in the alternance 
government, it proved unable to pass the national plan, due to strong opposition. Ultimately, it 
dropped the plan and delegated the reform of the Moudawana to the new King, Mohamed VI.  
In the third wave, King Mohamed VI initiated the most extensive reforms to the Moudawana 
in 2004. Furthermore, he included them in decision-making by ensuring that he included 
women in his advisory commission. The King also made other notable changes, such as 
agreeing to remove all reservations to CEDAW and backing quotas for women in politics. 
Furthermore, the 2011 Constitution, initiated by the King includes is more women-friendly and 
commits to gender equality.   
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In the next chapter, I will go into detail about mobilisation on violence against women, as well 
as on the legal and policy achievements in this area. I will discuss the types of claims made by 
women’s rights’ activists and other political actors, to analyse the extent to which they align.  
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5.Performances of Elite Allyship  
5.1. Introduction 
As I have demonstrated in previous chapters, elite allies form a core dimension of the 
concept of opportunity in the literature on social movements. However, my meta-analysis in 
chapter 3 shows that the presence of elite allies is not a strong predictor of policy change 
favourable to social movements. To better understand the relationship between elite allies and 
social movements, one needs to move away from examining their presence, to examining their 
performances. As I have argued in previous chapters, we can assess the quality of these 
performances by analysing the extent to which they perform four functions.  
First, they need to represent the interests and claims of social movements. To measure effective 
representation, one needs to evaluate the substantive representation of social movements’ 
interests by potential elite allies, through a claims-making approach (see Chapter 2). This 
means that elite allies cannot be determined a priori, but only a posteriori. Elite allies also need 
to have some ties with social movement actors and provide resources to them. Finally, they 
need to mobilise other elites by engaging in specific strategies towards them.  
These performances of elite allyship are investigated in this chapter through a dataset of 
representative claims on violence against women in Morocco, taken from the Moroccan 
newspapers Liberation and Aujourd'hui Le Maroc. I draw on a form of content analysis called 
representative claims analysis to provide a systematic analysis of the extent to which different 
sets of elite political actors and non-elites articulate claims that represent the interests of social 
movement actors mobilising on this issue, and to provide a thick description of their opinions, 
actions and interactions.  
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With regards to representation, I stated in chapter 2 that I expect intergovernmental 
organisations, foreign governments, the Moroccan King and the government, political parties, 
bureaucrats and the judiciary to be potential sources of elite allyship. Findings from my 
representative claims-analysis, are broadly in line with these expectations, though I find that 
Parliament as an institution engages in representative claims-making, as well as other types 
politicians.  
I do not find the judiciary to be particularly well engaged in claims-making. I also find that 
there is no one type of elite actor which consistently aligns with the claims of Moroccan 
women’s rights groups and coalitions. Furthermore, I find a lot of similarity between the 
interest representation of Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions and the Moroccan 
government, challenging the assumption in the literature on social movements that opposition 
political parties can be more reliable potential allies because they are less constrained. 
Additionally, the relevance of both Moroccan bureaucrats and intergovernmental organisations 
suggests that geographical and power distance may not necessarily affect the extent to which 
elite actors can become potential allies.  
More importantly, elite actors prefer to speak on behalf of the constituencies represented by 
Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions, rather than directly represent women’s rights 
groups and coalitions in Morocco. By neglecting the role of these actors in the debate, they 
limit the extent to which they engage in effective representation.  
With regards to arrangements, I expect the presence of networks or coalitions involving 
political elites and social movement actors, to be instances of elite allyship, though the latter 
arrangement is preferable as it is deeper and more horizontal. I find that there is very little 
evidence of co-ordination and joint action with elite actors, though most elite actors shared the 
same broad beliefs as activists with regards to violence against women. This suggests that the 
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mobilisation for reforms on violence against women is one involving loosely coupled networks 
rather than elite-social movement coalitions. 
As I discussed in chapter 2, I expect I expect a third performance of elite allyship to be the 
direct provision of moral, material, informational and human resources to women’s rights 
activists. My findings show that the most frequent type of resource is moral, though elite actors 
also provide some material, human and informational support. Moral resources in this sample 
involve the use of claims that express support for tackling violence against women in Morocco. 
Along with the presence of loose networks, this suggests that there is not only little contact 
between elite actors and Moroccan women’s rights activists, but also a lack of commitment to 
engage deeper on this issue.  
The final dimension of elite allyship I consider in this thesis is the use of double mobilisation 
towards other political elites. Double mobilisation, which I explain in chapter 2, involves the 
use of both pressure and collaboration to persuade other elite actors to support Moroccan 
women’s rights activists. I find that few elite actors do perform this strategy through the 
simultaneous use of moral leverage and persuasion. Elite actors might be unwilling or unable 
to engage in riskier activities to support activists because of the institutional constraints placed 
on political actors in Morocco.  
5.2. Data  
To carry out my claims analysis, I collect data from newspaper articles. The advantage of 
newspapers is that compared to other types of media, they are comprehensively recorded on 
digital news archives (Deacon, 2007). The preferred digital news archives in social movements 
studies are Lexis Nexis and Factiva. In fact, Lexis Nexis is regarded as being ‘the media archive 
of choice for many academic and political sources across North America and Europe’ (Deacon, 
2007, p. 7). However, these two archives proved to be inadequate for my research due to 
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restrictions on institutional membership and the limited availability of Moroccan newspapers. 
I thus settled for using Maghress, a digital archive of Moroccan newspapers, to identify and 
code representative claims pertaining to violence against women issues in Morocco.45 
Maghress lists newspaper articles in both French and Arabic. However, due to language 
restrictions, I limit my coding to French language sources.  
My selection of newspapers was influenced by the degree to which they covered the issue of 
violence against women in Morocco. As, the goal is not to compare coverage of violence 
against women in different types of newspapers, but rather to get newspapers that cover this 
topic in the most comprehensive and consistent way, I settled on two prominent, but 
complementary daily newspapers.46 The newspapers are Liberation (affiliated with Union 
Socialiste des Forces Populaires and the independent Aujourd’hui Le Maroc (henceforth 
ALM). The time frame is restricted to the period between 29th November 2011 and 31st July 
2016. The start date refers to when the current government came to power, while the end date 
has been selected as Bill 103-13 on Violence against Women passed in the Lower House of 
Parliament on 21st July 2016.  
These newspapers complement one another because Liberation belongs to the traditional 
partisan media that has long dominated Moroccan society, whereas ALM belongs to the new 
wave of independent and privately-owned media. Liberation is based in Casablanca and is the 
French-language daily of the left-wing USFP, the Arabic one being Al Ittihad al Ichtiraki. The 
readership of the USFP’s press reflects the urban and educated character of the USFP’s 
constituency of USFP. It appeals to university students, young professionals and government 
employees (Rugh, 2004). Circulation figures for Liberation are quite low, standing at 1 713 in 
                                                             
45 http://www.maghress.com/fr  
46 As I was also the sole coder, I did not have the time to consider more than two newspapers.   
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2016-7 according to academic sources and Morocco’s audit bureau on the press (Organisme de 
Justification de la Diffusion, no date; Rugh, 2004). Liberation’s total circulation progressively 
declined every year since 2005 when it stood at 4093 (Organisme de Justification de la 
Diffusion, no date). This decreasing circulation is not surprising if we consider the fact that 
Moroccan society is alienated by traditional newspapers because they are financially dependent 
on subsidies by the government and represent party lines (Cropf, Benmamoun and Kalliny, 
2012). However, if we look at the dailies with the highest circulation, these are the two 
independent Al Akhbar (The News) and Al Massae (The Evening), and the two royalist 
Assabah (The Morning) and Le Matin du Saharah et du Maghreb (The Morning of the Sahara 
and the Maghreb, henceforth Le Matin). In 2016, the total circulation of Al Ahbar and Al 
Massae was 45 240 and 33 362 respectively (Organisme de Justification de la Diffusion, no 
date). Assabah and its French counterpart, Le Matin had a circulation of 32 558 and 20 092 
respectively in the same period (Organisme de Justification de la Diffusion, no date).  
Al Akhbar and Al Massae are new arabic language dailies that were launched in 2007 and 2009 
respectively, and which are widely seen as being professional and liberal (Benchenna, Ksikes 
and Marchetti, 2017). However, their usefulness for this research was affected by the fact that 
due to their popularity, they have been subject to repression by the authorities (Benchenna, 
Ksikes and Marchetti, 2017). I decided against using Le Matin because Maghress only had a 
handful of articles on women’s rights in the period under study.  
I used ALM, which is an independent daily that was established in 2001 (Rugh, 2004). ALM 
is part of a new wave of independent and privately-owned newspapers that surfaced in the 21st 
century. Its circulation considerably fluctuated between 2006 and 2016. Its highest was 7 739 
in 2010 and its lowest 2 274 in 2013 (Organisme de Justification de la Diffusion, no date). It is 
owned by ALM Publishing, which now belongs to the group Caracteres, and is based in 
Casablanca (Reporters Without Borders, 2017). The founder of ALM is Khalid Hachimi Idrissi, 
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a close ally to the regime, and the largest shareholder is the Akwa Group which belongs to 
Moroccan billionaire Aziz Akhannouch, who has been involved in politics as member of the 
royalist RNI (Reporters Without Borders, 2017). It is therefore not suprising that despite its 
officially independent line, ALM is popular among pro-monarchy readers interested in national 
and regional politics (Skalli, 2011).  
In analysing these two newspapers, it is important to bear in mind that they operate under 
institutional constraints. Morocco’s press is not free, as the authorities frequently intervene to 
censor and exert editorial pressure (Freedom House, 2017). Journalists themselves engage in 
self-censorship by staying clear of sensitive topics, to avoid repression in the form of fines, 
imprisonment, intimidation and physical violence (Freedom House, 2017). Topics that cannot 
be addressed include criticism of Islam, the King, the monarchy, Morocco’s authority over 
Western Sahara, as well as discussion of sex and anything that would affect the ‘public order’  
(Freeman, 2017, p. 3145).   
5.3. Measurement of Concepts  
To code instances of claim-making, I use the delimitations offered by Koopmans (Koopmans, 
2002, pp. 5–7). Like Koopmans, I only code claims that contain an explicit action. An example 
of a representative claim would be: ‘The organisers of the regional conference on violence 
against women spelled out that the phenomenon of violence against women is universal and 
that since it presents socio-economic costs to society, it is logical that everyone participates in 
its eradication.’ Similarly to Koopmans (Koopmans, 2002), speculations about opinions or 
action of others do not count as claim-making, nor do the attribution of motives to other actors.  
However, I do code claims by journalists in opinion articles, though I code these as claims 
reflecting their position on policy on violence against women. Furthermore, if the statement is 
only a statement of fact without explicit normative connotation, it is not coded as a claim. 
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Finally, to capture the current discourse on policy on violence against women, I only code 
claims made within the last two weeks of the document publication date, or otherwise presented 
in present tense or ongoing form.  
Existing codebooks adopt a 150-200 words search strategy (Koopmans, 2002). Put simply, 
whether or not an article is relevant is determined according to whether or not the first 150/200 
words contain relevant claims on an issue area. However, this approach is not gender-sensitive. 
During my pilot study, I have noticed that when relating speeches of government figures on 
various issues, women’s issues tend to be discussed towards the end of the speech and also 
tend to be reported towards the end of an article by the journalist relating the event. This means 
that relevant claims by important actors might not be identified because they appear after the 
word limit set by the coder. I thus decided to read the whole article instead.   
The data collected for this research includes 604 representative claimants from 207 newspaper 
articles. These claimants sometimes raised one distinct issue, sometimes more. Out of these 
604 claimants, 383 are single claimants. I collected several variables about each claimant, 
though for this chapter, the ones that are discussed relate to the form of a claim, the function 
of the claimant, the represented constituency, and the prognostic and diagnostic frames they 
used in their claims (i.e. the policy change they advocate, who they hold responsible for 
implementing their claim, and why). These variables are summarised in Appendix 2. The 
values in the variable CLAIMANT_FUN and ADDRESSEE_FUN are grouped in such a 
manner that they help to differentiate between Moroccan and non-Moroccan representatives, 
and between state and non-state actors in Morocco.47 An addressee must be explicitly 
                                                             
47 I have made slight amendments to the coding used in existing codebooks, by coding certain 
values differently or including other variables. Here, I clarify the most important ones. In my 
research, intergovernmental organisations refer to both these entities as a whole, and their 
constituent agencies. I have not used separate values to differentiate between them, as this is 
not relevant for my research. International civil society refers to international non-
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mentioned in the claim and must be a concrete actor, and is coded whenever a claimant calls 
upon another actor to change their position on a certain topic. This is even done when this 
reference is a form of criticism, without an explicit call for change of position.  
I use the definition provided by Haunss and Kohlmorgen (2008, p. 29) in their codebook, and 
define an addressee as ‘the actor at whom the claim is directly addressed in the form of a call 
or appeal to do or leave something.’48 The represented constituency, denoted by the OBJECT 
variable, needs to include actors living in Morocco. For instance, I assume that a representative 
speaking on behalf of women all over the world is also speaking on behalf of women living in 
Morocco, including migrant women in Morocco. I do not include instances where a claimant 
is speaking exclusively on behalf of Moroccan women that reside abroad, because such women 
are not affected by political developments in Morocco in the same way as those residing in 
                                                             
governmental organisation or not-for-profit organisations such as NGOS, labour unions, 
indigenous groups, charitable organisations, faith-based organisations, professional 
associations, and foundations. Foreign Governments refer to foreign embassies or other 
representative functions for a foreign government. Moroccan government refers to governing 
political parties, as well as national and local governments in Morocco, individual Moroccan 
Ministers and their official representatives, such as ambassadors, and the Moroccan polity as a 
whole. Opposition political parties refer to parties in Parliament that are not part of the 
governing coalition, whereas other politicians refer to actors that do not hold elected office in 
Morocco, such as political parties that are not represented in Parliament. Parliament refers to 
this the Moroccan parliament or legislatives as an institution. Bureaucracy refers to local and 
national-level state institutions like ministries, departments, institutions created by the 2011 
Constitution, and agencies of the Moroccan government. The judiciary denotes all actors in the 
Moroccan legal system from courts to prosecutors and lawyers presented in the framework of 
a specific case. The police/security/military refers to any formal state organisation with a 
monopoly on violence, like the Moroccan police and army. Women's rights groups/coalitions 
refers to such groups and coalitions in Morocco whose key goal is the advancement of women’s 
rights, whereas other social movements refer to groups that do not primarily mobilise on 
women, or for which such information is not available.  
48 I draw on Koopmans’s (2002) priority rules, in prioritising organisations and institutions 
over unorganised groups.  
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Morocco.49  The policy change advocated by the representative claimant – PREFPOLICY – is 
used to measure the degree of discredit to the status quo. The values used for this variable 
represent different degrees of policy change. Borrowing Peter Hall’s (1993) terminology, first 
order change is denoted by the value label ‘Amendments to the content of existing policy.’ 
This could refer to non-substantial revisions to a piece of legislation. Second order change is 
denoted by the value label ‘Amendments to the implementation of existing policy.’ It 
essentially refers to procedural changes, such as calling for the Moroccan government to 
involve civil society actors in decision-making process on violence against women. Third order 
change is denoted by ‘New Policy.’ This refers to calls for a new piece of legislation, or a new 
policy. For instance, calling for a specific law on violence against women, or calling for the 
criminalisation of certain actions would fall under this category. I also include in this category 
calls for adopting a gender-sensitive approach. The category ‘Unclear appraisal of policy’ 
                                                             
49 The represented constituency always refers to a group of people that is attributed a shared 
characteristic in the claim, and is always passive. An object is only coded when the claimant 
explicitly mentions a constituency as intended beneficiary of the claim, other than themselves. 
If, however, there are two different objects mentioned in the claim, I code the one who is the 
ultimate object of the claim. Consider the following representative claim, ‘To remedy the 
exclusion of women’s rights groups from decision-making, and to counter violence against 
women in Morocco, the Spring of Dignity coalition calls for a real partnership with the 
government, and is ready to share its expertise with the relevant state agencies, to help establish 
a law that would meet Morocco’s international obligations in this area.’ Though the Spring of 
Dignity coalition speaks on behalf of women’s rights groups, its ultimate goal is to counter 
violence against women in Morocco. Therefore, the represented constituency is women. This 
approach differs from that of Koopmans’ (2002) codebook for the Europub project. Thus, the 
methodological difference is threefold. First, I only code an object if it is explicitly mentioned. 
Second, I do not code an object if the claimant defends their own interests. Third, I prioritise 
positively evaluated constituencies over negatively evaluated ones. I similarly draw on de 
Wilde et al’s (2014) coding of the different categories of objects, which correspond to major 
cleavages in society, as well as broader and narrower social groups relevant for my research 
project. In case there are several object actors whose interests are represented by the claim, I 
code the ultimate object of the claim as the object. If there is no Object, the Object variable is 
coded as ‘None.’ 
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refers to situations where representatives do not make a clear policy proposal. Only one value 
can be selected, so to determine which one, look at the frequency with which a claimant calls 
for a particular type of policy, or alternatively, which type of policy change is mentioned first. 
JUSTIFICATION identifies the idea that underlies the claim formulated by a representative, 
and FORM identifies the characteristics of the claim. Justifications can be instrumental, based 
on notions of collective identity, or highlight universal or moral principles. The form of the 
claim - which I look at in the second part of this chapter - can take the form of political 
decisions, executive action, judicial action, verbal or written statements, meeting, direct 
democratic action, petitioning, protest.  
Finally, it is important to mention that in this study, I depart from de Wilde et al’s (2014) 
approach by only coding frames mentioned by the claimant, whether explicit or implicit. In 
other words, instances where the claimant formulates a demand in the form of ‘I want X 
because of Y’ or where the claimant articulates a demand, alongside a goal or value without 
explicitly connecting the two.  If there is more than one frame present of the same type, I code 
the one that is considered the ultimate goal. These variables are then used to construct simple 
crosstabs to compare the interest representation of women’s rights groups and coalitions and 
other actors. 
5.1. Method 
In chapter 2, I argued that Saward’s (2006, 2010) concept of the representative claim can be a 
useful tool to analyse the political representation of activists on violence against women in 
Morocco by a range of political actors. I have explained that Saward’s performative approach 
to representation suits my conceptual framework, which views elite allyship as a performance. 
RCA allows researchers to capture interactions between actors, as well as the alliances and 
networks that exist (Koopmans and Statham, 1999). In contrast to other methods of media 
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content analysis, such as protest event analysis, it provides more information on interactions 
and contention in public communication (de Wilde, 2013, p. 288). Furthermore, ‘by focusing 
on actors, their speech acts and issues, the concept of ‘event’ is expanded beyond description 
of “what happened” to a focus on the ‘meaning that was attributed to what happened”’ (de 
Wilde, 2013, p. 288). The RCA is thus a suitable method to investigate the relationship between 
different types of political elites and domestic activists, as well as the actions of the former, 
because it provides a thick description of a range of opinions, actions and interactions.  
Despite having gained currency among scholars, Saward’s conceptualisation has been applied 
to relatively few studies, which can be divided into those that adopt a Critical Frame Analysis 
(CFA) and those that use Representative Claims Analysis (RCA). In the first category, we find 
Severs et al.’s (2013) study of the substantive representation of Muslim women on the 
headscarf debate in Dutch-speaking Belgium between 2004 and 2009. This study draws on 
representative claims made in the public sphere, such as televised journals and shows, 
legislative documents, manifestos, press releases, conference proceedings, magazines and 
websites. The authors refer to Meier’s (2008) arguments to explain why they adopt CFA, a 
form of content analysis which starts from the premise that all political acts are problem driven, 
to locate within instances of political acts, the definition of a problem (diagnosis), the proposed 
solution to the problem (prognosis) and the responsible actor for providing this solution 
(Severs, Celis and Meier, 2013, p. 437). First, it helps to map out implicit and explicit 
representations of a policy problem. Second, it allows for the identification of who has a voice 
in defining the policy problem and offering a solution to it.   
In this methodology, claims are broken down into policy problems (Severs, 2012, p. 177). This 
starts with scrutinising claims-makers’ public interventions for the presence of a ‘substantive 
core,’ which is a claim that denounces a situation that is disadvantageous for the represented, 
formulates a proposal to improve the situation of the represented, or claims a right to improve 
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the situation of the represented (Severs, 2012). The claim is then broken down into a principal 
and an interest dimension. Assessing the principal dimension of the claim allows for the 
identification of the problem-holder, whereas the interests dimension involves locating the 
problem diagnosis (i.e. what is presented as the problem and why?), the causality (i.e. What or 
who is seen as a cause of that?), and the problem prognosis (i.e. Which action is deemed 
necessary, why, and who is included in solving the problem?) (Severs, 2012). The final step 
involves comparing the overall problem frame by looking at the issue raised and the interest 
formulated (Severs, 2012). 
As an alternative, de Wilde (2013) proposes to analyse representative claims through a more 
systematic method of qualitative content analysis called Representative Claims Analysis 
(RCA). De Wilde (2013) came up with this idea to bridge between the empirical method of 
Political Claims Analysis (PCA) developed by Koopmans and Statham (1999) and Saward’s 
(2006, 2010) theoretical framework of the representative claim. PCA originates within the field 
of social movement studies and has been developed to bring together Protest Event Analysis 
(PEA) and Political Discourse Analysis (PDA), and thereby integrates frames and contentious 
actions, two different dimensions in political contention (Koopmans and Statham, 1999).  
As Koopmans and Statham (1999) point out, as forms of protests have become more 
sophisticated and evolved, simply measuring the physical mobilisation of protesters no longer 
provides a good indication of the level of contention. Thus, to make sure that as many forms 
of actions and types of actors are included, the unit of analysis used instead is instances of 
claims-making, whether routine or non-routine, institutional or non-institutional (Koopmans 
and Statham, 1999). Koopmans (2007, p. 189) describes a political claim as ‘a unit of strategic 
action in the public sphere that we define as: the purposive and public articulation of political 
demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms or physical attacks, which, actually or 
potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors.’ Put 
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simply, claims are units in which the claimant(s) present a single political demand on an issue. 
For a claim to be political, it must contain a political statement, meaning that they should relate 
to collective social problems and not a personal problem (Koopmans, 2002, p. 6).  
A political claim can be broken down into the following constituent units: the location of the 
claim in time and space (i.e. when and where is the claim made?), the actor making the claim 
(i.e. who makes the claim?), the form of the claim (i.e. how is the claim inserted in the public 
sphere?), the substantive issue of the claim (i.e. what is the claim about?), the addressee of the 
claim (i.e. at whom is the claim directed?), the object actor (i.e. whose interests are affected by 
the claim?), and the justification for the claim (i.e. why should this action be undertaken?). In 
summary, a political claim is composed of WHERE and WHEN (location), WHO (claimant) 
makes a claim, on WHAT (issue), addressing WHOM (addressee), for/against WHOSE 
interests (Object) and WHY (frame) (De Wilde, Koopmans and Zürn, 2014).  
In practice, each time an actor makes a claim, this is manually coded in a dataset, along with 
other relevant variables that contain information about the claimant, the addressee, the object, 
and the frame, amongst others. The slight difference that de Wilde makes is that he uses the 
Object variable to denote the constituency that is explicitly represented by the claimant, instead 
of using it to measure whose interests will be affected more broadly as Koopmans does. De 
Wilde also uses the Addressee variable to specifically operationalise actors with some degree 
of authority (i.e. ‘which authority is called upon to act and/or whether its actions thus far are 
evaluated positively or negatively’) (De Wilde, Koopmans and Zürn, 2014, p. 2). 
In fact, the main criticism of PCA by de Wilde is the neglect of the variables Addressee and 
Object in the reporting of findings, which are important variables that capture accountability 
and delegation mechanisms as well as the production of imagined communities (de Wilde, 
2013, p. 291). Thus, RCA goes beyond voicing preferences and coding representative claims 
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in which someone publicly links themselves as champion of a set of ideas or interests belonging 
to a particular in-group (de Wilde, 2013, p. 288). This allows us to see how ‘[t]rough the act of 
claiming, this group is both constructed and represented at the same time’ (de Wilde, 2013, p. 
288).  
Similarly to PCA, RCA also draws on media sources such as newspaper articles as it focused 
on interactions and contention in public communication (de Wilde, 2013, p. 288). However, 
since the most important issue for claims-analysis is to capture publicly visible claims-making 
(Koopmans and Statham, 1999, p. 668), it is not necessary to limit data collection to media 
sources, and de Wilde (2014) does draw on transcripts of parliamentary debates alongside 
newspaper articles.  
There are two main challenges to measuring the success of representation via RCA. First, the 
response to representative claims ought to be measured in direct relation to those claims being 
made. Second, representative claims need to be translated into policy (de Wilde, 2013, p. 289). 
Indeed, this would allow us to measure whether and to what extent citizens or constituencies 
have been exposed to the claims made by other actors or institutions and directly respond to 
these claims as opposed to other stimuli. To achieve the first aim, de Wilde (de Wilde, 2013, 
p. 290) suggests making use of the comments section of the websites of newspapers to capture 
the responsiveness of representative claims detailed in newspaper articles, though he admits 
that it would still not allow us to know if readers that do not post comments accept these 
comments. With regards to the second aim, de Wilde (2013) suggests taking into account the 
addresses of claims, and their responses as they are often the ones in a position to translate 
claims into policy.  
Despite these challenges and the fact that RCA is labour-intensive, I use this methodology for 
my case study because ultimately, RCA allows me to examine the visibility of violence against 
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women in the public sphere, the positions of various actors on this issue, their tactical 
repertoires and their frames (Beyeler and Kriesi, 2005). This method also allows me to capture 
interactions between actors and to understand what alliances and networks exist and how they 
shift, as well as the relative positioning of different actors, and the weight of each type of actor 
in claims-making in a field (Koopmans and Statham, 1999). This is helpful in helping me gauge 
the ties between a range of elite actors and Moroccan women’s rights activists, as well as the 
resources exchanged and the strategies employed. In sum, the characteristics of RCA are 
particularly useful for the relational approach used in this thesis.  
Though scholars using PCA or RCA use the claim as the unit of analysis, I use instead the 
individual claimant. This is because I am interested in the types of representative claimants on 
the issue of violence against women in Morocco and the character of their interactions. A 
representative claimant (or representative) is an actor who makes a representative claim; a 
claim which is political in nature and represents a particular constituency. For my case study, 
such a claim needs to contain at least the following dimensions: a claimant, an action form, an 
issue related to violence against women in Morocco,50 a position on this matter (a criticism, an 
                                                             
50 With regards to violence against women, I use the definition provided in the UN Declaration 
on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, signed by the UN General Assembly in 1993.  
This is because the UN defines what constitutes discrimination against women and sets the 
agenda with regards to how to end such discrimination. Article 1 of this Declaration defines 
VAW as: ‘any act of gender-based violence, that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, 
sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion 
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life’ (Article 1). I 
divide violence against women into several dimensions, each belonging to one of the following 
three forms: violence in the family, violence in the community, state-sanctioned violence 
against women.  Coding of the various VAW categories starts with the UN Declaration, but is 
done in an open manner, extending the codes when necessary whilst preventing overlaps 
between the categories, like Mario Diani and Kousis  (2014, p. 393).  
Page 183 of 395 
 
agreement or a call for change), and a represented constituency. If any one of these variables 
is missing, I do not code a claim.  
However, given that one single representative claim can be made by various representatives, I 
allow for multiple representative claims. For instance, if three representatives make a claim 
together, I code this as three separate claims, as the claimant varies. Similarly, if a claimant 
raises two different issues, these are coded as two different claims, as the issue area differs. 
Thus, claims are not necessarily independent of each other, and in practice there is often a high 
degree of overlap between who is making the claim, the issue, and the object. 
For this project, I draw on de Wilde et al.’s (2014) codebook on representative claims for their 
research as well as on the PCA codebook developed by Koopmans (2002).51 As noted by 
previous researchers, the keywords used influence the type of debate captured in the sample 
(De Wilde, Koopmans and Zürn, 2014). Unfortunately, while Lexis Nexis and Factiva allow 
for a sophisticated search query, Maghress only allows users to use the search function to make 
a simple query. The search terms I used are therefore quite general: ‘violence + femme’ While 
this means that I am less likely to omit relevant articles, as the search term is quite general, it 
also means that I have to sift through more irrelevant articles. To limit this, I screened the title 
first and if it looks irrelevant, I move on to the next. However, if the title is quite ambiguous, I 
read the whole article to see if there are any claims on violence against women. I saved the 
search results in a Word document and only coded those articles that contained representative 
claims on violence against women.  
5.2. Sample Overview  
Before presenting the data on representative claims made by different sets of political actors 
                                                             
51 I essentially reproduce the questions asked, with some amendments for my research project. 
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on violence against women in Morocco, it is useful to provide an overview of the sample. I do 
this by discussing the distribution of claimants by publication, genre of article, topic, location 
and year. Table 1 shows that Liberation allowed me to locate no less than 87.7% of the 
representative claimants in my sample, compared to 12.3% by Aujourd’hui Le Maroc. Both 
are daily newspapers, though the latter’s articles are shorter and less detailed than Liberation. 
Nonetheless, the latter covered events that were not addressed by Liberation in the period under 
study, notably the fact that the lower chamber of Parliament adopted Bill 103-13 on violence 
against women in July 2016.  
Moreover, some political actors, notably women’s rights groups and coalitions, only appeared 
in Aujourd’hui Le Maroc. These include the coalition La Force des Femmes, its partner Italian 
NGO Progetto Mondo, and the Union for the Mediterranean. Thus, despite its less regular 
coverage, Aujourd’hui le Maroc makes visible some actors Liberation rendered invisible. Most 
representative claimants are reported in news stories, with very few reported as part of an 
interview, analysis article, or commentary. News stories report on 88% of representative 
claimants, or 529 out of 604. This suggests that journalists prefer to report on violence against 
women in Morocco when it is part of an event, and not discuss it at length.   
With regards to the location of claimants, we can see that most of these are located in Morocco, 
suggesting that the debate centres local actors. These claimants were more active during 2016, 
where 145 of them, or 24%, expressed themselves on violence against women. It is not 
surprising that the fewest claims were articulated in 2011, as the sample only starts on the 
autumn of that year. We can see that claimants were also less active in 2012. Thus, most of the 
debate occurs between 2013 and 2016.  
Finally, concerning the main issues discussed, Table 1 shows that claimants were not very 
specific. Out of 604 claimants, 364, or 60%, articulated claims about violence against women 
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as a general concept. The second and third most frequent categories are forced or child marriage 
and various forms of state-sponsored violence, accounting for 58 and 57 claimants respectively, 
or less than 10%. Family exploitation, honour-based violence and trafficking were all 
articulated by one claimant each. The fact that forced and child marriages remain an important 
topic of discussion, after the reform of the Moudawana in 2004 suggests that perhaps not much 
has changed on the ground. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Claimants  
Table 1 – Distribution of Representative Claimants   
Variable  Frequency  Percentage  
Publication Liberation 530 87.7 
Aujourd’hui Le Maroc 74 12.3 
Total 604 100.0 
Genre of Article   News Article  529 87.6 
Analysis Article  6 1 
Interview  36 6 
Opinion/Commentary 33 5.5 
Total 604 100.0 
Location of Claimant  Morocco 516 85.4 
Other 88 14.6 
Total 604 100.0 
Date 2011 3 .5 
2012 88 14.6 
2013 124 20.5 
2014 132 21.9 
2015 112 18.5 
2016 145 24 
Total 604 100.0 
Main Issue Addressed  Battering  4 .7 
 Marital Rape  2 .3 
FGM and other cultural practices  9 1.5 
Family Exploitation 1 .2 
Honour-based Violence  1 .2 
Forced or Child Marriage  58 9.8 
Other Family Violence  22 3.6 
Rape  16 2.6 
Sexual Abuse  1 .2 
Sexual Harassment  21 3.5 
Trafficking and Forced Prostitution 1 .2 
Other Community Violence  10 1.7 
Forced Pregnancy  14 2.3 
Discrimination in Criminal Sentences  2 .3 
Other state-sponsored violence  57 9.4 
Other Form of VAW 18 3.0 
VAW in General  364 60.3 
Other  3 .5 
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5.3.  Empirical Findings  
In this section, I use contingency tables, or crosstabs, to look at the congruence in representative 
claims between Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions and a range of international 
and domestic political actors.52 I determine congruence with regards to the represented 
constituency, proposed policy change, addressee and justification, by comparing the 
proportions of claims made by each type representative claimant. If a type of claimant differs 
with Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions in the level of attention granted to a 
specific issue, I view it as a lack of congruence. I use congruence in claims between elite actors 
and Moroccan women’s rights activists to determine the extent to which the former represent 
the interests of the latter, and are therefore performing allyship.  
5.3.1. Representatives on Violence Against Women in Morocco 
Figure 1 shows the actors that are most commonly reported as making representative claims on 
VAW in Morocco between November 2011 and July 2016. The most visible representatives 
are Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions, as they account for about 200 of the 
reported 604 representatives. These include the most visible Moroccan women’s rights 
organisations, based in Rabat or Casablanca. In this category, we find some of the biggest 
associations I discussed in previous chapters, such as ADFM, AMDF, FLDDF, AMVEF, 
Jossour and UAF. Added to these are smaller associations based in Rabat or Casablanca, such 
as, Ennakhil  Fondation Ytto, Association Insaf,  Solidarite Feminine (Feminine 
Solidarity), Association Marocaine de Lutte contre l’Avortement Clandestin (Moroccan 
Association Against Clandestine Abortion, henceforth AMLAC), and Union nationale des 
                                                             
52 I do not report extremely low figures that represent less than 5% of claimants in the tables.  
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femmes du Maroc de Tanger-Madina (National Union of Moroccan Women of Tanger-
Madina).  
Women’s rights organisations based outside of Rabat and Casablanca also make claims on 
violence against women. We find in this group Association Amal, based in Al Hajeb,  
Association Chaml, based in Kenitra, Association Karama and Association Tawaza, both based 
in Tanger, Initiative pour la Protection des Droits des Femmes, based in Fez, and Association 
de bienfaisance feminine El Khir, based in Essaouira. 
Other claimants in this category include national coalitions and networks. Among them is the 
network of listening centres for violated women, Anaruz. Another network related to violence 
against women is the Reseau Solidaire des Femmes Contre la Violence (Women’s Solidarity 
Network against Violence), and the Comite National de Soutien des Victimes de Viol et 
d’Agressions Sexuelles (National Support Committee for Victims of Rape and Sexual Assault). 
With regards to coalitions, we find those mentioned in chapter 4, such as the Coalition Civile 
pour l’Application de l’Article 19 (Civil Coalition for the Implementation of Article 19), a 
coalition of organisations that wants to ensure the application of Article 19 of the 2011 
Moroccan Constitution. We also find the Printemps de la Dignite (Spring of Dignity) coalition, 
which regroups women’s rights organisations whose goals are linked to ending violence against 
women in Morocco. A related coalition is the Printemps Feministe pour la Democratie et 
l'Egalite (Feminist Spring for Democracy and Equality), whose goals is to fight against gender 
discrimination. Also included is Marche des Femmes Libres du Maroc (Free Moroccan’s 
Women’s March), an ad-hoc campaign group formed in relation to article 475 of the Penal 
Code which until recently allowed a rapist to marry a minor victim to escape prison.  Force des 
Femmes (Women’s Strength) an EU-supported coalition also made representative claims. 
Finally, we also find in this category, a network of organisations based in the Laayoune-Sakia 
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Al Hamra region, called Reseau Feminin de Lutte contre la Violence a l’Egard des Femmes 
(Feminine Network to Combat Violence against Women) .  
Activist research centres and observatories also appear in this group. We find among them 
Centre d'Information et d'Observation des Femmes Marocaines (Information and Observation 
Centre for Moroccan Women), part of the FLDDF, the ISIS Centre for Women and 
Development; and Oyoune Nissaiya, an observatory that monitors violence against women.  
The next most visible representatives after Moroccan women’s rights groups are bureaucratic 
actors in Morocco, international civil society actors, and intergovernmental organisations, 
which constitute 60 representative claimants each, which accounts for less than 10% of all 
claimants.  
Bureaucratic actors mainly come in the form of constitutional institutions, such as Conseil 
National des Droits de l’Homme (National Human Rights Council) and Conseil Economique, 
Social et Environnemental (Economic, Social and Environmental Council). Other bureaucratic 
actors include national and regional development agencies and human rights councils, 
commissions for the protection of women and children victims of violence, the ministry of 
justice, and the observatory for children’s rights.  
International civil society actors include NGOs and federations such as the International 
Federation for Human Rights, Mobilising for Rights Associates, The Advocates for Human 
Rights, Amnesty International, Global Rights, Progetto Mondo, Medecins Sans Frontieres, and 
Human Rights Watch.  
The international petition site AVAAZ also made claims, as well as transnational political 
organisations such as Socialist International Women and International Christian Democratic 
Women. Research centres and universities include the South African Council for Medical 
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Research, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, McGill University, and the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  
British and German foundations acted as representatives notably, the Westminster Foundation, 
the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung Foundation, and the Frederic Ebert Foundation. Finally, the 
British Daily Mail is the only international newspaper that is included in my two selected 
sources. Intergovernmental organisations include the European Union, the Council of Europe, 
the Union for the Mediterranean, the World Bank Group, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the United Nations and 
associated agencies such as the World Health Organisation, the Working Committee on Gender 
Discrimination and Violence against Women, UN Women, the Children’s Fund, and the 
Population Fund.  
The third most visible representative is the Moroccan government, which encompasses actors 
that belong to the monarchy, especially Mohamed VI, governing political parties and other 
government representatives, such as ministers. This category accounts for about 40 of the 
reported representatives, or about 7%. In this sample, the key representatives are ministers such 
as Bassima Hakkaoui, the Minister for Solidarity, Family and Social Development, Abdelilah 
Benkirane, the Prime Minister, Mustapha Ramid, the Minister for Justice and Public Liberties, 
Mostafa Khalfi, the Minister for Communication, the Minister for Health, Ali Alaoui Belghiti, 
Nezha Skalli and Charafat Afilal, parliamentarians for the Parti du Progres et du Socialisme 
(PPS). 
The least prominent actors are private actors, such as multi-corporations, religious actors, such 
as the coordinator of the women’s unit of the Ulema Council of Tanger, politicians not 
represented in Parliament, the general public, and Parliament, as they are each composed of 
less than ten representatives, or less than 2%. Ulemas’ low visibility in this debate contrasts 
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sharply with their prominent role as opponents in the debate on the reform of the Moudawana, 
discussed in chapter 4. As we will see in this section, this lack of engagement by religious 
figures is accompanied by a lack of religious discourse on this debate.  
Foreign governments, the judiciary, Moroccan academics, the media, as well as other political 
parties and social movements make up between 10 and 35 of the reported representatives each, 
averaging between 2 and 6%.  
Claims by opposition political parties come from parliamentarians from the USFP, PAM and 
Groupe Socialiste. Judicial actors include courts of first instance and prosecutors. Academics 
include the Institut International des Langues et Cultures, Cadi Ayyad university and the 
faculty of law at the university of Tanger. 
Moroccan news media that participated in the debate include Liberation, the newspaper of the 
USFP, and journalists from Aujourd’hui le Maroc. Other social movements come in the form 
of local human and civil rights groups such as the Centre des Droits des Gens (Centre for 
People’s Rights), the Moroccan branch of Amnesty International. They also include 
miscellaneous groups. These include Association Marocaine de planification familiale 
(Moroccan Association for Family Planning), an organisation for family planning. Two other 
actors in this category are Association des jeunes avocats de Khemisset (Association of Young 
Lawyers of Khemisset), and Tofola Chaabia, an organisation focusing on disadvantaged 
children.  
Foreign governments involved in the issue of violence against women are the UK, France, and 
delegations from Arab, African and Asian countries. Embassies that took part are the Canadian 
and Finnish ones. Development and intercultural agencies also got involved, in the form of the 
German IFA Institute for Cultural Relations and the Spanish Agency for International 
Cooperation and Development.  
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These findings confirm assumptions in the literatures on social movements and transnational 
advocacy networks that both domestic and international elite political actors are relevant for 
social movements. The high visibility of bureaucrats and intergovernmental organisations 
suggests that these two types of actors are the most likely potential elite allies for women’s 
rights organisations and coalitions in Morocco mobilising on violence against women.  
The presence of non-elite representatives in the form of the media and academics, amongst 
others, confirms that potential sources of allyship can come from non-powerful actors 
(Amsterdamska, 1987; Strang and Soule, 1998; Tarrow, 2005), even though these actors are 
not traditionally associated with interest representation (Marien, Schouteden and Wauters, 
2017). On the other hand, expected representatives like labour unions, do not make 
representative claims on violence against women in Morocco.  
The high proportion of representatives from international civil society, the Moroccan 
bureaucracy and Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions demonstrates that most 
representative claims on VAW in Morocco are articulated outside elected assemblies. This in 
in line with Weldon’s (2002) and Marien’s (2017) findings that the representation related to 
socially disadvantaged groups such as women and the poor occurs mostly in extra-
parliamentary arenas, and that organisations and state agencies that are relevant for such groups 
are indeed of great importance for their representation.  
However, the most interesting finding is the low visibility of Islamist representatives outside 
of the ruling PJD. As I have stated in my discussion of the Moroccan women’s movement, 
secular activists faced intense opposition from Islamist movements, from the 1990s onwards, 
and especially with regards to its successive efforts for the reform of the Moudawana. Islamists 
have been the traditional opponent of the secular current of the Moroccan women’s rights 
movement, and not only opposed them directly through protests, journalism and even fatwas, 
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but also mobilised against them indirectly, by drawing on the support of Islamist women’s 
associations. This could suggest that there is little conflict on the issue of tackling violence 
against women because it is not as controversial as reforming laws that violate Islamic 
principles. 
In sum, we can see from Figure 1 that there is a variety of representatives speaking on violence 
against women in Morocco, though these are mostly non-elected actors. Surprisingly, 
parliamentary actors are under-represented in claims-making, despite being expected to engage 
in representation. In contrast, intergovernmental organisations, which are not expected to act 
as the representatives of social groups, engage prominently in interest representation on 
violence against women in Morocco.  
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Figure 1: Representative Claimants on VAW  
Figure 1 Representative Claimants on VAW in Morocco 2011 -2016 (N = 604) 
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5.3.2. Represented Constituencies 
Table 2 shows that representatives – both elite and non-elite - overwhelmingly speak on behalf 
of women. Claims that speak on behalf of women take various forms. On the one hand are 
claims that portray women as victims of specific types of violence that need to be saved. For 
instance, in the context of article 475 of the Penal Code that allows a rapist to avoid jail by 
marrying his victim, Fatiha Saidi, a socialist Belgian senator claimed that ‘[female] victims of 
rape need to be helped and protected. The last thing that could help them overcome their trauma 
is forcing them to marry the man who raped them’ (Bouhamida, 2012). On the other hand are 
claims that speak on behalf of women with regards to violence against women in general. For 
instance, addressing bill 103-3 on violence against women, journalist Nezha Mounir exclaimed 
that ‘Women are associated to children! This project of law must be reviewed by a ministerial 
commission. Will it even fulfil the expectations of women?’ (Mounir, 2013a) 
In this sample, women constitute between 100 and 50 per cent of claimants from each group. 
The lowest figure belongs to religious actors, while the highest one belongs to the media, the 
general public and miscellaneous actors. Women also form the most prominent constituency 
of Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions, with 92% of representatives speaking on 
their behalf. We can thus infer that there is a certain degree of congruence in interest 
representation between elite actors and activists on this issue.  
This pattern suggests that representatives are more likely to make claims for women in general, 
than address specific subgroups of women, such as migrant women, disabled women and non-
straight women. Since violence against women is perceived as being a phenomenon that affects 
women as an abstract group, the specific interests of women that face multiple forms of 
oppression are overlooked. In sum, there is little evidence of intersectionality in interest 
representation on VAW in Morocco. 
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If Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions only substantially represent women, such 
cannot be said of other political actors. For several types of representatives, VAW affects a 
variety of actors besides women. Five per cent of claimants from the Moroccan government 
speak respectively on behalf of the family and other miscellaneous constituencies. Five per 
cent of generational groups are represented by academics, while this figure is 12 % for 
opposition political parties. Fourteen per cent of academics also speak on behalf of organised 
political actors. Finally, the public is represented by other social movements and religious 
actors.  
In this sample, an example of a claim speaking on behalf of a generational group is the criticism 
475 of the Penal Code by Latifa Jbabdi, member of the USFP, in terms of its traumatic effects 
on underage girls (M Taleb, 2012). An example of a claim representing an organised political 
actor is the suggestion by representatives of intergovernmental organisations to include civil 
society in debates and decision-making on violence against women in Morocco (Salaheddine, 
2012). An example of a claim representing the family is the statement by Mustapha Ramid, the 
Minister of Justice, that the legal arsenal on women has been strengthened by new measures to 
protest all members of a family  (Liberation, 2013a). Examples of claims involving other 
constituencies include Attajdid, the newspaper of PJD, questioning the democratic credentials 
of a TV programme for failing to include ulemas in a debate on a rape case (Liberation, 2012d). 
Finally, an example of a claim representing the public is the call by the Moroccan Association 
for Family Planning to turn rights to sexual and reproductive health into fundamental rights for 
all, regardless of religion, culture or social class (Mounir, 2014a).  
Political elites at the domestic and international level neglect the direct representation of 
Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions, preferring instead to speak on behalf of the 
constituencies that these actors represent – women. This could have the potential of 
marginalising from the debate and reduces their significance, which could be particularly 
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problematic if we consider the fact that Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions are 
the most prominent representatives on VAW.  Despite this lack of direct representation, elite 
actors have the same major constituency as Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions – 
women. There is thus some degree of alignment with regards to who is primarily affected by 
VAW in Morocco.   
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Table 2: Represented Constituencies (%) 
  Women  Subgroups of women  Organised Political Actor Generation  Family Public Other N 
International Actors 93       157 
  Intergovernmental Organisation 91       70 
  International Civil Society 95       73 
  Foreign Governments 93       14 
Domestic Political Actors   83       77 
  Moroccan government 86   
 
5 
 
5 42 
  Opposition political parties 85   12 
   
26 
  Parliament 67       6 
  Other politician(s) 67       3 
State Actors 91       91 
  Bureaucracy 91       75 
  Judiciary 94       16 
Social Movements 90       228 
  Women's rights groups and coalitions 92       197 
  Other social movement 81     6  31 
Civic Groups 86  6     49 
  Media 100  
 
    22 
  Academics  71  14 5 
 
 10 21 
  General public 100       4 
  Religious actor 50     50  2 
Other 100       2 
N 543 10 20 7 4 11 9 604 
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5.3.3. Solutions and Lack Thereof 
With regards to the solution offered by different actors to tackle violence against women in 
Morocco, we can see from Table 3 that representatives are not clear on how best to respond to 
violence against women. Forty-two per cent or 255 out of 604 representatives, do not advocate 
a clear form of policy change. Twenty-six per cent - 157 representatives - supports the 
introduction of a new policy, while amendments to the content of existing policy and 
amendments to the implementation of existing policy are advocated by 84 and 108 
representatives, which represent 14% and 18% respectively.  
In this sample, examples of claims for a new policy include calls for a comprehensive policy 
that prevents violence against women and protects them, a law that criminalises domestic 
violence; a framework law on violence against women, and a specific law on violence against 
women. Examples of claims for amendments include calls for a reform of the Penal Code, the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Family Code. Finally, examples of amendments to the 
implementation of policy include such actions as improving existing legal provisions to justice 
to violated women and the application of the 2011 Constitution.  
 The fact that in general, interest representation on VAW in Morocco does not involve the 
formulation of explicit policy changes suggests that the debate is not so much about providing 
a clear prognosis to the problem. This could be due to a lack of clarity on the best policy to 
tackle this phenomenon, as reflected in the tendency of each type of claimant to advocate for 
different responses.   
Slightly over half of representatives from women’s rights groups and coalitions do not advocate 
a clear change in policy. This is strange because as discussed in chapter 4, the Moroccan 
women’s rights’ movement has traditionally focused its efforts on reforming the law and 
changing policies, to improve the status of women, particularly within the family. Moreover, 
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given their role as activists and their access to Moroccan women, we would expect them to be 
the most knowledgeable about how to tackle VAW in Morocco, and therefore propose concrete 
changes. In the next chapter, when I discuss activists’ perceptions of elite actors, I uncover that 
there is a lack of agreement on the type of policy change desired. This lack of agreement could 
explain why there is not more enthusiasm in advocating for concrete changes.  
In contrast to Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions, academics, other social 
movements, as well as elite political actors such as Moroccan bureaucrats, opposition political 
parties, and the judiciary mostly advocate for concrete policy changes. Except academics, of 
which 57% advocate for changes in the implementation of existing policy, the other groups 
primarily advocate for a new policy to tackle violence against women in Morocco. These actors 
are therefore more critical of existing policy.   
The fact that bureaucrats are quite proactive in pushing for radical policy change confirm 
Amenta and Caren’s (2004) suggestion that like-minded bureaucracies have a tendency to 
promote legislation benefiting a social movement’s constituency. The issue of opposition 
political parties is slightly more puzzling. As we have seen in chapter 3, in the discussion on 
the Moroccan political system, political parties have tended to refrain from taking a strong 
stance on issues affecting women, so as not to jeopardise their participation in institutional 
politics. Perhaps this boldness is due to the fact that tackling violence against women is not a 
controversial topic, as we have seen above. Therefore, advocating a new policy on this issue is 
far from being a risk.  
Another interesting finding is the marginal difference in the proportion of representative claims 
that advocate a new policy between the Moroccan government and opposition political parties. 
This challenges the assumption that because governing parties are more constrained when in 
government, they are less likely to call for radical solutions in favour of a social movement 
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(Lorenzini, Hutter and Kriesi, 2016). Perhaps this observation is based on democratic systems, 
as the case of Morocco shows that there are limits as to how much opposition the political 
opposition can engage in (see chapter 3).  
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Table 3: Policy Change Advocated (%) 
  Amendments to the content  
of existing policy  
Amendments to the implementation  
of existing policy  
New policy  Unclear appraisal 
 of policy  
N 
International Actors 8 20 25 47 157 
  Intergovernmental Organisation 11 23 26 40 70 
  International Civil Society 6 12 29 53 73 
  Foreign Governments  50  50 14 
Domestic Political Actors 21 19 29 31 77 
  Moroccan government 12 26 29 33 42 
  Opposition political parties 34 8 31 27 26 
  Parliament 17 33 17 33 6 
  Other politician(s) 33  33 33 3 
State Actors 21 16 44 19 91 
  Bureaucracy 20 12 49 19 75 
  Judiciary 25 37 19 19 16 
Social Movements 15 14 22 49 228 
  Women's rights groups and coalitions 15 12 21 52 197 
  Other social movement 13 32 29 26 31 
Civic Groups 6 29 8 57 49 
  Media  4 14 82 22 
  Academics  5 57 5 33 21 
  General public 50 25  25 4 
  Religious actor    100 2 
Other   50 50 2 
N 84 108 157 255 604 
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5.3.4. Actors Responsible for Implementing Claims   
Table 4 demonstrates that out of the 604 representatives, only 238 specify an addressee. By far, 
the most called upon addressees are domestic political actors, such as the Moroccan 
government, other politicians, and opposition political parties, with 163 of the representatives 
addressing them. Non-social movement civic groups, international actors, and Moroccan state 
institutions, are mentioned by 27, 21, and 20 representatives respectively.  At the other extreme, 
we find that social movements are addressed twice, while other miscellaneous groups are 
mentioned by 5 representatives. International actors, state actors and social movements in 
Morocco figure prominently among those who call upon someone to realise their claims, with 
each representing 58, 48 and 77 of claimants respectively. On the other hand, only 26 
representatives from civic groups and 28 domestic political actors call upon someone to realise 
their claims.      
To some extent, these observations are in line with de Wilde’s (2013, p. 290) assertion that the 
actors making representative claims are not necessarily the ones who are able to implement 
them. In this case, while women’s rights groups and coalitions are the most visible 
representatives, they are only addressed by two claimants. Given that the addressee is the actor 
with the formal capacity to realise the claims voiced by representatives (de Wilde, 2013, p. 
286),  it is understandable why Moroccan state actors are among the most prominent addresses, 
while social movements are the least prominent ones.   
Civic groups are called upon by several representatives such as international actors, domestic 
political actors and state actors, as well as social movements, despite the fact that they are not 
the highest authority. There could be two main explanations for this. First, claimants could 
believe that VAW is a societal problem that requires a societal answer, and not just a political 
one. Second, civic groups could be perceived as having the skills and expertise necessary to 
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help solve the problem. As we have seen in chapter 3, institutions like the Moroccan parliament 
are under-resourced and lack the funding necessary to hire staff trained in policy-making. 
Looking at some examples of claims addressing civic groups suggests that the first assumption 
is the most plausible one. Indeed, a typical addressee that comes under the umbrella term of 
civic group, is the general public. For instance, one claim criticises the mentality of Moroccan 
citizens for teaching girls to cover up and avoiding men (Friguech, 2013). Another involves an 
awareness-raising campaign targeting Moroccan citizens and encouraging them to authenticate 
their marriage acts, to ensure they align with the dispositions of the Moudawana (Bouhamida, 
2014). Finally, another claim also involves an awareness-raising campaign by the FLDDF, 
though this one is about sexual harassment and targets young people (Liberation, 2012c). 
Moreover, the fact that women’s rights groups and coalitions in Morocco mostly address 
Moroccan political actors instead of international actors defies Keck and Sikkink’s (Keck and 
Sikkink, 1999) Boomerang Model of transnational activism. As described in chapter 3, their 
model claims that domestic activists call on international actors to put pressure on their own 
government if opportunities for change at home are restricted. The fact that this does not happen 
in this case could suggest that either the domestic arena is not perceived as being restricted for 
women’s rights activists on the issue of VAW, or international actors are not considered to be 
useful, or both.  
However, for a more plausible explanation, we need to go back to the attitude of segments of 
the Moroccan women’s rights movement. Even though Morocco is an authoritarian state 
wherein the King is above all other institutions, associations like UAF have at times preferred 
to appeal to Parliament and the Prime Minister to bring about policy change to ensure that 
reform comes through democratic means  (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). As discussed in 
chapter 4, activists are not always keen on bypassing official channels of representation to 
achieve their goals, to avoid reinforcing authoritarianism. In this sample, there is a similar 
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preference for addressing democratic institutions. Though the King is included in the category 
of government, only one claimant addresses him. This representative is the Moroccan Social 
and Economic Council which gave a rapport to the King highlighting the lack of 
implementation of certain laws that could help tackle widespread violence against women  
(Liberation, 2012a). The most frequent addressees in my sample are ministers associated with 
members associated with the ruling PJD party, notably Benkiran, Hakkaoui El Khalfi, Ramid. 
The fact that the King is not invoked to arbitrate on this issue reinforces my earlier claim that 
tackling VAW in Morocco is not a controversial issue. As I have discussed in chapters 2 and 
4, the King appropriates divisive debates in the country and is even sometimes directly 
appealed to by opposing parties.  
Ultimately, there is broad consensus among elite and non-elite actors, and women’s rights 
groups and coalitions with regards to who is responsible for realising their claims on VAW. 
Moroccan political actors are perceived as being the overarching authority with the ability to 
realise claims, suggesting that claimants see VAW mostly as a political problem.  
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Table 4: Addressees Calle Upon (%) 
 
  International Actors Domestic Political Actors State Actors Social Movements Civic Groups Other N 
International Actors 17 64 5  9 5 58 
  Intergovernmental Organisation 9 82   9  22 
  International Civil Society 19 55 10  6 10 31 
  Foreign Governments 40 40   20  5 
Domestic Political Actors 18 54   14 7 28 
  Moroccan government 29 47  6 18  17 
  Opposition political parties  67       33 6 
  Parliament  50   50  2 
  Other politician(s)  67 33    3 
State Actors  92     48 
  Bureaucracy  95     43 
  Judiciary  60 20  20  5 
Social Movements  69 14  13  77 
  Women's rights groups and coalitions  72 15  10  67 
  Other social movement 10 50 10  30  10 
Civic Groups 15 50 12  23  26 
  Media  67 8  25  12 
  Academics  36 18 18  27  11 
  General public  100     3 
Other 100      1 
N 21 163 20 2 27 5 238 
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5.3.5. Justifications  
Table 5 suggests that that there are stark differences between representatives with regards to 
the use of frames to justify their claims. On the one hand, we find that most representatives 
from women’s rights groups and coalitions (58%), foreign governments (57%), international 
civil society (48%), opposition political parties (50%), Parliament (50%), other politicians 
(67%), the Moroccan media (59%) and the general public (74%), use arguments rooted in 
moral principles and rights. Frames rooted in principles and rights mostly address women’s 
human rights. An illustrative example is the open letter drafted by the FLDDF to call on the 
government to pass a framework law on violence against women, because the different forms 
of violence women face in Morocco are instances of gender-based violence, which are rooted 
in discrimination and male domination (Rerhaye, 2012a).  
On the other hand, we find a handful of representatives that overwhelmingly provide no 
arguments. These are intergovernmental organisations (50%), the Moroccan government 
(62%), the bureaucracy (60%), the judiciary (44%), and other social movements (52%). Two 
notable exceptions are religious actors and academics. While the former is equally split 
between using no frames at all and resorting to arguments rooted in collective identity, the 
latter mostly draw on instrumental frames (43%).  
The aforementioned figures suggest that those representatives most in line with women’s rights 
groups and coalitions are civic groups and international actors. However, since Table 5 shows 
that   moral principles and rights are at least the second most prominent category for all groups, 
it can be argued that violence against women in Morocco is mostly discussed using moral 
arguments, based on universal human and women’s rights.  
Instrumental frames are also quite prominent amongst the major groups, accounting for 29 to 
10 per cent of their claimants. Thus, there are only slight variations in the extent to which this 
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type of frame is important.  Instrumental frames are those claim that are concerned with state 
effectiveness and efficiency An example includes an instance where representatives of UN 
bodies called on Morocco to introduce legal changes to fight gender-based discrimination and 
protect women from violence because of deficiencies in the existing legal arsenal (Liberation, 
2012b). However, many instrumental frames refer to economic development. For instance, 
Socialist International Women issued a document calling for the introduction of a goal tackling 
gender-based violence in the Millennium Development Goals because sexual violence 
negatively impacts on the realisation of all other development goals  (Rerhaye, 2013).  
The least prominent frame among all representatives is collective identity, such as Moroccan, 
masculine or Islamic identities. It is least prominent for international actors and social 
movements, with less than 5% of claimants from these groups drawing on it. It is most 
prominent for civic groups and domestic political actors, respectively accounting for 8 and 7 
per cent of their claimants. Unsurprisingly, this frame is used by the Moroccan government, 
the judiciary and religious actors. If we consider the fact that a conservative judiciary has 
prevented the proper application of the new Family Code in 2004 and that the Moroccan 
government was led by the Islamist PJD in the first government after the Arab Spring (see 
chapter 4), these findings come as no surprise. An example of an argument rooted in collective 
identity is Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane’s claim that it is necessary to adopt an Islamic 
framework to tackle violence against women, because Islam has given women a better place in 
society and Islamic culture is the only culture that states that Paradise is at the feet of the mother 
(Salaheddine, 2012).  
With regards to the issue of violence against women in Morocco, most representatives 
underplay the role of collective identity, and prefer instead to draw on universal moral frames 
and instrumental arguments to justify their claims. This suggests that there is tacit agreement 
that collective identity is not relevant for this topic. This finding challenges the argument that 
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the rising popularity of Islamists in Morocco has entailed an Islamisation of the discourse on 
women’s rights. As I have discussed in chapter 4, the secular current of the Moroccan women’s 
rights movement has Islamised its discourse, particularly at the turn of the century, to respond 
to the challenge of Islamism. Islamism had become such a potent force in the 2000s that as we 
have seen in chapter 2, King Mohamed VI established a royalist party after the parliamentary 
elections of 2007, to placate it. The rise of their historical opponent encouraged secular activists 
within the movement to tone down their secularism and revisited the sacred to show that their 
goals were in line with Islam (Bras, 2007; Elliott, 2009).  
The prominent use of moral principles and rights in this debate can be understood through the 
prism of the Arab Spring, which promoted ideas surrounding democracy and civil liberties 
rather than Islamic tradition or Moroccan identity. Following the wave of protests that had 
started in neighbouring countries, Moroccans started protesting on 20th February 2011, 
demanding amongst others greater democracy, better rights for the Amazigh people, lower food 
prices and the release of political prisoners (McKanders, 2014). Women played a key role in 
the ensuing 20th February Movement, by inscribing their agenda on the movement. Such is the 
case of Amina Boughalbi, the founder of the movement, who did not allow religious, sectarian 
and political slogans in the ranks of this ‘youth dynamics’ that was ‘secular, modernist, 
democratic and independent of all foreign agendas or political affiliations’ (Salime, 2012, p. 
102).  Furthermore,  the increasing difficulty of Islamising  secular thought or  secularising 
Islamic thought in the last few years has led to an increasing divergence between the secular 
and  religious currents of the Moroccan  women’s rights movement (Sadiqi, 2014a). The next 
chapter lends credence to this claim, as it highlights the stark differences in discourses between 
representatives of secular and Islamist women’s associations. 
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Table 5: Justification (%) 
 
  No argument 
provided 
Instrumental Collective  
identity 
Moral principles 
and rights 
N 
International Actors 44 11  44 157 
  Intergovernmental Organisation 50 13  37 70 
  International Civil Society 41 8  48 73 
  Foreign Governments 29 14  57 14 
Domestic Political Actors 45 16 7 32 77 
  Moroccan government 62 12 9 17 42 
  Opposition political parties 27 19  50 26 
  Parliament 33 17  50 6 
  Other politician(s)  33  67 3 
State Actors 57 10  29 91 
  Bureaucracy 60 11  27 75 
  Judiciary 44 6 13 37 16 
Social Movements 25 17  55 228 
  Women's rights groups and coalitions 21 19  58 197 
  Other social movement 52 10  35 31 
Civic Groups 20 29 8 43 49 
  Media 14 23  59 22 
  Academics  24 43 9 24 21 
  General public 25   75 4 
  Religious actor 50  50  2 
Other   0   100 2 
Total 224 92 19 269 604 
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5.4. Discussion  
In this section, I have drawn on representative claims analysis to analyse one way in which 
elite allyship can be performed – interest representation. I have uncovered that overall, elite 
allyship is performed by a range of actors in the context of the debate on VAW in Morocco. 
This is because the claims of various elite political actors align with those of Moroccan 
women’s rights groups and coalitions on the dimensions I have examined. First, 
intergovernmental organisations, foreign governments, the Moroccan government, opposition 
political parties, Parliament, bureaucracies and the judiciary agree with Moroccan women’s 
rights groups and coalitions that the primary constituency affected by VAW is women. Second, 
similarly to Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions, most claimants from 
intergovernmental organisations and the Moroccan government do not suggest a clear policy 
change. This contrasts with Moroccan bureaucrats, opposition political parties, and the 
judiciary who mostly advocate for concrete policy changes. Third, similarly to Moroccan 
women’s rights groups and coalitions, most claimants from intergovernmental organisations, 
the Moroccan government, opposition political parties, other politicians, bureaucracies and the 
judiciary, believe that domestic political actors in Morocco are primarily responsible for 
tackling VAW. Fourth, foreign governments, opposition political parties, Parliament and other 
politicians use arguments rooted in moral principles and rights to discuss VAW in Morocco, in 
the same vein as Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions. Nonetheless, there is no one 
type of elite actor which aligns with Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions across all 
four dimensions. Nonetheless, going back to my second research question, my findings suggest 
that a range of elite actors and Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions speak on VAW 
in Morocco in broadly similar terms.  
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5.5. Alliances: Networks Rather than Coalitions  
In this section, I draw on other aspects of the RCA to discuss the form and content of claims 
made by the elite political actors introduced above and domestic activists. To determine to what 
extent various types of political elites make claims with domestic activists, and to what extent 
these joint claims involve an element of co-ordination, I look at joint claims between different 
types of representatives. This is to help me determine if the relationship between elite actors 
and domestic activists takes the form of a coalition or a network.  
In Chapter 2, I argued that coalitions involve shared beliefs and co-ordination, and are more 
formalised and sustained than networks. As I explained earlier, I view the latter as being ad-
hoc arrangements bringing together actors that may share similar beliefs, but do not act together 
in a concerted manner. In practice, I expect that if there is there is evidence of co-ordination in 
joint claims between different types of actors, the arrangement is that of a coalition. If two 
actors make joint claims together, but there is not enough evidence to suggest that there is some 
co-ordination, I assume them to simply be part of the same network, as joint claims assume 
shared beliefs.  As I have stated in chapter 2, I expect participation in a coalition to be a more 
useful form of elite allyship as coalition work involves more collaboration and cooperation and 
therefore more contact with the recipient of support.  
I find that the types of actors that make joint claims with Moroccan women’s rights groups and 
coalitions are the Moroccan judiciary, intergovernmental organisations and foreign 
governments. At least half of the joint claims these actors make with domestic activists involve 
some degree of coordination, rather than just expressing a similar point together. However, 
these cannot be referred to as coalitions because they do not constitute much of the joint claims 
expressed by political elites. Most joint claims involving domestic and international political 
elites involve other political elites or other civil society actors. This suggests that political elites 
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prefer to engage with one another, and are inaccessible to domestic activists. In sum, referring 
to my theoretical framework, the joint claims analysed in this section suggest that the most 
dominant type of relationship between domestic activists and elite actors is that of the network, 
as suggested by Keck and Sikkink (1998), rather than the elite actor-social movement coalition 
suggested by Almeida and Stearns (2004). 
Table 6 shows the form of claim used by single claimants. We can see that most claimants (214 
out of 383, 56%) express themselves through verbal or written statements, which take the form 
of interviews, public speeches, communiques and letters, online comments or publications such 
as reports, books or leaflets. This is followed by 139 out of 383 (36%) claimants who express 
themselves as part of meetings, including amongst others, conferences, seminars, party 
congresses, parliamentary sessions, roundtables, and public education meetings. Protest, direct 
democratic actions, political decisions and petitions come a long way behind, comprising 
respectively 13, 7, 6 and 4 claimants out of 383. This suggests that individual representatives 
do not express themselves in a confrontational manner for the most part.  
If we look more closely at political elites, we can see that there are very few individual 
claimants from foreign governments, the judiciary, the Moroccan Parliament, and politicians 
from parties not represented in Parliament. In contrast, individual representatives from the 
Moroccan bureaucracy, intergovernmental organisations, the Moroccan government and 
opposition political parties are highly involved in this debate, constituting respectively 61, 43, 
32 and 26 claimants. These actors do not engage in protest behaviour, or judicial action like 
lawsuits. They also do not make executive decisions, including material support, nor do they 
draw on repressive measures.  
Though this is not shown in table 6, the particular actions taken by claimants include making 
verbal or written statements, taking part in meetings, making political decisions that take the 
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form of decrees, producing government reports and proposals, holding hearings; proposing 
legislation, holding parliamentary votes and motions, making court rulings and administrative 
decisions, adopting resolutions, and making binding agreements and personnel decisions.  
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Table 6: Form of Claim (%) 
 
  Political  
Decisions  
Verbal/Written  
Statements 
Meetings Direct  
Democratic  
Action 
Petitioning  Protest  N 
International Actors  68 23    95 
  Intergovernmental Organisation   51 40    43 
  International Civil Society  82 10    51 
  Foreign Governments  100     1 
Domestic Political Actors  30 64    61 
  Moroccan government  16 71    32 
  Opposition political parties  50 50    26 
  Parliament 100      2 
  Other politician(s)   100    1 
State Actors  74 22    66 
  Bureaucracy  80 20    61 
  Judiciary   80    5 
Social Movements  41 46    128 
  Women's rights groups and coalitions  41 45    124 
  Other social movement  50 50    4 
Civic Groups  91     32 
  Media  100     22 
  Academics   88     8 
  General public      100 1 
  Religious actor   100    1 
Other   100    1 
N 6 214 139 7 4 13 383 
 
Page 216 of 395 
 
These representatives also make joint claims. In this section, I describe the claimants involved 
in these joint claims and their content. Table 7 shows that out of the 604 claims, 221 are joint. 
Among elite political actors, opposition political parties, bureaucratic actors and the Moroccan 
government have the smallest proportion of joint claimants. Opposition political parties do not 
make joint claims. For bureaucrats, the figure is 19%, while for the Moroccan government, it 
is 21%.  In contrast, foreign governments have the highest proportion of joint claimants, with 
95%  claimants being part of joint actions. This is followed by the judiciary, whose proportion 
of joint claimants is 69%. Two thirds of other politicians are joint claimants, while the figure 
for Parliament is half of claimants. Elite actors thus make joint claims with domestic activists. 
In what follows, I describe the content of these joint claims and the actors they involve. 
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Table 7: Percentage of Joint and Individual Representatives 
 
  Joint Representatives Individual Representatives N 
International Actors 40 60 157 
  Intergovernmental Organisations 37 63 70 
  International Civil Society 32 68 73 
  Foreign Governments 93 7 14 
Domestic Political Actors 18 82 77 
  Moroccan government 21 79 42 
  Opposition political parties 0 100 26 
  Parliament 50 50 6 
  Other politician(s) 67 33 3 
State Actors 27 73 91 
  Bureaucracy 19 81 75 
  Judiciary 69 31 16 
Social Movements 44 56 228 
  Women's rights groups and coalitions 38 62 197 
  Other social movement 87 13 31 
Civic Groups 37 63 49 
  Media 5 95 22 
  Academics  62 38 21 
  General public 75 25 4 
  Religious actor 50 50 2 
Other 50 50 2 
Total 224 92 604 
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Judicial actors take part in several joint claims with domestic activists, alongside other civil 
society actors. One of them involves a symbolic tribunal organised by the Union de l’Action 
Feministe, and bringing together other politicians and the judiciary, to highlight the negative 
impact of underage marriage and call for the revision of articles 20 and 21 of the Family Code, 
as well as Article 475 of the Penal Code (Mohammed Taleb, 2012a). The Association Karama 
for Women’s Development, as well as judicial figures and researchers highlighted in a 
conference that the law cannot end violence against women, and that this necessitates raising 
awareness about harmful practices among the public (Liberation, 2014a). Chaml Association 
for the Family and Solidarity organised an event in Kenitra involving judicial figures and 
academics to condemn violence against women working in agriculture (Liberation, 2015d). 
Finally, the committee in charge of women and children at the district court of Ouarzazate co-
organised with a women’s rights NGO – the Federation de la Ligue Democratique des Droits 
des Femmes – a roundtable to call for a participatory approach to tackle violence against 
women, the simplification of judicial assistance for women victims of violence, a fast treatment 
of complaints related to violence against women, and the organisation of meetings between the 
committee and civil society (Liberation, 2016a).  
Besides judicial actors and other civil society groups, international actors also make joint 
claims with domestic activists. A campaign against violence against women was launched, co-
financed by the EU, and with the support of an Italian NGO, Progetto Mondo, and involving a 
coalition of NGOs working on this issue (Zerrour, 2014). The ISIS centre for women and 
development, as well as the German institute for cultural relations and the international institute 
for languages in Fes, organised a workshop on strategies to tackle violence against women and 
called on the media to take an active role in this matter, as well as highlighting the significance 
of families, schools, communities and the State (Liberation, 2016b). Oyoune Nissaiya, a 
Moroccan women’s rights NGO, with the help of the Spanish agency for international 
Page 219 of 395 
 
cooperation and development (AECID) presented a report highlighting that women victims of 
violence experienced obstacles in accessing justice due to discriminatory legal provisions and 
the absence of a law on violence against women (Tabet, 2014). It also called for the 
involvement of democratic women’s rights groups in the elaboration of laws and policies on 
violence against women (Tabet, 2014). The Ytto Foundation, a women’s rights group based in 
Casablanca, co-organised with UNICEF and the embassy of Finland, an ‘Equality Day’ to raise 
awareness on the phenomenon child marriage in a creative way (Liberation, 2014a). In 
Marrakesh, Annakhil, a women’s rights organisation, UNFPA and the embassy of Canada in 
Morocco preferred calling on the government and civil society to fight effectively against child 
marriage (Liberation, 2014b). 
As the aforementioned discussion suggests, joint claims between elite political actors and 
domestic activists essentially comprise of international organisations, foreign governments and 
judicial figures. We can see that there is some co-ordination between international actors and 
domestic activists, and between the judiciary and domestic activists. However, most political 
elites articulate claims with other political elites, and sometimes with other civil society groups, 
rather than with activists involved in the mobilisation. I discuss these instances of collaboration 
in section 5.9.2.   
These joint claims between political elites and Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions 
suggest that the most dominant form of relationship between Moroccan activists and elite 
political actors on violence against women was that of the network, rather than the elite actor-
social movement coalition suggested by Almeida and Stearns (2004). This is because while 
there is evidence of shared beliefs, there is very little evidence for systematic coordination. 
Only a few joint claims involving women’s rights activists and elite actors involve coordinated 
efforts. Surprisingly, many joint claims involve elite actors only, and occasionally, civil society 
actors such as academics. This is very telling and suggests that there may be challenges for 
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domestic activists with regards to accessing political elites. In the next section, I examine more 
thoroughly the different types of resources provided by political elites to domestic activists.  
5.6.  Resources  
In chapter 2, I have argued that two other ways to perform elite allyship is the provision of 
resources to social movements and interacting with other political elites on their behalf. I have 
identified four types of resources, based on Cress and Snow’s (1996) taxonomy. These are 
moral, material, informational and human resources. I have clarified that moral resources refer 
to external endorsements, such as supportive statements and participation in events alongside 
social movements. Material resources refer to goods and services, and includes such things as 
supplies, space, transportation, jobs, and money. Informational resources refer to the provision 
of relevant knowledge, and include strategic and technical support, as well as personal 
connections. Finally, human resources refer to ‘people who donate resources, time and energy,’ 
such as audiences, cadres and leaders (Cress and Snow, 1996, p. 1095).  
I have also identified in my theoretical chapter, three types of strategies that elite allies use 
towards other elite actors they perceive to be the targets of mobilisation, to support social 
movements. Based on Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) Boomerang Model of transnational 
advocacy, I identified two strategies: leverage and accountability politics. Leverage politics is 
composed of moral and material leverage. Moral leverage involves naming and shaming actors 
for their actions, while material leverage involves linking the provision of money or goods to 
a stance on an issue (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, p. 97). The second strategy – accountability 
politics – involves holding an actor accountable to their pledges, by highlighting the gulf 
between what they say and what they do (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, pp. 97–8). The final strategy 
included in my theoretical framework draws on Wu’s(2005) Double Mobilisation thesis (see 
Chapter 2). Wu’s (2005) theory is part of a body of works that challenges the assumptions of 
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the Boomerang Model, and highlight the complexity of interactions between transnational 
advocacy networks and target states. Wu (2011) argues that Keck and Sikkink’s model is biased 
in favour of contentious politics, because it assumes that confrontational strategies, such as 
leverage and accountability politics, are the only political dynamics that exist between target 
states and international actors. Referring to the relationship between international elite actors 
and states, Wu (2005; 2011) argues that actors do not necessarily disengage when others behave 
in a way that frustrates them. They still communicate, and may resort to non-confrontational 
strategies such as persuasion, education, recommendation, and socialisation (Fengshi, 2011). 
TANs thus collaborate with the target state, and do not just work with domestic social 
movements. I draw on these insights to examine if elite actors engage with other elite actors, 
and specifically with domestic political and state actors in Morocco, on behalf of activists 
mobilising for the criminalisation of violence against women.  
In this section, I draw on RCA to determine which resources and strategies are associated with 
which type of elite actor. I have shown above that the judiciary, intergovernmental 
organisations and foreign governments make joint claims with domestic activists. Support from 
these actors takes the form of co-organising campaigns and meetings, and providing funding. 
This suggests that with regards to resources, such actors provide informational, human and 
material support. In this section, I show that other elite actors provide resources to activists. 
The most frequent type of resource is moral, though elite actors also provide some material, 
human and informational support. With regards to strategies, elite actors engage in both 
leverage politics and collaboration. They thus engage in double mobilisation. In this section, I 
describe these performances in greater detail. I divide it into sub-sections discussing a specific 
type of resource, as it makes the discussion more coherent. I introduce the identity of actors, 
before discussing the form of their claims as they relate to the resources they provide and the 
strategies they employ.  
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5.8.1. Moral Resources 
Domestic Political Actors 
Domestic political actors mostly provide moral resources to activists. Prominent actors that 
perform acts of allyship include senior Ministers, like the chief of state; parliamentarians from 
the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS), which is part of the coalition government; 
parliamentarians from the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), an opposition political 
party, and the King. 
Regarding government actors, one the one hand, we have claims articulated in the form of 
political decisions, verbal and written statements and as part of meetings by three leading 
figures: Abdelilah Benkirane, the Prime Minister of Morocco, Mustapha Ramid, the Minister 
of Justice, and Bassima Hakkaoui, the Minister of Solidarity, Women, Family and Social 
Development. These three figures are all members of the Justice and Development Party, the 
leading conservative party in the two coalition governments formed after the Arab Spring. 
The moral resources provided by government actors include: pledges to reform the Penal Code 
to strengthen provisions against violence against women (Aujourd’hui le Maroc, 2012a; 
Rerhaye, 2012a), assurances to improve access to justice to women victims of violence 
(Aujourd’hui le Maroc, 2012b), and a call to the media to help fight violence against women 
(Friguech, 2013). The two most notable measures are the presentation of a draft law on violence 
against women in November 2013 by Bassima Hakkaoui, Minister for Development, Women, 
and the Family, and the adoption of a revised version of this draft law in March 2016 by the 
Council of government, the first of its kind in Morocco. Bassima Hakkaoui even addressed 
women’s rights activists telling them: ‘I am working towards what you want, your message has 
been received’ (Salaheddine, 2012).  
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The aforementioned measures were complemented with denials that violence against women 
is as high as reported by the Haut Commissariat au Plan, a governmental initiative tasked with 
investigating the prevalence and characteristics of this phenomenon. One claim involves 
Benkirane denying the existence of underage marriage in Morocco and maintaining that ‘it is 
not always minors that are married against their will, but young girls between 16 and 17 that 
want to get married themselves’ (Ouassat, 2015). Benkirane also made a claim that led to a sit 
in by women’s rights activists; notably a claim to parliamentarians that Moroccan women ‘have 
a more important role to play inside the family for the education of children…their role inside 
the family should be made sacred, instead of treating them in a condescending manner, because 
they have a more important role to play inside the family than inside enterprises and 
administrations’ (Rerhaye, 2014b).  
Members of other parties in the coalition government also engage in this debate. A visible PPS 
figure is Nezha Skalli, former Minister for the Family, who expressed herself on the issue of 
abortion, calling for its legalisation under certain conditions. Skalli also lamented the obstacles 
she faced when she tried to present a law on violence against women to Parliament in 2010, 
and explained the rise in child marriage in terms of the ideologies and culture of Morocco 
(Mounir, 2013b; Rerhaye, 2014b). 
Opposition political parties involved in this debate include the USFP, the Socialist Union of 
Popular Forces. USFP figures, Khadija Yamlahi and Driss Lachgar also called for a framework 
law  (Liberation, 2014a). The call for a framework law, rather than a specific law is at odds 
with the type of policy change supported by other elite actors. While Lachgar also called for 
changes to discriminatory provisions in existing legal texts such as the Family Code, and the 
liberalisation of abortion, Yamlahi added that national laws should be in line with international 
conventions, and that both the Penal Code and Family Code should be rewritten to stop 
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underage marriage, but also to achieve equal rights between men and women in marriage 
(Mohammed Taleb, 2012b). 
The Femmes Ittihadies, a group of female parliamentarians associated with the USFP party 
similarly called for a revision of the Family Code, for judicial justice, the abolition of all 
discriminatory laws, the right to have an abortion, and the promulgation of a framework law 
(Liberation, 2013b).  
King Mohammed VI also contributed to the debate on violence against women, by calling for 
its elimination in general, during the Rabat Declaration, but particularly female genital 
mutilation, forced and child marriage (Rerhaye, 2012b). Moreover, the King played a key role 
in the debate on abortion between liberal and conservative figures, by calling for a consultation 
with the view of introducing a draft law to liberalise abortion. 
State Actors  
The state actors that perform acts of allyship are Morocco’s national human right’s institution, 
national commissions, as well as jurists, legal bodies, and ministries. These actors provide 
mostly moral resources, but also human and informational. The national human rights 
commission, the Economic, Social and Environmental Council and legal figures are 
particularly critical of the government and engaged in moral leverage, though, alongside other 
state actors, provide recommendations. 
As stated above, the key individual claimants associated with state institutions, such as the 
judiciary and the bureaucracy are the ministry of justice, figures from the National Council for 
Human Rights, the Economic, Social and Environmental Council, the Social Development 
Agency and national development institutions such as l’Entraide Nationale, deputy 
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prosecutors, lawyers, judges, tribunals, the regional commission on supporting cells for women 
and children victims of violence.  
These actors express themselves through verbal or written statements and meetings. Those 
claimants associated with the judicial area make claims calling for a better legal process to 
support women victim of violence (Khallad, 2012), criticised current legal provisions and 
notably Article 20 of the Family Code that makes underage marriage permissible; called for 
the application of the law; and made recommendations on the content of bill 103-13. One claim 
involves the declaration of a new process by a procurer: the ending of the regulation of acts of 
marriage that do not have a notarised certificate, while another involves the declaration that a 
new fast process had been implemented in Ouarzazate with regards to court decisions (Mounir, 
2014b).  
Individuals associated with the National Council for Human Rights - a constitutional institution 
created by Royal decree in 2011 - account for the most claims on this issue. These actors called 
for the liberalisation of abortion laws (Khallad, 2012; Mounir, 2014b; Liberation, 2016c; Tabet, 
2016a), presented recommendations on possible amendments to bill 103-13, including harsher 
punishments for certain crimes; called for the redefinition of concepts such as rape to be aligned 
with international standards; and recommended better institutional support for women victims 
of violence (Zerrour, 2014).  
National development commissions called for legislation to tackle this problem, as well as the 
adoption of ‘ambitious measures,’ collaboration between different actors, and the 
multiplication public awareness campaigns (Liberation, 2015a).  Finally, the ministry of justice 
made a claim agreeing with the decision of a parliamentary group to remove a provision in 
Article 475 of the penal code that allows a rapist to escape punishment if he marries his 
underage victim.  
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International Actors 
The last set of elite actors that make individual claims come from inter-governmental 
organisations (IGOs) or their agencies. When speaking by themselves, these actors perform 
allyship by providing moral resources in the form of statements supportive of women. They 
engage in moral leverage, though they also seek to educate governments, such as Morocco, on 
the need to tackle violence against women.  
Several individual claimants from IGOs come from the United Nations and its associated 
agencies, programmes and working groups. These include the working group on human rights, 
UNICEF, the UN special rapporteur, the commission on the status of women and its 
spokesperson Joy Ngozi Ezeilo, the Committee on economic, social and cultural rights, UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, UN Women and UN Women Maghreb’s spokesperson Leila 
Rhiwi, ECOSOC, UNFPA and its spokespersons Mieko Yabuta and Abdelilah Yaakoubd, and 
the executive director of the UN, Phumile Mlambo Ngcuka. Other IGOs claimants come from 
the OECD, the Union for the Mediterranean, the World Health Organisation and its 
spokesperson Claudia Garcia-Moreno, Jim Yong Kim, president of the World Bank Group, 
and Abdelwahad Radi from the Inter-parliamentiary Union.  
These claimants express themselves through conferences, communiques, and campaigns to 
highlight deficiencies in the Moroccan legal system with regards to violence against women, 
and call on the Moroccan government and associated institutions to make quick progress on 
this matter (Liberation, 2012b). 
The UN addresses issues not prevalent in the debate. For instance, it raises the issue of women’s 
reproductive and sexual health and their right to their bodies, specifically calling for 
governments to decriminalise abortion, and ensuring that vulnerable women such as sex 
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workers have access to sexual health services, alternative economic opportunities, and get 
protection from violence and discrimination (Bouithy, 2016a).  
The World Health Organisation further highlight the link between health and violence against 
women when it called on health professionals to take this issue more seriously (Mounir, 2013c). 
The UN also raised the issue of sexual violence during conflicts and its impact on society 
(Mounir, 2014c) and the negative consequences of child marriage (Liberation, 2015b). 
 
5.8.2. Material Resources  
International Actors  
I have not been able to identify many instances of material support to Moroccan women’s rights 
groups and coalitions, though this is mostly because this type of support cannot be easily 
discerned by newspaper articles. Nonetheless, I have been able to identify such few instances, 
though they all involve international actors.  
Intergovernmental organisations like the EU, helped finance specific campaigns, such as one 
involving combatting violence against women (Zerrour, 2014). Branches of governments, such 
as the Spanish agency for international cooperation and development helped a Moroccan 
women’s rights NGO, Oyoune Nissaiya, to produce a report on the legal obstacles faced by 
women victims of violence (Tabet, 2014).  
5.8.3. Informational Resources and human resources  
State Actors 
Drawing on joint claims between political elites and Moroccan women’s rights groups and 
coalitions, we can see that judicial actors provide human and informational resources to 
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Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions. The judiciary and politicians took part in 
activities organised by UAF to raise awareness of the harmful consequences of underage 
marriage  (Mohammed Taleb, 2012a). Other activities include co-participation in conferences, 
roundtables and other meetings on violence against women (Liberation, 2014a, 2015d, 2016a).  
International Actors 
As seen above, intergovernmental organisations and foreign governments helped finance the 
activities of Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions. They also directly participated in 
them, to increase their reach to the population. A notable example is the co-organisation of a 
campaign raising awareness of child marriage by UNICEF, the embassy of Finland and the 
association Foundation Ytto. Additionally, UNFPA and the embassy of Canada helped 
Annakhil, a women’s rights association, amplify their claim to warn against the phenomenon 
of child marriage (Liberation, 2014b). 
5.9. Strategies 
5.9.1. Leverage  
In this section, I describe the ways in which political elites exerted leverage on one another to 
combat violence against women in Morocco. I show that criticism is mostly directed at the 
Moroccan government. I have shown in chapters 2 and 4 that the Moroccan King has played a 
critical role in debates on the reforms of the Moudawana. In this chapter, other elite actors do 
not particularly address the King, but instead engage with representative and democratic 
institutions.  
Domestic Political Actors  
Opposition political parties involved in this debate include the USFP, the Socialist Union of 
Popular Forces. These claimants make rather critical comments towards the government. In the 
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lower chamber of parliament, Rachida Benmessaoud exclaimed: ‘Enough talk, we want 
concrete actions. We want a framework law on violence against women. Tell us how and when 
such a text will be promulgated’ (Rerhaye, 2012b). 
Lachgar also called for changes to discriminatory provisions in existing legal texts such as the 
Family Code, and the liberalisation of abortion, while Yamlahi added that national laws should 
be in line with international conventions, and that both the Penal Code and Family Code should 
be rewritten (Mohammed Taleb, 2012b). Once the bill 103-13 had been presented, USFP 
politicians engaged in harsh criticism about it. Abdelkebir Tabih argued that the bill looked 
more like a bill to amend the Penal Code than a comprehensive bill on violence against women, 
given its emphasis on criminal provisions (Tabet, 2016b). Tabih also lamented the fact that the 
bill limited violence to its physical aspect in general, and neglected other forms of violence 
(Tabet, 2016b). More worryingly for Tabih, the bill contained provisions that could be used 
against women themselves. In sum, this bill ‘has nothing to do with a bill on violence against 
women’ (Tabet, 2016b). 
State Actors 
Mostapha Naoui, from the CNDH criticised the bill presented by the government for being well 
below what activists had been campaigning for, and accused it of being a subterfuge (Tabet, 
2016b). Criticism extended to the lack of a satisfactory law that prevents, protects and punishes, 
and the lack of protection of domestic workers, most of whom are women. For Rabea Naciri, 
women victims of violence should not burdened with proving that they have been subject to 
violence. Instead, the state should prevent and investigate acts of violence, and an effective 
political strategy should be put in place (Rerhaye, 2014a).  
The Economic, Social and Environmental Council similarly produced reports criticising 
deficiencies in dealing with this topic, and specifically the lack of implementation of relevant 
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legislation, and explained the prevalence of violence against women to be the result of living 
in a patriarchal society (Liberation, 2012a). National development commissions have a less 
critical tone, but nonetheless also called for legislation to tackle this problem, as well as the 
adoption of ‘ambitious measures,’ collaboration between different actors, and the 
multiplication public awareness campaigns (Liberation, 12th December 2015).  
International Actors 
Whilst acknowledging development in the field of human and women’s rights in Morocco, 
these actors nonetheless repeatedly deplore slow progress and make a series of 
recommendations, such as amending discriminatory provisions in the Penal Code on rape, 
amending the Family Code to forbid underage marriage, and introducing a specific law on 
violence against women that is aligned with international standards (Liberation, 2015c).  
UN bodies such as ECOSOC criticised the provisions of Bill 103-13 elaborated by the 
Moroccan government, and specifically the failure to criminalise marital rape and extra-marital 
relations, and a proposal to set the minimum age for marriage to 16.  The World Bank Group 
preferred to call for a global application of punishment for rape and spousal violence. In fact, 
several claims by IOs targeted governments in general, and not just Morocco (Mounir, 2013b).   
5.9.2. Collaboration 
International actors engage with one another and with Moroccan political elites. The UN, 
Morocco’s Programme Tamkine and Amnesty International took part in a public awareness 
campaign on violence against women in educational institutions. The spokesperson for the 
Council of Europe and the European Union ambassador made a claim calling for the 
government to involve civil society in decision-making (Salaheddine, 2012). UN Women co-
organised a parliamentary meeting with the Interparliamentary Union in New York, to identify 
Page 231 of 395 
 
parliamentary strategies to combat violence against women and girls (Liberation, 2013c). The 
Moroccan government signed a UN declaration alongside other governments to condemn 
violence against women and girls and highlight the significance of putting in place multi-
sectorial services for victims of violence, in the field of healthcare and psychology (Mounir, 
2013d). The National Observatory for Children’s Rights and the UN co-organised a meeting 
in Rabat, under the patronage of the King and Princess Lalla Meryem, which culminated in the 
Rabat Declaration calling for an end to all forms of violence against women and girls, the 
adoption of a law to criminalise these acts, the eradication of all harmful practices such as 
underage and forced marriage, but also economic exploitation of young girls (Bouithy, 2015). 
Finally, UN Women, the Communal Council, the local province and the Spanish Development 
Agency AECID organised a seminar to make the city of Marrakesh safer for women through 
awareness raising (Bouithy, 2016b).  Finally, there is one claim solely involving Moroccan 
state actors, in the form of the judiciary and agencies. The regional commission on supporting 
cells for women and children victims of violence and the regional commission for Human 
Rights of Tanger-Tetouan organised a study group on violence against women, and called for 
Morocco to adopt a strong law that tackles violence against women and conforms to universal 
standards on human rights, to ensure that victims are well protected (Aujourd’hui le Maroc, 
2014).  
5.10. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have used RCA to offer an insight into how political elites at the national and 
international level interact with domestic activists on the issue of violence against women in 
Morocco. This was done to determine to what extent these elites facilitated their mobilisation 
for the criminalisation of violence against women, and therefore uncover who performs elite 
allyship. In the first part of this chapter, I have uncovered that generally speaking, the claims 
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of political elites aligned with those of Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions. They 
therefore performed allyship through interest representation.  
In the second part of this chapter, I looked at the form of the relationship between Moroccan 
activists and political elites. I found that there is very little evidence of co-ordination and joint 
action with elite actors, though most elite actors shared the same broad beliefs as activists with 
regards to violence against women. This suggests that the mobilisation for reforms on violence 
against women is one involving loosely coupled networks rather than state-social movement 
coalitions. Second, I looked at the types of resources provided by elite actors to determine who 
could be considered to be engaging in acts of allyship. I found that all types of elite actors – 
domestic political actors, state actors, and international actors – provide moral resources in the 
form of articulating claims that express support for progress on tackling violence against 
women in Morocco. This comes as no surprise, as the previous section already highlighted that 
there is little public opposition to combating violence against women. I also found that foreign 
governments and IGOs provided the most diverse range of resources.  
I have found little involvement of King Mohamed VI, even though I have shown in chapter 4 
that the monarchy has historically played a role in debates on women’s rights. This could 
suggest that VAW is not a divisive issue that requires the King to appropriate the issue and 
perform his role as arbiter. Moreover, other political elites address actors from representative 
and democratic institutions, rather than the monarchy, in spite of Morocco’s authoritarian 
political system. This suggests that there is tacit understanding about political actors that 
change should happen democratically and through formal channels of representation. In the 
next chapter, I show that this attitude is adopted by Moroccan women’s rights groups and 
coalitions.   
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6. Perceptions of Performances 
6.1. Introduction  
In this section, I look at domestic activists’ perceptions of the afore mentioned actors and 
performances. I juxtapose these findings with my observations from chapters 4 and 5.  I have 
clarified in Chapter 1 that my definition of opportunity is, ‘possibilities that originate outside 
the mobilising group, but affect its perceived chances of mobilising and/or realising its 
collective interests.’ Thus, it is not possible to determine who is an elite ally and what is good 
elite allyship without drawing on the perceptions of social movement activists. I capture the 
perceptions of activists mobilising for the criminalisation of violence against women in 
Morocco through semi-structured interviews with representatives of coalitions, women’s rights 
organisations, and non- women’s rights groups involved in the mobilisation.  
I find that their assessment is mostly negative, very few of the elite actors that perform elite 
allyship are perceived as being allies. Moreover, even perceived allies are harshly criticised for 
not doing more, which involves amongst others, engaging in mobilisation, and exerting 
leverage.  Additionally, I find that activists perceived effective elite allsyhip to possess the 
following characteristics: the provision of a wide range of resources, the use of moral leverage 
over other political elites and collaboration with activists. With regards to domestic political 
actors, activists preferred allyship from representative and democratic institutions. 
6.2.  Data  
This section is based on 15 semi-structured interviews that I carried out between January and 
May 2016 in the following cities in Morocco: Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakesh, Fez, Agadir and 
el Hajeb. These interviews did not solely involve women’s groups, but also other actors that 
participated in the various debates on violence against women. Activists were drawn from both 
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secular and religious groups. I also included participants from formal organisations and 
informal groups, as well as those from women and non-women centred groups. Finally, I have 
not restricted my sample to the Rabat-Casablanca area, but have also carried out interviews in 
the Moroccan provinces. I have done this to make sure that I obtained a variety of viewpoints, 
and was not just interviewing the activists from the most visible groups and coalitions.  
I have interviewed the Rabat and Casablanca sections of major women’s associations such as 
Federation de la Ligue Democratique des Femme (FLDDF), Association Marocaine des Droits 
des Femmes (AMDF), which is based in Casablanca, and Jossour, Forum des Femmes 
Marocaines (Jossour). As we have seen in chapter 4, these associations have historically played 
a major role in debates on women’s rights in Morocco. Besides these, I have interviewed 
smaller organisations based in Rabat and Casablanca, such as Woman Action, Solidarite 
Feminine (Feminine Solidarity), Association Marocaine des Femmes Progressistes (Moroccan 
Association of Progressive Women, Femmes Progressistes), and Union Feministe Libre (Free 
Feminist Union). I have also interviewed a representative for Forum al Zahra, which we have 
seen in chapter 4, is linked to the PJD. In the Rabat-Casablanca area, I have spoken to two 
female representatives from associations that do not solely focus on women’s rights, but have 
participated in the debate. These are Collectif Aswat (Aswat), which is an LGBT association, 
and Mouvement Alternatif pour les Libertes Individuelles (Alternative Movement for 
Individual Freedoms, MALI), an informal group that focuses on individual freedoms. Outside 
of the Rabat-Casablanca region, I have interviewed Initiative pour la Protection des Droits des 
Femmes (Initiative for the Protection of Women’s Rights), based in Fez, which was managing 
the Spring of Dignity coalition in 2016. I have also interviewed Association Amal, based in El 
Hajeb, to include the voice of associations from more remote areas of Morocco. Below, I 
provide a brief overview of these associations below.  
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For this section, I have interviewed IPDF in its capacity as the managing association of the 
coalition Printemps de la Dignite in 2016. As we have seen in chapter 4, this coalition started 
a few years before the Arab Spring and brings together more than 20 associations. Its original 
goal was the reform of criminal legislation to combat violence against women in Morocco. 
However, today its goals have expanded because it realised that the problem was the whole 
justice system that needed an overhaul (IPDF, 2016). The coalition has participated in 
international forums to communicate its vision and produced a number of memoranda on 
violence against women. It has staged protests to protest violence against women, though a 
significant proportion of its actions involve conferences and meetings. Though this coalition is 
highly visible and benefits from the membership of well-resourced associations such as ADFM, 
it has witnessed the breakaway of AMVEF, UAF, Jossour and FLDDF due to its organisation. 
Nonetheless, several associations in my sample, such as Solidarite Feminine, Femmes 
Progressistes and AMDF, are still part of it. I now turn to discussing individual associations 
and informal groups.  
An alternative network to the Printemps is Forum Al Zahra. Chapter 4 has already discussed 
Forum al Zahra, the only Islamic association in this sample. As we have seen earlier, this forum 
addresses women’s rights in the context of the family. This forum is not visible in mainstream 
debates on violence against women, though as we will see in the section below, it has also 
campaigned for a law on violence against women. It is marginalised from the secular current 
of the women’s rights movement due to its religious approach to women’s rights. However, 
the real reason for its lack of visibility is also due to its emphasis on social work, in the form 
of listening centres for women victims of violence (Forum Al Zahra, 2016). Moreover, whereas 
the other associations communicate in both French and Arabic, this network predominantly 
communicates in Arabic.  
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One of the oldest associations in this sample is Solidarite Feminine. Solidarite Feminine was 
founded in 1985 by Aicha Ech Chenna, and focuses primarily on single mothers, a group that 
is marginalised in Moroccan society, due to the stigma of being an unmarried mother and an 
illegitimate child (Solidarite Feminine, no date; Marshall, 2009; Zouak, 2015). Solidarite 
Feminine seeks to bring an end to children abandoned by unmarried mothers and empower 
these women through social work and traineeships (Marshall, 2009). Solidarite Feminine also 
engages in advocacy and is part of the coalition Printemps de la Dignite.  
The 1990s saw the establishment of even more associations. Among them are AMDF and 
Femmes Progressistes, that started in 1992, FLDDF that was created in 1993, and Jossour that 
was established in 1995. As we have seen in chapter 4, AMDF has been an important player in 
debates on women’s rights in Morocco. It was involved in the drafting of the plan for the 
integration of women in the late 1990s (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009; Elliott, 2009). AMDF 
has also been one of the founding members of the Printemps de la Dignite coalition in the 
2000s, along with ADFM, AMVEF and FLDDF (Printemps de la Dignite, 2010). 
FLDDF is a major network for women’s rights in Morocco and posseses branches in several 
cities. FLDDF was officially established in 1993 and engages in both advocacy to criminalise 
violence against women, and grassroots work (FLDDF, 2016a). With regards to grassroots 
work, it provides psychological and legal support to women victims of violence (FLDDF, 
2016a). Like UAF and ADFM discussed above, it started as a group of women that broke away 
from a political party and has sought to fight violence against women from the beginning 
(FLDDF, 2016a). FLDDF is a federation of associations that work on different, yet 
complementary aspects, to help women. It is composed of an observatory on women’s rights, 
a residential centre for women victims of violence, and other associations that engage in 
awareness-raising campaigns (FLDDF, 2016a). A particularity of FLDDF is that it focuses on 
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overcoming taboos such as virginity, abortion and equal inheritance rights between women and 
men (2016a). 
Like FLDDF, Femmes Progressistes has been addressing violence against women from the 
beginning, though it has been biased towards economic violence (Femmes Progressistes, 
2016). It engages in both advocacy and grassroots work as well, though it primarily works with 
marginalised women such as housewives as well as factory and agricultural workers, as it 
considers violence towards these groups to be the most affected by Morocco’s economic crisis 
(Femmes Progressistes, 2016). Though it works with the Printemps de la Dignite, its major 
criticism is that the coalition exclusively targets elite women (Femmes Progressistes, 2016). 
Jossour’s main goal is to increase the visibility of women in all aspects of Moroccan society. 
It has combined advocacy and grassroots work, and has sought to increase women’s economic 
empowerment, in the face of economic, cultural and societal challenges (Jossour, 2015). 
Jossour has played an active role in campaigning for gender equality in Morocco, and has 
worked with other associations to submit memoranda to influence policy (Jossour, 2016). 
Jossour is highly involved in international forums and even enjoys a consultative status with 
the UN (Jossour, 2016). 
Among the smaller women’s associations in Rabat, we find Woman Action and Union 
Feministe Libre. UFL was officially formed in 2016, thought it had been a project in the making 
in the last 5 years (UFL, 2016). It was spurred by a case of sexual harassment that the founder 
had been fighting since 2014 (UFL, 2016). UFL stands out for being ran by educated and 
internet savvy young women. Indeed, unlike other women’s associations in Morocco, it focuses 
heavily on social media to promote its events and mobilise, and communicates in English, 
French, Arabic and Darija. As we have seen in chapter 4, UFL was established to allow young 
women to have an independent voice within the Moroccan women’s rights movement, which 
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is still dominated by figures that had been mobilising on this issues for decades. Its focus is on 
combating sexual violence and particularly harassment, though it has also taken part in 
campaigns against child marriage. UFL has a good relationship with more established secular 
women’s associations and has worked with them on the campaign to criminalise violence 
against women. However, it has also mobilised independently on this issue and carried out 
more confrontational tactics. 
Unlike UFL, Woman Action is more concerned with development and empowering women. It 
has worked with foreign governments and national networks to train women and educate them 
on their rights (2016). It has carried out campaigns to combat violence against women in the 
private and public spheres. We have seen in chapter 4 that the Family Code has not been 
communicated to all sectors of society, after its reform in 2004. Woman Action is one of those 
associations that address this problem by teaching women about the provisions of the code.   
Another small women’s rights association is Association Amal, which is based in El Hajeb, 
and was established in 2002 (Amal, 2016). It has focused on marginalised groups not addressed 
by bigger associations, such as sex workers. It works directly with vulnerable women, by 
educating them on their rights, but also campaigns for greater rights for women (Amal, 2016). 
It also engages in capacity-building for other associations (Amal, 2016). Unlike other 
associations in this sample, it is part of a regional network that involves local NGOs and the 
Rabat-based international NGO Mobilising Rights Associates (Amal, 2016). This network has 
worked separately on the formulation of a law to combat violence against women.  
Besides women’s associations, I have also interviewed female figures from Collectif Aswat 
and MALI, to grasp the involvement of other civil society actors in this debate. MALI is an 
informal network rather than an association. MALI has faced a lot of repression from the 
authorities because of its criticisms of sensitive topics such as religion. Nonetheless, it has 
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engaged in controversial actions, such as breaking the fast during Ramadan, to protest forced 
fasting. Due to its inability to exist as a formal structure, it works with established associations 
to mobilise. It turns to social networks and the foreign media to communicate its ideas (MALI, 
2016).  
Collectif Aswat was established in 2012 and fights discrimination towards sexual minorities in 
Morocco. It acts as a source of information for the LGBT community in Morocco, but also 
engages in political campaigns that target decision-makers, civil society and the general public 
(Lacroix, 2016). Its focus is the repeal of article 489 of the Penal Code which criminalises 
homosexual relations (Lacroix, 2016). Though it is an LGBT association, Aswat more 
generally campaigns for individual liberties, such as freedom of conscience, sexual freedom 
and religious freedom (Lacroix, 2016). In spite of its interest in women’s rights, members of 
Aswat have found it difficult to participate in the activities of women’s rights groups and 
coalitions on the issue of violence against women in Morocco (Aswat, 2016).  
In sum, my sample is composed of a variety of women’s rights associations and coalition. With 
regards to coalitions, we can see that Forum Al Zahra, Printemps de la Dignite, MRA and its 
network of regional NGOs, and FLDDF have worked in parallel on the issue of violence against 
women. With regards to associations, we can see that they cannot be easily grouped into 
advocacy or grassroots organisations, as several of them work with women and campaign on 
women’s rights.  
6.3. Method  
In this section, I draw on interviews to juxtapose the performances of elite actors on the issue 
of violence against women in Morocco, with how activists mobilising on this issue interpret 
the impact of their performances on their mobilisation. I have chosen to carry out semi-
structured interviews because they are helpful for research that is not well documented (Blee 
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and Taylor, 2002). Since I am studying a relatively recent campaign, there is not much primary 
or secondary information I could draw on to determine the perceptions of elite actors by 
women’s rights activists. Due to the lack of Internet use by the groups and coalitions in 
question, there are not many digitised versions of their organisational documents and not much 
maintenance of their websites. While there are interviews of them online, these do not draw on 
their beliefs about different types of elite actors. I thus had to carry out a period of fieldwork 
in Morocco to speak to activists and observe first hand their interactions with one another and 
with other actors. I also draw on semi-structured interviews because of their ability to help me 
learn about the emotions, beliefs, and identities of activists, and therefore their ability to ‘bring 
human agency to the centre of movement analysis,’ as Blee agues (Della Porta, 2014, p. 229). 
Understanding the identities of activists is also important because it allows me to understand 
how ideologies and relationships affect perceptions of allyship and perceptions of different 
external actors. Having described my methods, I now turn to examining my empirical findings.  
 
6.4.  Empirical Findings  
6.4.1. Domestic Political Actors  
In chapter 2, I have suggested that representative and democratic institutions might be not be 
perceived as being effective sources of elite allyship in Morocco. I have argued that this is due 
to the fact that Morocco is not a democratic country, and the King has extensive powers, which 
he has drawn on to maintain his power. This lack of democracy means that representative 
bodies have limited powers and cannot exercise their free will. On the other hand, because the 
King is above all other institutions, he can make reforms happen. Moreover, having 
connections with the regime means that an association can exist and carry out its functions.  
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However, I have also shown that in previous campaigns, some associations preferred to address 
elected officials and avoided appealing to the King, so as not to deepen authoritarianism.  
My findings so far align with this latter approach. My RCA shows that the main interlocutors 
of Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions are the Moroccan Cabinet and other 
politicians, rather than the King, despite the fact that the Cabinet is dominated by Islamist 
figures from the PJD. My interviews show that though the PJD was seen as a major obstacle to 
criminalising violence against women, this has not resulted in associations courting the support 
of the King. I develop on these issues below.  
As shown in chapter 5, publicly, the government supports and even proposes legal reforms on 
violence against women – as evidenced by the proposition of a draft bill in November 2013 
and the vote on bill 103-3 in March 2016 to tackle this issue. However, reflecting on the slow 
progress of these texts, as well as the way in which they were developed and their content, 
activists report that the ruling party in government – the PJD - actively resists progress on this 
issue. Activists also report that resistance is displayed through the handling of funding on this 
topic and character assassination. With regards to left-wing parties in the coalition – such as 
the PPS - activists perceive them as allies, but deplore the fact that they only provide moral 
resources in the form of rhetorical support. Nonetheless, in spite of perceived resistance by the 
PJD, activists kept engaging with it rather than appeal to the King, as has happened in the early 
2000s with the debate on the reform of the Moudawana (chapter 4).  
Interviewees lamented the slow pace on this matter, and were taken aback by the fact that the 
draft bill was neglected and surfaced again only in March 2016, at the end of the government’s 
term (FLDDF, 2016a; AMDF, 2016; Femmes Progressistes, 2016).  As one interviewee put it, 
this law project had been ‘locked in a drawer’ since November 2013 (Woman Action, 2016). 
The slow progress was particularly worrisome because the 2011 Constitution required the 
Page 242 of 395 
 
government to pass and implement its proposed laws and align all legal texts with its own 
dispositions (FLDDF, 2016a; Jossour, 2016). There were thus fears that such a law would never 
see the light of day and that the government could get away with not respecting the new 
Constitution. Another reason why slow progress was worrisome was because activists relied 
on the law to educate society. As one interviewee said, ‘laws have a pedagogic role which 
contributes to changing mentalities’ (IPDF , 2016).  
The slow progress on this matter is observed to be a general characteristic of the government 
towards projects concerning women’s rights (Amal, 2016). In more detail, one interviewee 
declared that:  
‘There are many law projects that they neglected all these years and only started looking into 
last year. Last summer, they started introducing bills in bulk. It was very hard. For instance, 
we had elections on 4th September 2015 and it was only towards June, July 2015 that relevant 
electoral laws that specified the status of women, were promulgated. There was only a bit of 
time. We could not discuss and raise women’s awareness on this issue. It was horrible. It was 
very difficult.’ (FLDDF , 2016a) 
Another interviewee further reported that since the coming to power of this government, 
existing developments on women’s rights had been frozen, exemplified by the failure to 
promulgate an Authority for Parity and Equality as directed in Article 19 of the 2011 
Constitution, and the neglect of the project on domestic work (Jossour, 2016).  
Interviewees interpreted these delays as a lack of concern for women’s rights and as 
exemplifying that women are simply not a priority for the government. As one of them put it,  
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‘the priority is not the cause of women. It is not equality. It is not a law on violence against 
women. They have another agenda. They have other priorities in their governmental plan’ 
(Jossour, 2016). 
This resistance was also expressed through denying access to information and participation to 
women’s rights groups and coalitions in the development of the draft bill and the bill. An 
interviewee I spoke to in early March 2016 reported not having heard anything between the 
presentation of the draft bill on 7th November and that of the final version that was adopted by 
the government on 17th March 2016: 
‘This [proposed] law was presented during a council of government meeting to be discussed 
and adopted on 7th November 2013. We have not heard anything about it since. We are told 
that it is in the legislative arena now, but we do not anything. All we know is that the last stage 
was what happened in 2013 during the Council of Government’ (FLDDF, 2016a). 
For Femmes Progressistes (2016), this was a deliberate strategy to sideline women’s right 
groups and coalitions, while a spokesperson for the Association Marocaine des Droits des 
Femmes went so far as qualifying this refusal to consider their position as an anti-democratic 
move (2016). 
Denying access to information on the development of the bill and restricting access to women’s 
rights groups and coalitions were criticised by interviewees for breaching articles of the new 
Constitution, which promoted participatory governance.  By wanting to be involved in 
decision-making, activists also wanted to ensure that the government respected the positive 
developments they had gained following the Arab Spring. According to an activist, 
participation should take the following form:  
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‘The women’s rights movement has given its opinion on the [draft] law, on some articles, on 
some amendments. All of this should be taken into account by all parties responsible for 
formulating it. A national commission should be put in place that brings together the viewpoints 
of civil society, the women’s rights movement, the National Council for Human Rights, the 
government and also political parties, to design a clear and precise law’ (Jossour, 2016 ). 
This focus on participatory governance is not surprising if we consider that the post-Arab 
Spring era has witnessed the popularity of discourses centring democracy.  
Even Islamist women’s groups were kept in the dark about the bill. According to a 
spokesperson for Forum Al Zahra (2016), it had asked to speak to the Prime Minister, following 
the long silence after the presentation of the draft bill in November 2013, but was rebuffed. 
This denial of participation was apparently not just limited to this law project. For the 
Printemps coalition, under the previous government, there was a mixed committee composed 
of individuals from this coalition and state actors from the Ministry of Justice to examine the 
penal code, but this no longer existed (2016). This no longer existed.  
Besides the process surrounding the formulation of the draft bill and the bill on violence against 
women, their content also posed problems to activists. The draft bill 103-13 contained 19 
articles and had a definition of violence against women that acknowledged and punished 
physical, sexual, moral and economic violence (Media24, 2013). Its focus was mostly on 
punishing violence, though it proposed the creation of instances to take care of women and 
children victims of violence (Media24, 2013). It also proposed the creation of a national 
commission and sub-national commissions presided by a magistrate and composed of 
representatives from the ministries of justice, interior, health, children’s affairs, youth, women 
and the police, with the aim of coordinating for the protection of women and children against 
violence (Media24, 2013). The bill suggested amendments to the Penal Code to criminalise 
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certain acts like the refusal to reinstate a spouse previously expelled from the marital home, 
forced marriages, breaching the integrity of a woman’s body, and the deliberate squandering 
of the household’s money (Media24, 2013). Sexual harassment was criminalised and 
considered as such if it involved colleagues, authority figures and relatives (Media24, 2013). 
Revenge porn was somewhat also criminalised, as using recordings and images of a woman in 
her private environment and against her consent faced penalties (Media24, 2013). 
The following acts not addressed in the Penal Code were criminalised: breach of trust, fraud 
and theft towards a spouse. Worsened penalties were put in place for violence involving 
pregnant women, or done in the presence of children or parents (Media24, 2013). Protective 
measures included the removal of the violent spouse, the interdiction to access the wife or 
children and to manage household resources (Media24, 2013). The bill contained more general 
provisions such as making threats and refusing to help someone in danger, when reasonable 
and safe to do so (Media24, 2013). The bill that was voted on at the council of government in 
March 2016 contained 17 articles and many of the same provisions, though a few were 
withdrawn. It still contained sentences for the aforementioned forms of violence, including 
aggravating sentences for violence perpetrated towards women in special circumstances such 
as pregnant women, and still proposed institutional mechanisms such as central and local cells 
and committees to support women victim of violence. However, fraud and theft towards a 
spouse were removed.  
Undoubtedly, the lack of involvement and participation of women’s rights groups prevented 
the demands of religious and secular women’s rights groups from being met. Speaking on 
behalf of the Printemps, one interviewee argued that this bill was a bill against violence against 
women only in name, given that it contained provisions that focused on violence against 
minors, parents and children (AMDF, 2016). Another key critique involved the fact that the 
bill did not have a preamble that determined the objectives, clarified the socio-political context 
Page 246 of 395 
 
and referenced key international and domestic legal frameworks (AMDF, 2016). In fact, due 
to its lack of breadth, the bill was perceived to go against international conventions like the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (AMDF, 
2016).  
It was even seen as a regression from the draft bill in many ways. First, not only was violence 
not defined clearly (Forum Al Zahra, 2016), the bill no longer contained the provision that 
psychological violence was a form of violence, thereby preventing moral harassment from 
being criminalised (AMDF, 2016). The specific needs of marginalised women, such as those 
from rural areas and Amazighe women were not taken into consideration (Voix de la Femme 
Amazighe, 2016). Criticism also revolved around the removal of several acts as acts of violence 
against women, such as marital theft and fraud, light violence against women, and breaching 
the integrity of women, and the legitimacy of a medical certificate (AMDF, 2016). 
Added to that were the fact that marital rape was not included in both texts and rape not defined 
within a human rights framework (AMDF, 2016; Amal, 2016; Woman Action, 2016). Though 
the criminalisation of certain acts such as expelling a woman from the marital home and 
refusing her access, as well as forced marriage and squandering the money of the household, 
were welcomed, the fact that these necessitated a complaint from the victim was deplored, as 
the state has a duty to stop violence (AMDF, 2016). What interviewees agreed on was that the 
bill was nothing more than amendments included in the draft bill of the Penal Code. As one of 
them said,  
‘The criminal provisions in this bill already exist in the draft bill of the Penal Code and the 
draft bill on the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is nothing new in this draft legislation. So, 
if we move the dispositions of this bill to the Penal Code, there is nothing left. There are no 
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autonomous dispositions solely reserved for this bill. When the Penal Code will be amended, 
this bill will become void. It does not have a raison d’etre’ (AMDF, 2016).  
This view was also shared by Islamic women’s groups, which were against simply having 
amendments to the Penal Code. According to Forum Al Zahra, ‘we would like to have a specific 
law, rather than amendments to the Penal Code. We would like a legal framework that fights 
violence against women before it even reaches women, what we call prevention’ (2016).  
Unlike secular activists, Forum Al Zahra saw the bill presented by the PJD as being a 
progression, given the fact that it was the most comprehensive draft legislation on violence 
against women in Morocco unlike previous draft legislations presented by Yasmina Baddou in 
the cabinet of Driss Jettou between 2002 and 2007 and Nezha Skalli in the cabinet of Abbas el 
Fassi between 2007 and 2012 (2016). Moreover, the Forum had a more nuanced attitude 
towards the bill, pointing out positive measures such as its recognition that violence is not just 
physical, its institutionalisation of commissions and instances that tackle violence against 
women, and the fact that the perpetrator needs to be removed from the victim (Forum Al Zahra). 
However, it lamented that this removal only started after a court decision, and not immediately 
upon the victim’s complaint. It also complained about the fact that the definition of violence 
was not comprehensive and that the text did not consider treating the person that commits 
violence, amongst others. Nonetheless, the Forum was more positive about the bill because this 
question had been discussed under 3 governments, and it was the first time this draft legislation 
finally reached Parliament (Forum Al Zahra). In fact, the Forum stated that, ‘the fact that it 
reached Parliament is a very good thing, regardless of its content, because we can hope that the 
Parliament can help improve this text’ (Forum Al Zahra, 2016). Thus, for the Forum, the bill 
was far from being an obstacle to the claims of women’s rights groups and coalitions. This 
contrasted with the more rigid position of secular groups and coalitions mobilising on this issue.  
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More important for women’s rights groups and coalitions was the fact that civil society’s role 
was extremely restricted in both the draft bill and the bill. The first version required civil society 
groups to have the status of organisations of public utility, if they wanted to be civil parties in 
criminal proceedings (AMDF, 2016). However, women’s rights groups fighting against 
violence did not have such a status, and were therefore excluded (AMDF, 2016). The second 
version which was voted by the Council of government in March 2016, changed this disposition 
and allowed for only a private audience for criminal proceedings, rather than a public one, and 
now required the victim’s authorisation (AMDF, 2016). 
It was perceived that civil society’s role was not firmly established, in spite of the 
Constitution’s call for participatory governance. As one interviewee lamented,  
‘The composition of this bill totally ignores civil society that works on this domain. Civil 
society worked on combatting violence against women before the government joined it in its 
efforts. We have groups that have pioneered refuge centres. Civil society has acquired expertise 
in this domain and contributed a lot. We think that this text only calls upon these groups when 
it deems suitable. In 2011, we got a constitution that opened a great door to participatory 
democracy. This constitution requires all instances to engage civil society in the adoption of 
public policies, in monitoring. We find that this text ignores all of this’ (Forum Az Zahra, 
2016).  
What this discussion shows is that while the government presented draft legislation on violence 
against women, it actively sought to sideline Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions. 
It is not surprising that the PJD-led Cabinet has been resistant to the vision of the secular current 
of the movement. This party has been their traditional opponent, staging counter-protests 
against their proposals to reform the Moudawana in the early 2000s (chapter 4). What is 
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surprising is that it has equally sidelined Forum Al Zahra, which is associated with the party. 
This shows the limits of ideology in ensuring effective allyship.  
Despite restricting the participation of women’s rights groups, the government provided 
material resources, though these were deemed insufficient and discriminator. First, 
organisations with a public utility status had more access to state funding, while others were 
forced to search for projects supported by other national actors (Woman Action, 2016). 
Representatives from several organisations reported not receiving any funds from the 
government, leading them to look for funding abroad. However, even those organisations that 
received material support admitted that this was so low that they had to resort to other sources 
of funding to carry out their activities. As one noted,  
‘We receive very little from the government. It does not even represent one percent of our 
overall budget. Other organisations also receive very little. Without the support of our 
international partners, we would be struggling’ (Solidarite Feminine , 2016).  
Members of the Spring of Dignity even reported that those women’s groups associated with 
the dominant political party, the PJD, received favourable treatment. For instance, one reports 
that only 10 women from amongst the groups unaffiliated with this party could afford to 
participate in a meeting organised by the UN commission on the status of women in New York, 
whereas many more women from PJD-affiliated groups could travel there (AMDF, 2016). 
However, I also came across groups that were independent, yet also received funding for 
human rights projects through a competitive process (Amal, 2016). 
Besides slowly progressing on the topic of violence against women, denying women’s rights 
groups and coalitions participation in drafting legislation, and providing limited material 
support, the government also directly attacked activists and engaged in character assassination. 
This took the form of making personal attacks on them or their claims. Examples include the 
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government mocking their recommendation to criminalise marital rape and the minister for 
Justice, Mustapha Ramid stating that the husband can do whatever he wants with his wife 
(Amal, 2016). Another reported that some elements within the government accuse women’s 
rights groups of not only attacking Islam (FLDDF, 2016b), but also of serving a foreign agenda, 
which has led some to spend time to defend themselves against these allegations. As one 
interviewee said, 
‘We work so hard, to say that it’s us working for us, not other beliefs or Western ideas, or 
perversion, because this is what people think, especially the Islamic government. They exploit 
each occasion there have. They don’t let it slip’ (UFL, 2016).  
These interviews are in line with my findings from the claims-analysis. Indeed, prominent 
figures within the PJD denied the existence of violence against women, questioned official 
statistics on the matter, and even stated that women play a more important role in the family.  
Alongside their tenuous relationship with individuals with the PJD, secular activists lamented 
the failure of liberal and left-wing political parties within the government, such as the National 
Rally of Independents and the PPS, to take advantage of their position and exert pressure. Even 
though interviewees recognised the contribution of the former Minister for the Family, and 
member of the PPS - Nezha Skalli – some complained that such energy and willingness were 
not shared by other members (Woman Action, 2016). As a representative of the Spring of 
Dignity coalition exclaimed,  
‘Our traditional allies are left-wing and liberal parties. However, with regards to the Left, the 
Party of Progress and Socialism and the Communists, at the beginning, were strategic allies, 
including the former Minister for the Family, who was a member of this party. Often, they will 
not go beyond having a principled position. If they are in government, it means that they can 
put a veto on certain things, which has not happened. This is the same thing with the liberals, 
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such as the National Rally of Independents. The First Chamber is headed by a member of this 
Rally. Their position and engagement before and after being in government, which happened 
following a reform, is quite different. I know that the president of the Parliament can delay 
things, but we are not seeing this. So, saying that they are for equality as a principled position 
is ok, but it does not go beyond that. This poses a problem (2016). 
This quote is in line with the social movement’s literature’s assumption that being in 
government constraints political parties because they have to balance different interests and 
responsibilities. As we have seen in chapter 2, because parties in government and mainstream 
parties have to represent and be accountable to the general public, they are more constrained 
than niche and opposition parties in actively supporting social movements who represent 
particular interests (Hutter and Vliegenthart, 2016).  
What activists needed was more pressure and resolve. As one interviewee put it, ‘there needs 
to be a great willingness and determination, and even bang fists on the table to make progress 
(Woman Action, 2016). 
To illustrate this lack of willingness, one interviewee referred to the fact that many ministers 
and female parliamentarians failed to take responsibility and seize the opportunity to vote 
against the version of bill 103-13 discussed at the Council of Government in March 2016: 
‘Even though the PPS is a progressive political party with lots of great ministers, it does not 
assume its responsibility. Most ministers were absent for the meeting of the Council of 
Government… They knew about the meeting, but they were too busy. There was also the issue 
of the Sahara and Ban Ki Moon. There were many absences. Ministers, especially women that 
were in Morocco did not want to take responsibility. They did not insist’ (AMDF, 2016).   
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In sum, in the public sphere, government actors were overwhelmingly committed to combating 
violence against women, as demonstrated by their pledges and proposal of legislation. They 
provided moral resources to women’s rights activists. However, interviews with activists reveal 
a different reality. First, the dominant party in the coalition government – the PJD – was seen 
as being a key obstacle to having a satisfactory law on violence against women by secular 
activists. Activists pointed to the slowness of progress on this matter, their lack of participation 
in drafting legislation, and the content of the draft bill and the bill, as evidence of opposition to 
combating violence against women. While Islamic women’s rights groups shared similar 
grievances, they did not qualify the PJD as being an obstacle, and were more positive about its 
efforts. Second, even though secular activists regarded left-wing and liberal parties in 
government, such as the PPS and the RNI as their traditional allies, they claimed that their 
support once in government, was essentially rhetorical, and they criticised their lack of pressure 
on the PJD. We can thus see that for allies in government, moral resources are not enough. 
What is needed was exerting leverage over the perceived target and opposition to mobilisation, 
which in this case was the PJD. I now turn my attention to another type of domestic political 
actor: opposition parties.  
Despite the opposition putting public pressure on the government to make progress on the issue 
of violence against women, activists perceived them to not be doing much. Much like political 
parties in government, they saw them as not doing more than providing moral resources in the 
form of rhetorical support. Further, political parties were widely perceived to have a lack of 
interest in women’s issues and to be engaging in violence against women themselves, 
irrespective of their ideology.  
In fact, there was a sense that women’s issues were of secondary importance to political parties 
and male politicians (Femmes Progressistes, 2016), leading them to providing ad hoc support, 
though the commitment of Nabila Mounib who led the Unified Socialist Party was noted 
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(Woman Action, 2016). Some reported that political parties held meetings with them, though 
while they asked questions, they were perceived as not following through with more concrete 
actions. In the words of an interviewee, 
‘When we speak with a political party, or a local or national actor, they say “we agree, this is 
a good initiative, we will see what we can do.” However, the reality is different. Nobody 
disagrees. Everybody agrees and says it is a good initiative’ (Amal, 2016). 
If we consider the fact that the RCA shows that all political elites agree with combating 
violence against women in Morocco, this could suggest that opposition does not take the form 
of direct repression, but neglect of the issue and inconsequential moral support. Political parties 
provided rhetorical support without exerting pressure. In the words of an interviewee,  
‘The support is oral. There is agreement with the principles we defend. Political parties come 
up with a satisfactory program, but one needs to see the implementation. What sort of pressure 
are they exerting in Parliament? What pressure are they exerting in government? This is what 
we need, not oral support. Oral support is good, but we need something more effective’ 
(Solidarite Feminine, 2016).  
Others reported that some political parties did propose legislation and participated in their 
actions (Mains Libres, 2016), but would only lobby for limited change. According to an 
interview, political parties were fine with their law proposal and did ask questions to the 
relevant ministry and inside parliament during relevant oral sessions (Amal, 2016). However, 
they failed to push the Minister for the Family to come up with a law, justifying it with the lack 
of political will from the Ministry (Ibid). Moreover, the interviewee deplored the fact that some 
political parties suggested proposing a modified version of their project though they did not 
follow suit, and only showing real support to amending specific provisions in existing texts, 
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such as modifying articles 16 and 20 of the Family Code, amending article 475 of the Penal 
Code (Ibid). 
 Before the government adopted a bill on violence against women at a meeting of the Council 
of Government in March 2016, the lack of enthusiasm from other political parties to adopt and 
defend the proposals of women’s rights groups and coalitions, was noted and was explained as 
being the result of a lack of enthusiasm. What was needed was more mobilisation on the part 
of political parties:  
‘As civil society, our role is to propose, we do not have the power to promulgate a law. This is 
the role of Parliament. This is the problem. We already made a proposal, but a political party 
needs to adopt and defend the draft legislation, so that the government agrees to pass it’ (Amal, 
2016). 
Not only were political parties perceived as being uninterested and uncommitted to women’s 
issues in general, they were also thought to be directly in violence against women themselves, 
making political parties an unsafe arena for women. As one interview who used to be part of a 
liberal party complained,  
‘We do not talk about political violence inside political parties. There is a lot of violence. Some 
women prefer to work inside associations [civil society groups] instead of becoming members 
of a political party because you are penalised for not conforming to traditional views and for 
making remarks or observations. This is a form of violence for which there is no punishment. 
[…] Even though there are structures for women inside political parties, we do not have this 
freedom to provoke a discussion on the theme of women. When this is talked about, it is usually 
before the elections; it is for external consumption. I have never ever been in a political party 
that had a debate about women’s issues, including violence against women and equality. […] 
Women that are now in Parliament through a quota system, it is thanks to militant women that 
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have fought. However, these women are penalised by political parties for daring to provoke a 
discussion and going beyond political parties. In other words, for not obeying them. And to 
penalise them, political parties have put other women in place and pushed aside militant ones. 
So, women that dare to speak do not have a place inside political parties. It is only when a law 
is on its way that political parties want to appropriate it. However, thematic areas and important 
questions concerning us have never been areas of interest of political parties generally 
speaking’ (Woman Action, 2016).  
This quote is in line with my discussion of the role of political parties for women’s rights 
activists in Morocco. As I have shown in chapter 4, political parties strongly criticised UAF’s 
petition to reform the Moudawana in the 1990s, as it came at a time when the political 
environment was becoming more liberalised. Parties did not want women’s rights activists to 
frustrate this liberalisation by addressing a divisive topic. In fact, the formation of the first 
women’s associations in Morocco were encouraged by their inability to act on their interests 
within the structures of political parties (chapter 4).  
Furthermore, political parties distorted and fragmented the efforts of institutional female 
activists through their exploitation of the quota system. Female parliamentarians mobilised 
together for quotas to mobilise for women’s rights inside the political establishment (Woman 
Action, 2016). However, political parties exploited quotas to increase the presence of women 
that were not invested in women’s issues, but instead were there because of connections and 
opportunism (Woman Action, 2016). This reduced the scope for activism inside political 
parties and reduced the chances of a homogeneous mobilisation inside politics (Woman Action, 
2016). 
These assessments of political parties align with their public performances. The RCA has 
shown that political parties, and particularly the left-leaning PPS and USFP provided moral 
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resources, but not much beyond that. They did not provide material, informational or human 
resources. However, parties in the opposition did try to exert moral leverage over the 
government on its attitude towards the criminalisation of violence against women.  
Besides political parties, the King was also seen as a key potential source of allyship, though 
his participation was not particularly welcome. In speaking about reforms, interviewees did not 
emphasise the role of the King. Their interlocutors remained representative institutions. They 
revealed writing countless memoranda, holding press conferences and even demonstrating to 
encourage politicians to make progress on the criminalisation of violence against women in 
Morocco. As one interviewee mentioned,   
‘If the King decides to change things, they change immediately the day after. […] We should 
not need to resort to the King.  If we are going to resort to the King, then why not get rid of 
Parliament? Why not get rid of ministers? What would be the point of these structures then? 
We should be a parliamentary monarchy. We should not be in a monarchy where the King 
settles debates and decides everything (MALI, 2016).  
In conclusion, even though opposition political parties pressured the government to draft a 
satisfactory law on violence against women that conformed to international standards, this 
support was not particularly visible to activists. Interviewees perceived them as unwilling to 
provide more than moral resources. Not only were political parties perceived as being 
uninterested in the topic, they were also criticised for engaging in violence against women 
themselves. In spite of the less than satisfactory role of political parties and resistance from the 
PJD, interviewees did not call for greater involvement of the monarchy. This contrasts with 
previous efforts, wherein women’s rights activists sought the arbitrage of the King in the face 
of fierce opposition from Islamists in the beginning of the 21st century (chapter 4).  
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6.4.2. State Actors  
In chapters 2, I have argued that since democratic and representative institutions have no power 
and since the monarchy is the supreme institution, we should not expect other institutions to be 
perceived as useful sources of elite allyship. In fact, if we go back to the discussion in chapter 
4 about the reform of the Moudawana, we can see that state institutions did not play a major 
role. Chapter 5 has contradicted this and shown that constitutional institutions, particularly in 
the form of the CNDH, performed allyship through the provision of moral resources and 
exerted leverage over other domestic elites.  
My interviews reveal that though constitutional institutions only perform an advisory role, they 
were perceived as facilitating the mobilisation of secular activists for legal reforms on violence 
against women, and specifically, members of the Spring of Dignity coalition, thanks to its 
production of expert publications. As one spokesperson for the coalition declared,  
‘I think one of the greatest strengths of the Spring of Dignity coalition is that it has managed 
to ensure that national institutions, and particularly the National Council for Human Rights and 
the Social and Economic Council, have a similar position to the Spring with regards to violence 
against women, gender issues, and penal legislations more globally. I think this is an asset’ 
(2016). 
Interviewees also recognised the important role of the National Council for Human Rights 
producing reports and memoranda, particularly on issues such as abortion to advise decision-
makers (AMDF, 2016). The CNDH was considered to be willing to be part of the solution, and 
particularly engaged on the matter, going so far as amplifying the voice of activists (Jossour, 
2016).  
In sum, the previous chapter has shown that while the judiciary, ministries and constitutional 
institutions all made recommendations on tackling violence against women, the CNDH was 
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the strongest critic of the government, with some of its members adopting a particularly 
antagonistic tone towards the government. Though interviewees did not pronounce themselves 
much on these institutions, the CNDH was the key actor that was noted as being particularly 
supportive. It was seen as offering explicit recommendations in line with the broad aims of the 
most visible secular women’s rights groups and coalitions. However, it is not surprising that 
the actors praising the CNDH are, or have been, associated with the Printemps coalition. A 
representative from this institution revealed in an interview that while there were other 
coalitions, they essentially worked with the Printemps (CNDH, 2016). 
6.4.3.  International Actors  
Chapters 2 and 4 have shown that IGOs and foreign governments have historically played a 
major role in promoting women’s rights in Morocco. Chapter 5 has revealed that these 
international actors provide the most diverse range of resources, engage in leverage politics, 
but also collaborate with domestic political actors. They therefore engage in double 
mobilisation. In this section, I show that though activists did not perceive all of these forms of 
support, they nonetheless saw international actors as being important sources of opportunities. 
This supports Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) Boomerang Pattern of advocacy, wherein 
international allies can help alleviate the constraints activists face at home.  
Interviewees recognised the important role of foreign governments and intergovernmental 
organisations.They saw great potential in them, and recognised their efforts, but were 
ultimately disappointed in their approach. These actors were praised for providing a range of 
resources, but criticised for providing support that frustrated their advocacy efforts, and for not 
being more consistent in their assistance.  
Interviewees also acknowledged that international actors could exert a lot of influence on 
Moroccan decision-makers and that mobilisation at the national level could not succeed 
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without international support. Moreover, activists argued that they exploited mutual interests 
between countries to bring to light the issue of human rights (Woman Action, 2016). As a 
spokesperson for Femmes Progressistes claimed,  
‘I think for Morocco, international pressure is very important, and even more important than 
pressure at the national level. This is because the intervention of the UE and and the UN gives 
more results than pressure at the national level, due to the various economic interests. So 
international pressure is more beneficial and important’ (2016).  
Activists also justified this on the basis of previous efforts to effect legal changes in Morocco 
with regards to women’s rights. For instance, the reform of the Family Code in 2004 that was 
hailed as being progressive, though not emancipatory, was perceived as being the result of 
mobilisation at the national level, and pressure and action at the international level (Woman 
Action, 2016). Other outcomes included nationality rights for children from a mixed couple 
and quotas for women in politics (FLDDF, 2016a). 
Moreover, activists recognised that Moroccan political institutions such as the Ministry of 
Justice received funding from the European Union to implement certain political programs, 
and that this was tied to making progress on certain issues (IPDF, 2016). However, some 
lamented the fact that despite funding from the European Union, the governmental plan for 
equality between 2012 and 2016, otherwise known as the plan Ikram plan, was not 
implemented (FLDDF, 2016a).  
Finally, another reason why interviewees saw international actors as potentially useful was 
because Morocco had signed several international treaties related to women’s rights, such as 
the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
and that Morocco had to demonstrate that it was acting in line with the terms of the treaties.  
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International conventions were regarded as being particularly important because the 2011 
Constitution recognised the need to harmonise national laws with international conventions 
(Federation de la Ligue Democratique des Droits des Femmes, 2016a). Indeed, the preamble 
states that Morocco has as one of its objectives, 
‘To comply with the international conventions duly ratified by it, within the framework of the 
provisions of the Constitution and of the laws of the Kingdom, within respect for its immutable 
national identity, and on the publication of these publications, [their] primacy over the internal 
law of the country, and to harmonise in consequence the pertinent provisions of national 
legislation’ (Ruchti, 2012). 
To some extent, international elite actors were regarded as facilitating the mobilisation for 
reforms on violence against women in Morocco. A key resource was that they provided access 
to their structures and legitimacy to their claims.  For instance, a couple of organisations 
presented reports to the UN Committee Against Torture, and the UN Committee for Human 
Rights, both in Geneva calling on Morocco to have a comprehensive law on violence against 
women, and that these recommendations were subsequently adopted by these committees.  
Interviewees argued that access to these international institutions was made possible by the 
accreditation from the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) that their organisations 
enjoyed. Many Moroccan non-governmental organisations that work on the issue of women’s 
rights have ECOSOC consultative status, which permit them to access the ECOSOC, but also 
its subsidiary bodies and UN human rights structures. One interviewee even reported that each 
time they participated in UN meetings, women’s rights was one of the thematic issues that had 
the support of everyone (Woman Action, 2016). 
Activists further argued that Morocco’s signing of human rights conventions led to a situation 
of rhetorical entrapment, which worked to their advantage. They hoped to exploit the normative 
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commitments made by the Moroccan government to these international bodies, to push for their 
claims. In other words, they hoped that it would entrap itself in its own rhetoric. As one 
interviewee described,  
‘The government has to face the [UN] Human Rights Council in front of everyone. Human 
rights mechanisms are a great opportunity for us. The government accepts the 
recommendations in a spontaneous manner. It says “Yes, I accept this.”  So when it comes back 
home, we remind the government that it has accepted out of its own will and had the choice of 
not accepting, so it has to apply the recommendations and not have a double talk. It is a way of 
negotiating rights here’ (FLDDF, 2016).  
However, intergovernmental organisations were perceived as doing more than just provide 
moral resources through granting legitimacy. UN Women was praised by members of the 
Spring of Dignity coalition for providing the experiences of its cadres, such as Leila Rhiwi, 
though she used to be part of a Moroccan women’s rights NGO before joining the UN (AMDF, 
2016). The UN’s ability to engage the Moroccan government was also commended. Besides 
the UN, interviewees declared enjoying relations with EU bodies such as the European 
Parliament and Euromed – a Euro-Mediterranean partnership program, and Western European 
and North American governments, to exert pressure on the Moroccan government (IPDF, 2016; 
Femmes Progressistes, 2016; MALI, 2016). These relations were done through foreign 
embassies and competitive grants from these countries for advocacy projects, such as the US’s 
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) (Woman Action, 2016; Jossour, 2016).  
Despite reporting the positive role of intergovernmental organisations and foreign 
governments, interviewees were quick to point out the limits of their facilitation. Grievances 
included the lack of leverage and accountability politics, the lack of support for political work, 
the rigidity of support, the emphasis on material support, and favouritism. These factors were 
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regarded as limiting the extent to which these actors could act as a source of opportunity for 
legal reforms on violence against women in Morocco.  
A key critique of interviewees was that while these international actors helped with specific 
programs, they would go so far as exerting pressure on Moroccan decision-makers and holding 
them accountable. Though the EU once threatened to pull back its funding from governmental 
projects, this was rare, and the demands of Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions to 
exert more pressure often fell on deaf ears (Solidarite Feminine, 2016).  
One interviewee also claimed that ‘the European Union helps. It provides material support 
amongst other things. However, it does not hold Morocco accountable with regards to how it 
spends EU funding’ (AMDF, 2016). What was needed particularly from the European Union, 
the Council of Europe, the United Nations and rapporteurs on violence was political support 
(AMDF, 2016). This was because these actors had presented their remarks to Morocco with 
regards to the Penal Code, the Code for Criminal Procedure, and their awaited law on violence 
against women (AMDF, 2016). They therefore had a responsibility to monitor progress on 
these matters and exert pressure (AMDF, 2016).  
Interviewees also reported that international actors preferred supporting public awareness 
campaigns to prevent violence against women and structures such as helping manage listening 
centres for women victims of violence, instead of helping with policy advocacy. This has 
resulted in women’s rights groups and coalitions being on a constant lookout for international 
organisations that would help them with their advocacy efforts (Mains Libres, 2016).  
Besides, the bureaucratic procedure underlying these partnerships slowed their work. One 
interviewee complained about the fact that there was too much administrative work to 
undertake, as well as tasks irrelevant to the project, which prevented them from getting on with 
the project (Woman Action, 2016). In fact, the whole structure between international supporters 
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and women’s rights NGOs in Morocco was considered inadequate, as priority areas were 
perceived as being imposed by funders, which had for effect of diverting attention away from 
pressing problems. As one interviewee testified,  
‘Now, there is some degree of awareness that priorities should be shaped by local realities. 
However, there are still some priorities that are imposed by funders. It is done in a subtle 
manner. There are diagnostic workshops that determine the issues we will be working on. 
These issues may be important when a funding request is made, however, the context changes 
and other priorities appear. Unfortunately, organisations are trapped in their contracts, their 
partnership, and the results they need to show, even if they are not relevant. There is a rigidity 
with funders, especially with regards to the EU. They are really rigid concerning the terms of 
the contract they establish (Collectif Aswat, 2016).  
Interviewees also wanted more than funding, though they welcomed it. There was a perception 
that the support of international actors such as foreign governments and IGOs was essentially 
financial (MALI, 2016; Solidarite Feminine, 2016). However, they declared wanting them to 
invest themselves more in various ways, such as lobbying the Moroccan government on their 
behalf. Lobbying from foreign goverments and IGOs, particularly the EU, was considered 
particularly important because of they perceived that the various interests between countries, 
which I mentioned above, would mean that Morocco would be more attentive to the demands 
of other states and of international institutions (FLDDF, 2016a, 2016b). As one interviewee 
recommended that they should not only hold the Moroccan government to account, but also 
make integrate lobbying in their partnerships: 
‘We are not asking for much. Our funders should be in line with us, and also lobby our 
governments, because when decision-makers claim in front of international institutions that 
they are defending women’s human rights and achieved a lot of progress, their files on this 
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matter need to be shown to tell them that there is much to do still. […]. I would not sign a 
partnership agreement purely based on money. No, I would also want you to support me by 
doing advocacy on my behalf to my government. If things were like this, we would have 
progressed a lot’ (Solidarite Feminine, 2016). 
Finally, less visible organisations reported that IGOs were not acting in a fair and honest 
manner, due to their penchant for supporting certain organisations, generally the bigger ones, 
to the detriment of others. One interviewee argued that there were clientelistic connections 
between figures in well-known Moroccan women’s rights groups and some IGOs such as the 
United Nations, resulting in a form of favouritism that marginalised smaller organisations, 
especially those from the South of Morocco (Woman Action, 2016). Thus, while this is 
evidence that IGOs provided informational resources, it also shows that there stark inequalities 
in their provision.  
In sum, we can see that there is a gulf between the public actions of foreign governments and 
IGOs in the debate on violence against women in Morocco, and how these actors were 
perceived by Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions. Firstly, an analysis of the claims 
articulated by these actors in the public sphere suggests that they engaged in leverage and 
accountability politics, by calling on the Moroccan government to reform various legal codes, 
criticising its slow progress on the issue of violence against women, and shaming the content 
of its draft legislation. However, my interviewees argued that such pressure was not 
forthcoming. Moreover, they claimed that their relationship with them was fraught with 
difficulties and that they were not facilitating their efforts in a way that was satisfactory to 
them.  While they recognised the fact that these actors provided the widest range of support out 
of all elite actors involved in this debate, they deplored their unwillingness to challenge the 
Moroccan government, their emphasis on material support, and the management of their 
partnership with them.  
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6.5. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I sought to offer an insight into how political elites at the national and 
international level were perceived to interact with domestic activists on the issue of violence 
against women in Morocco. This was done to determine to what extent these elites were 
perceived as facilitating their mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence against women, 
and therefore uncover what effective elite allyship looks like. I have found that constitutional 
institutions such as the CNDH were seen as being helpful domestic elite actors because unlike 
politicians and political parties, they were perceived to be providing more than inconsequential 
moral support. We can better understand why activists thought that providing moral resources 
was not enough, if we consider the case of the PJD. Figures within the ruling political party 
provided public support for their aims, but resisted them in private. International elite actors 
were also perceived as being good sources of opportunity because of their provision of a range 
of resources. However, though these actors engaged in moral leverage towards domestic 
political actors, this was not perceived by activists. Nonetheless, based on the insights by 
interviews, we can deduce that effective elite allyship possesses the following characteristics: 
the provision of a range of resources, the use of moral leverage over other political elites and 
collaboration with activists. However, an interesting finding is that activists also preferred 
allyship from representative and democratic institutions. In the early 2000s, activists appealed 
to the King, in the face of fierce opposition by Islamists. However, in this campaign, activists 
preferred to ignore the King, even though the PJD-led government was perceived as being an 
obstacle to their claims, and political parties in general were seen as being uninterested in the 
issue. This suggests that even in non-democratic settings, elite allyship from representative and 
democratic institutions is preferred.  
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7. Conclusion  
7.1. Introduction  
 In this chapter, I reflect on my findings, as well as their significance and limitations. 
The key driver for my research was a desire to develop our understanding of elite allyship. As 
I have explained in the introductory chapter, elite allies occupy a key position in the (political) 
opportunity literature. However, the role of elite allies in helping social movements has not 
been rigorously examined, nor is there sufficient theorisation on the interactions between elite 
allies and social movements. We know little beyond the fact that elite allies are useful for social 
movements. Moreover, our understanding of the role of elite allies for social movements is 
based on democratic countries. I thus systematically examined the extent to which elite allies 
are a good predictor of policy change favourable to a social movement, when the latter is 
mobilising. I also drew on the case study of the mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence 
against women in Morocco, to explore the many ways in which elite allyship can be performed, 
and what performances are perceived as acts of elite allyship by social movements, in a non-
democratic setting.  I drew on theoretical insights from the literatures on social movements, 
transnational advocacy and political representation, to examine the relationship between elite 
allies and social movements.  
I brought to the fore the agency of political elites to remedy the movement-centric bias in the 
literature. External actors are often neglected in analyses of social movements, because they 
are assumed to be little more than the context of a social movement (Jasper, 2004). One cannot 
make sense of social movements if one omits from the analysis other relevant actors 
participating in the same issue. This observation rests on my assumption that external actors 
impose constraints on, and provide possibilities to, social movements (Jasper, 2004). I sought 
to clarify what it means to perform elite allyship towards a social movement, by examining 
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how acts of allyship are performed and perceived. Before looking at these interactions, I sought 
to determine if elite allies are even relevant for the study of the relationship between social 
movement mobilisation and policy change. Below are my research questions and my findings.  
1. To what extent is the presence of elite allies a strong predictor of policy outcomes 
favourable to a social movement, when the latter is mobilising? 
 
In my theoretical framework, I explained that to understand favourable policy outcomes to 
social movements, one needs to understand the context of their mobilisation. I have provided 
an overview of the literature on the relationship between social movements, opportunities and 
policy. This showed that amidst the plethora of works that highlight the significance of 
opportunities in general, and elite allies in particular, are a few exceptions that cast doubt on 
these orthodoxies.  
To untangle this relationship, I carried out a meta-analysis of quantitative academic papers on 
the subject. I have employed a meta-analysis to systematically analyse the association between 
different dimensions of opportunity linked to different models of opportunity, and policy 
change, controlling for social movement mobilisation. I have drawn on this method because I 
wanted to determine which models and dimensions of opportunity have the greatest 
explanatory power, and where elite allies fit in this assessment.  
In this chapter, I have employed a meta-analysis to systematically analyse the association 
between different dimensions of opportunity linked to different models of opportunity, and 
policy change, controlling for social movement mobilisation. I have done this to determine 
systematically which models and dimensions of opportunity have the greatest explanatory 
power. I have also done this to assess how relevant elite allies are for policy-making on an issue 
relevant to a social movement. I wanted to test the assumption that the presence of elite allies 
Page 268 of 395 
 
is a source of opportunity for social movements. I have found out that neither potential nor 
actual elite allies are strong predictors of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, 
controlling for mobilisation. This finding puts into question the veracity of the claim that social 
movements benefit from the presence of allies in power. In the next few chapters, I consider in 
more detail the relationship between elite allies and social movements, through a case study of 
the mobilisation for legislative reforms on violence against women in Morocco, to better 
understand exactly what the former contributes to the latter. 
Based on an examination of the proportion of successful relationships within each model, 
almost all models fail to be strong predictors of policy change favourable to mobilising social 
movements. Out of the 9 dimensions included in the political opportunity model, 3 (33%) are 
positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for 
mobilisation, at both the test and study level. Out of the 6 dimensions included in the discursive 
opportunity model, 2 (33%) are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social 
movement, controlling for mobilisation, though only at the test level. Out of the 14 dimensions 
included in the socio-economic opportunity model, 3 (21.4%) are positively associated with 
policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, at both the test 
and study levels. A further 3 (21.4%) are also positively associated with favourable policy 
change, at either the test or study level. Out of the 4 dimensions included in the legal 
opportunity model, 1 (25%) is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social 
movement, controlling for mobilisation, at both the test and study levels. Out of the 3 
dimensions included in the supra-national opportunity model, 2 (66%) are positively associated 
with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, though only 
at the test level.  
Out of these models, the dimensions of opportunity that are significantly associated with 
favourable policy change at both the test and study levels are: political openness, election year, 
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administrative capacity, spending, national income, ethnic/racial equality, poverty, and 
supportive legislators.  Of these, the success rate at both the test and study levels is above 50% 
for political openness, administrative capacity, national income, poverty, and supportive 
legislators. The effect size is statistically significant at both levels for political openness, 
administrative capacity, spending, national income, and ethnic or racial equality. These 
findings question the significance of opportunities for social movements mobilising for policy 
influence, though they highlight the relevance of structural opportunities, at a time when 
dynamic opportunities are becoming increasingly popular in studies of social movements.  
The dimensions measuring the presence of potential or actual elite allies in my meta-analysis 
are: left-wing or ideologically progressive legislators, supportive legislators, liberal states, left-
wing or progressive executive, left-wing or progressive government, politicians with a similar 
socio-economic status as the constituency of a social movement, political endorsement by 
politicians or political parties, and court decisions in favour of a social movement. Out of these, 
only the presence of supportive legislators is consistently associated with policy change 
favourable to a social movement, in the presence of mobilisation. This suggests that potential 
elite allies and the performance of elite allyship may not be sources of opportunity for social 
movements wishing to influence public policy.  
This finding has a key implication for the literature on social movements. It suggests that 
despite the assumptions of the (political) opportunity literature, elite allies may not be a source 
of opportunity for social movements. We may be over-stating the relevance of these actors. 
This assessment is in line with research that highlights that elite allies do not play a significant 
role in helping social movements influence the policy-making process. Uba’s (2005, p. 391) 
study of anti-privatisation mobilisation in India shows that elite allies do not have a direct 
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impact on privatisation policy.53 However, my findings do not go as far as supporting those of 
Soule and Olzak’s (2004), which show that the presence of elite allies may be negatively 
associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.  
To investigate why the presence of elite allies is seemingly unhelpful for social movements 
seeking to influence policy, I examined in detail their interactions with social movements in 
the case study of the mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence against women in 
Morocco. In what follows, I lay out the research questions associated with this case study, as 
well as my findings, and their implications.  
 
2. To what extent do the claims of various elite political actors align with those of 
domestic activists in Morocco on the issue of violence against women?  
 
In my theoretical framework, I have argued that it is not enough to look at the presence of elite 
allies to determine the extent to which they act as a source of opportunity. Drawing on a 
definition of elite allies that centres on performance, and which I have borrowed from social 
movement scholars (Kriesi et al., 1995; Giugni, 2004; Uba, 2005), I argue that to determine if 
an elite political actor is a potential ally, we need to look at the extent to which that actor 
performs acts of allyship. Based on the assumption that elite political allies have a 
responsibility to take up social movements’ claims (Giugni, 2004; Tarrow, 2011), I expected 
elite allies to be those actors that engage in the political representation of social movements, 
by articulating claims that align with theirs in the public sphere. 
I explored this expectation through a specific type of content analysis called representative 
claims-analysis. I have selected this method for three reasons. First, a claims-analysis allowed 
                                                             
53 See also Olzak and Uhrig (2001).  
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me to examine the policy positions of various actors on the issue of violence against women in 
Morocco. It also allowed me to identify their tactical repertoires, as well as the frames they 
drew on to justify their positions (Beyeler and Kriesi, 2005). It further allowed me to capture 
the interactions between actors, and to understand the networks that exist (Koopmans and 
Statham, 1999). I limited my examination of claim-alignment between elite political actors and 
Moroccan activists on violence against women to four variables. The first one refers to the 
constituency represented by an array of representatives. The second one refers to the policy 
position of said representatives. The third one refers to the addressee called upon by 
representatives to advance their position. The fourth one refers to the justification that underlies 
representatives’ claims. I have limited my analysis to these dimensions to capture alignment 
on the object of representation, and on diagnostic and prognostic frames, which respectively 
refer to the reason for a problem, and the solution to a problem.  
I have uncovered that overall, elite allyship is performed by a range of actors in the context of 
the debate on VAW in Morocco. This is because the claims of various elite political actors 
align with those of Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions on the dimensions I have 
examined. First, intergovernmental organisations, foreign governments, the Moroccan 
government, opposition political parties, Parliament, bureaucracies and the judiciary agree with 
Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions that the primary constituency affected by 
VAW is women. Second, similarly to Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions, most 
claimants from intergovernmental organisations and the Moroccan government do not suggest 
a clear policy change. This contrasts with Moroccan bureaucrats, opposition political parties, 
and the judiciary who mostly advocate for concrete policy changes. Third, similarly to 
Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions, most claimants from intergovernmental 
organisations, the Moroccan government, opposition political parties, other politicians, 
bureaucracies and the judiciary, believe that domestic political actors in Morocco are primarily 
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responsible for tackling VAW. Fourth, foreign governments, opposition political parties, 
Parliament and other politicians use arguments rooted in moral principles and rights to discuss 
VAW in Morocco, in the same vein as Moroccan women’s rights groups and coalitions. 
Nonetheless, there is no one type of elite actor which aligns with Moroccan women’s rights 
groups and coalitions across all four dimensions.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that overall, the claims of elite political actors align with 
those of domestic activists - in the form of women’s groups and coalitions - in Morocco on the 
issue of violence against women. I thus found international elite actors, domestic political 
actors and state actors to be performing allyship through representation. However, there is no 
one type of elite ally whose claims consistently align with that of Moroccan women’s groups 
and coalitions. The most aligned elite actors appeared to be the Moroccan government and 
intergovernmental organisations, as they closely matched the claims of women’s groups and 
coalitions on three out of the four dimensions discussed above.  
 The key implication is that since there is not one type of potential elite ally that consistently 
articulates claims that closely match those of social movement actors, the latter should not rely 
on any one set of elite actors as these may not be supportive on all their claims. This also means 
that in studying elite allyship, the scholarship should consider a broader constellation of elite 
actors, and not limit their analysis to one type. For instance, Minkoff  (1997, p. 788)measures 
elite allies as the number of Democrats in the House of Representatives in the USA. Including 
in the analysis potential elite allies in other branches of government would have provided a 
more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the presence of potential elite 
allies and protest dynamics (van Dyke, 2003, p. 231). However, besides political 
representation, elite actors can perform allyship by working with social movements, providing 
certain resources, and employing certain strategies. I explored these in the following research 
question.  
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3. Which strategies do these elite political actors employ and which resources do they 
provide to activists?  
In my theoretical framework, I argued that there are three additional ways in which elite actors 
may perform allyship. These include working in conjunction with activists, providing different 
types of resources, and engaging other political elites. Drawing on the taxonomy of Cress and 
Snow (1996), I hypothesised that one form of elite allyship is the provision of moral, material, 
human, and informational resources. Still drawing on the social movement literature, I also 
hypothesised that a second way of performing elite allyship is working with social movements, 
preferably as part of a formal arrangement, such as a coalition. Based on Keck and Sikkink's 
(1998) Boomerang Model of transnational advocacy, I hypothesised elite allyship to consist of 
exerting moral or material leverage over those elite actors responsible for realising claims, and 
to consist of holding them accountable. However, based on Wu’s (2005) Double Mobilisation 
thesis, I hypothesised that elite actors can also adopt non-confrontational strategies, and 
collaborate with other elites to persuade them to change their position.  
I drew on representative claims analysis to examine the form and content of the representative 
claims on violence against women articulated by the elite political actors identified in the 
previous research question. I selected RCA because it allowed me to capture interactions 
between actors, alliances, networks, and positions. It thus provided me with a thick description 
of a range of actions and interactions.  My claims analysis showed that elite actors were overall 
committed to working towards positive reforms on VAW, and to support women’s groups and 
coalitions on this issue.  
I have shown that the judiciary, inter-governmental organisations and foreign governments 
made joint claims with women’s groups and coalitions. Support from these actors took the form 
of co-organising campaigns and meetings, and providing funding. This suggests that with 
regards to resources, such actors provided informational, human and to a lesser extent, material 
Page 274 of 395 
 
support. The relationship between these and other elite actors and women’s groups and 
coalitions, took the form of the network. This is because claims-making was generally not joint, 
and when it was, it did not involve consistent co-ordination.  
My RCA also showed that the most frequent type of elite resource was moral, though elite 
actors also provided some material, human and informational support. With regards to 
strategies, elite actors engaged in both leverage politics and collaboration. They thus engaged 
in double mobilisation, as hypothesised by Wu (2005).  
Prominent domestic political actors included senior Ministers, like the chief of state, 
parliamentarians from the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS), which was part of the former 
coalition government, and parliamentarians from the Socialist Union of Popular Forces 
(USFP), an opposition political party. These actors mostly provided moral resources to 
women’s groups and coalitions. Concerning strategies, members of the opposition were the 
ones that engaged in moral leverage towards government figures. 
State actors that performed relevant acts of allyship included Morocco’s national human right’s 
institution, national commissions, as well as jurists, legal bodies, and ministries. These actors 
mostly provided moral resources, but also human and informational. The national human rights 
commission, the Economic, Social and Environmental Council, and legal figures were 
particularly critical of the government, and engaged in moral leverage. They also provided 
recommendations alongside other state actors. State actors then engaged in double 
mobilisation.  
International elite actors included intergovernmental organisations. Prominent among these 
were the United Nations its associated agencies. Other IGOs claimants came from the OECD, 
the Union for the Mediterranean, the World Health Organisation, the World Bank Group, and 
the Inter-parliamentiary Union. These actors performed allyship by providing moral resources 
in the form of statements supportive of women. They mostly engaged in moral leverage. They 
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also sought to educate governments, such as Morocco, on the need to tackle violence against 
women. In sum, these actors also engaged in double mobilisation.  
These findings suggest that the range of resources provided by elite actors was limited. Since 
moral resources involve less commitment than material, human and informational resources, it 
could be argued that elite actors prefer to perform allyship in parallel to, rather than with, 
activists. However, elites engaged heavily with one another on this issue. Some of them took 
risks, such as criticising the Moroccan government, and potentially antagonising their 
relationship with the target of their claims. Nonetheless, they also collaborated with their target, 
through the provision of recommendations and through education. Thus, elite actors performed 
acts of allyship that de-centred social movements.  
The implication of these findings is that research on the relationship between social movements 
and their allies should look at the provision of a broader range of elite resources, and move 
away from the standard focus on one type of resource. As I have stated in my theoretical 
framework, material resources are examined more thoroughly in the literature on domestic 
social movements. Since there is more interaction between potential elite allies and other elite 
actors, than between potential elite allies and social movements, research should focus more 
on how elites interact in institutional arenas to further the claims of social movements.  
What do social movements think of the ways in which elite actors perform allyship? Are these 
performances enough to be considered an elite ally? I explored these issues in my last research 
question.  
4. To what extent do domestic activists perceive these actors as being elite allies, and 
which type of elite allyship do they think is most conducive to helping them achieve 
their policy goals?  
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My thesis was guided by the assumption that an opportunity must be perceived as such to 
deserve this label. The definition of opportunity I have used is ‘possibilities that originate 
outside the mobilising group, but affect its perceived changes of mobilising and/or realising its 
collective interests.’ This is in line with my definition of elite allies as actors ‘who are 
responsive and who are in a position to be able to reform existing policies’ (Giugni, 2004, p. 
170). To investigate the perceptions of women’s groups and coalitions on the performances of 
elite actors, I drew on semi-structured interviews with representatives from various women’s 
organisations and coalitions, in several cities in Morocco. I used this method because activists 
are the best source of information on their perceptions. Moreover, there is limited online data 
on the perceptions of elite actors by Moroccan women’s groups.  
My interviews revealed that few of the elite actors discussed above were perceived as 
facilitating mobilisation, and that there was a gulf between the actions of those they considered 
to be their elite allies and what they considered to be effective elite allyship. The ruling party, 
the Justice and Development party was perceived as being a key opponent. Those that were 
perceived as being elite allies included left-wing and liberal parties and politicians in Morocco, 
inter-governmental organisations, Western governments, and national institutions. These were 
criticised for not working with women’s groups and coalitions, not providing enough resources, 
and not engaging in leverage and accountability politics.  
Activists then preferred a model of elite allyship that involves leverage over the target of their 
claims, rather than a model of elite allyship that involves persuasion and collaboration. Another 
key criticism revolved around the lack of collaboration with elite allies. Thus, activists saw the 
parallel participation of elite allies – demonstrated by the RCA - as not being particularly 
useful. My interviews also also revealed that activists wanted elite allies to provide 
informational resources to help them mobilise effectively. In sum, women’s groups and 
coalitions saw elite allies as not really being a good source of opportunity. More importantly, 
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my interviews showed that the source of elite allyship mattered greatly. Though the ruling party 
was perceived as being a key opponent, and political parties in general were perceived as 
unwilling to do much, activists did not consider appealing to the King, as they had done in the 
past. From my interviews, it appears that activists courted representative and democratic 
institutions because they wanted to make sure that change happens through democratic means. 
Even though the King is the highest authority in Morocco, his help was not sought-after.  
To answer the research question, constitutional institutions and intergovernmental 
organisations were perceived as being elite allies, particularly because they provided different 
types of resources and worked with activists, not alongside them. We can thus deduce that 
effective elite allyship includes the following characteristics: the provision of a range of 
resources, the use of moral leverage over other political elites, collaboration with activists, and 
the use of democratic methods. 
7.2. Theoretical and Empirical Contribution  
 
In terms of theoretical contribution, my research highlights that though there are different 
sources of elite allyship in democratic and non-democratic contexts, there is not much 
difference in those that are perceived as being more useful. My case study shows that even 
though the King is the highest authority in Morocco, and can therefore make change happen, 
activists were more proactive in courting the support of democratic institutions, in spite of 
fierce opposition by the Islamist-led government and neglect by political parties. Moreover, if 
we go back to my discussion of the mobilisation for the reform of the Moudawana in chapter 
2, we can see that activists were not always willing to resort to the King to achieve their goals. 
Thus, they did not always seek the support of those most capable of bringing about change, 
particularly in the post-Arab Spring era and the popular discourse on democracy. This 
challenges the assumption in the literature on civil society in the MENA that civil society 
Page 278 of 395 
 
reinforces authoritarianism because it plays by the rules of the game to achieve its goals. 
Clearly the case of Morocco shows that this is not always the case, as activists in my case study 
refused to bypass democratic institutions to achieve the criminalisation of violence against 
women.  
My findings lend support for the thesis that there is a difference between objective 
opportunities and perceived opportunities. Based on various measures of elite allyship in the 
literature on social movements, transnational advocacy and political representation, my 
findings suggest that several elite actors in my study could be considered elite allies. However, 
when I questioned activists about these actors, they painted a different picture. The public 
performances of elite actors do not align with their private interactions with activists. The 
implication is that, we should not limit our analysis of elite allyship to public displays. We 
should also not assume that elites whose ideological leaning is close to that of activists 
necessarily perform better allyship. As my interviews have revealed, despite being perceived 
as being allies, left-wing and liberal parties showed a lack of interest in the matter.  
 
7.3.  Limitations and Future Research   
My research has helped shed light on the complex ways in which potential and perceived elite 
allies interact with social movements. However, it has some limitations. The first weakness is 
related to my research design, and specifically, to my use of a case study to explore three of 
my research questions. I used a case study because case studies allow researchers to answer 
‘how’ questions. However, the use of a case study means that my research findings might not 
apply in other contexts. I cannot generalise my findings to other countries, movements, and 
even time-periods. A potential avenue for future research could be drawing on comparative 
research methods to determine to what extent my findings are specific to my case. I could 
compare the interactions between elite allies and women’s groups and coalitions in Morocco, 
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Algeria, and Tunisia, three countries in the Maghreb region. Much like Morocco, Tunisia and 
Algeria also experienced mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence against women in the 
post-Arab Spring era. Unlike Morocco and Tunisia, which have only passed a bill on the matter, 
Algeria recently passed a law criminalising violence against women. Comparing the role of 
elite allies in these different scenarios would extend my research.  
In my research, I have not investigated why elite actors offered the kind of support that they 
did. I have alluded to these issues in my theoretical framework, to explain which types of actors 
should be considered potential elite allies. I argued that there may be strategic, ideological and 
structural justifications for elite allyship. However, I have not delved on these issues as they 
were beyond the scope of my analysis. I have found that elite allies did not have much contact 
with women’s groups and coalitions, and were even perceived by the latter as not being 
invested in fighting violence against women. This begs the question of why did elite allies 
engage on this issue in the way that they did? Given that the context of my study was a non-
democratic state, it would be interesting to uncover to what extent the form of elite allyship 
was influenced by the political environment, and to what extent it was influenced by factors 
related to elite allies themselves, such as their strategic needs, their ideology, and their 
perception of women’s groups and coalitions. Skrentny (2006) highlights the role of policy-
makers’ perceptions of social movements in policy outcomes. Skrentny’s (2006) study suggests 
that the inclusion of social movements in the policy process is affected by how political elites 
attribute meaning to the constituency represented by them. This meaning-making involves how 
the constituency is defined, to what extent it is perceived as deserving its plight, and to what 
extent it poses a threat to wider society (Skrentny, 2006). In the future, I would like to expand 
on this and compare the relevance of the external environment and of the characteristics of elite 
allies to the form of elite allyship they adopt.  
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7.4. Conclusion  
 To conclude, my research has sought to bring clarity to the concept of elite allies, by 
investigating its usefulness for the policy outcomes of social movements, and by drawing on a 
case study to examine the interactions between a range of elite allies and women’s groups and 
coalitions in Morocco in the post-Arab Spring era. I have demonstrated that elite elites are not 
a strong predictor policy change favourable to social movements. I have also demonstrated that 
in the context of violence against women in Morocco, elite allies articulated claims that were 
overall aligned with those of women’s groups and coalitions, provided moral resources, and 
both exerted leverage over elite targets and collaborated with them. I finally found that despite 
these acts of elite allyship, women’s groups and coalition in Morocco did not perceive all of 
these actors to be elite allies. Moreover, they preferred a model of elite allyship that involves 
more partnership with them and greater leverage against other elite actors.   
If we combine my findings, we can see that they provide support for my argument that it is 
important to examine the agency of elite allies, and not just their presence, to determine to what 
extent they can be considered a source of opportunity. My meta-analysis showed that the 
presence of elite allies does not matter much in influencing the policy-making process. My case 
study suggests that one reason for this failure could be the fact that they do not exert greater 
leverage over those responsible for implementing the claims of social movements. My RCA 
showed that many elite actors were not critical of the Moroccan government or 
parliamentarians. Moreover, there was no use of material leverage or accountability politics. 
Inter-governmental organisations and foreign governments did not link progress on violence 
against women in Morocco to continued funding. Those elite actors that did criticise and shame 
the Moroccan government for failing to come up with a satisfactory law on violence against 
women, did not do this consistently. This lack of effective leverage was perceived by women’s 
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groups and coalitions as being a key reason why elite allies failed to help them advance their 
policy goals.  
Another reason why elite allies fail in amplifying the efforts of social movements could be their 
lack of contact with them. My RCA showed that elite actors do not speak on behalf of women’s 
groups and coalitions in Morocco, nor do they really work alongside them. They tended to 
mostly interact with one another on this issue. Representatives from Moroccan women’s groups 
and coalitions deplored this parallel participation, and argued that elite allies’ engagement 
limited their usefulness as a source of opportunity.  
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1.1.  Codebook Dataset Meta-Analysis Opportunities, Mobilisation and Policy Impact54  
 
Study Characteristics  
Variable  Variable Label Value Label Note 
ID_ART Id number article   
AUTHOR Author(s) name  String 
YR_PUB Year of publication   
JOURNAL Journal 1 = American 
Journal of 
Sociology 
2= American 
Sociological 
Review 
3= Mobilization 
4 = Social Forces 
5 = Sociological 
Perspectives 
 
                                                             
54 This is a replication of the codebook used by Smets and van Ham’s (2013) for their meta-analysis.  As this is 
the most suitable codebook for my study, and has been tested and approved, I have kept it as it is, but simply 
adapted the categories for my case study.  
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6 = American 
Political Science 
Review  
7 = American 
Journal of Political 
Science 
8 = Latin American 
Research Review 
9 = Political 
Research Quarterly  
10 = Social 
Problems 
11 = Publius  
12 = Journal of 
Politics  
 
Sub-study Characteristics  
Variable  Variable Label Value Label Note 
ID_SUB Id number sub-
study 
e.g.  
2.004 (ID_ART = 2, 
sub-study 4) 
Each model should get 
its own sub-study 
number. 
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etc 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CROSS_NAT Cross-national 
study 
0 = Not cross-
national study  
1 = Cross-national 
 
UNIT_1 Geographical unit 1  If not cross-national, 
code country name in 
UNIT_1,  
DATA_ANA Statistical 
technique (OLS, 
Logit) 
1=Logistic 
regression  
2=Probit regression  
3=Scobit regression  
4=Conditional logit 
regression  
5=Ordered logit 
regression  
6=Multi-level logit 
(MCMC/HLM logit; 
or GLS/MLE)  
7=OLS  
If new type of data 
analysis, add new 
number and data 
description in 
Codebook.  
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8=Ordered probit 
regression  
9=Structural 
Equation Model 
(SEM)  
10=Two Stage Least 
Squares (2sls)  
11=Markov Chain 
/Bayesian (MCMC)  
12=Multi-level 
probit/random-
effects probit  
13=Two-stage 
selection bias model  
14=Poisson 
Regression 
15=Generalised 
Least Squares  
16=Negative 
binomial regression 
17=Cox/Proportional 
hazards regression 
18=Heterogeneous 
diffusion model  
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Variable Characteristics  
Variable  Variable Label Value Label Note 
DEPVAR_DESCR Dependent 
Variable 
Description 
  
DEPVAR Dependent 
variable 
1 = agenda 
setting  
2 = policy 
passage 
3 = policy 
implementatio
n 
4 = policy 
repeal  
 
IV Independent 
variable name 
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IV_N Independent 
variable number 
 see below 
for IV_N 
and 
IV_OPERA 
combination
s  
 
IV_OPERA Operationalizatio
n independent 
variable 
 String 
T_Political_Opportunity_Model Political 
Opportunity 
Model 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
Follow my 
own coding 
detailed 
below 
T_Discursive_Opportunity_Model Discursive 
Opportunity 
Model 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
Follow my 
own coding 
detailed 
below 
T_SEconomic_Opportunity_Model Socio-economic 
Opportunity 
Model 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
Follow my 
own coding 
detailed 
below 
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T_Legal_Opportunity_Model Legal 
Opportunity 
Model 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
Follow my 
own coding 
detailed 
below 
T_Supranational_Opportunity_Mod
el 
Supranational 
Opportunity 
Model 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
Follow my 
own coding 
detailed 
below 
MOBILISATION_VAR_NAME What is the name 
of the variable(s) 
measuring 
mobilisation? 
 String 
MOBILISATION_TYPE What is the type 
of this 
mobilisation? 
1 = 
membership 
2 = incidence 
of non-
institutional 
protest 
3= incidence 
of institutional 
protest 
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4= several 
EFF_HYP_GEN Hypothesized 
direction effect 
independent 
variable on 
dependent 
variable as 
generally 
expected in 
literature 
1 = positive  
2 = negative  
3 = both or 
none 
Hypotheses 
as expected 
generally in 
the 
literature, 
see list of 
hypotheses I 
constructed 
below.  
 
EFF_HYP_AUTH Hypothesized 
direction effect 
independent 
variable on 
dependent 
variable as stated 
by authors 
1 = positive  
2 = negative  
3 = Both 
4 = No 
hypothesis 
formulated  
If no explicit 
hypothesis 
but 
expectations 
about effects 
formulated, 
coded as 1 or 
2. Only if 
really 
needed use 
category 3 or 
4.  
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EFF_HYP_ME Hypothesized 
direction effect 
independent 
variable on 
dependent 
variable as stated 
by me 
1 = positive  
2 = negative  
 
 
EFF_REAL Found direction 
effect variable 
independent 
variable on 
dependent 
variable 
1 = positive 
2 = negative 
 
EFF_SIGN Significance 
found effect at p-
value < .05 
1 = significant 
0 = not 
significant 
 
EFF_SIZE Effect size proxy 
of independent 
variable based on 
our/general 
hypotheses 
-1 = anomaly  
1 = success 
0 = failure  
Anomaly - 
significant 
but in wrong 
direction 
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(EFF_HYP_GEN
) 
Failure – 
insignificant 
 
Success - 
significant 
& expected 
direction 
CONTROL Variable of 
interest or control 
variable 
1 = control 
variable  
0= variable of 
interest 
 
INTERACT Variable main 
effect of an 
interaction 
1 = Main 
effect of an 
interaction 
effect  
0 = 
Normal/non-
interaction 
effect 
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VARTOTAL Number of 
variables 
included per test 
 Count of 
number of 
variables 
included per  
Test. 
Interaction 
variables not 
counted,  
collapsed 
(categorical) 
variables 
counted as 1. 
 
Theoretical Models  
 
Political Opportunity Model  
 
IV_OPERA  
Variable name/description  
IV_NO 
Variable Number  
Election year 1.01 
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Electoral competition 1.02 
Accessibility of the polity  1.03 
Political openness  1.04 
Administrative capacity  1.05 
State centralisation 1.06 
Bureaucratic paternalism 1.07 
Open Political Parties  1.08 
State founding   1.09 
Government (left) 1.10 
Social corporatism 1.11 
Executive (Left) 1.12 
Political alignment  1.13 
Political endorsement  1.14 
SES politicians  1.15 
Relevant policy machinery  1.16 
Turnout  1.17 
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No Variable Direction   Hypothesis   
1.01 Election year Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, an 
election year is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
1.02 Electoral 
competition 
Positive  Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
electoral 
competition is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
1.03 Accessibility of the 
polity  
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
accessibility of the 
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polity is positively 
associated with 
policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
1.04 Political openness  Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
levels of political 
openness is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
1.05 Administrative 
capacity  
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, 
administrative 
capacity is positively 
associated with 
policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
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1.06 State centralisation Positive  Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, state 
centralisation is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
1.07 Bureaucratic 
paternalism 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, 
bureaucratic 
paternalism is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
1.08 Open Party 
organisation 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, the 
presence of open 
party organisations 
is positively 
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associated with 
policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
1.09 State founding   Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, late 
state founding 
associated with 
policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
1.10 Government (left) Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, left 
dominance in 
government is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
1.11 Social corporatism Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
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mobilisation, social 
corporatism is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
1.12 Executive (Left) Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, a left-
wing executive is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
1.13 Political alignment Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, 
political alignment 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
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1.14 Political 
endorsement  
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, 
political 
endorsement of the 
movement is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
1.15 SES of political 
representatives 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, the 
presence of political 
representatives with 
SES similar to the 
constituency of a 
social movement is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
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1.16 Relevant policy 
machinery  
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, the 
presence of a 
relevant policy 
machinery is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
1.17 Turnout Positive  Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, high 
levels of political 
participation, 
through turnout, are 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
 
 
Discursive Opportunity Model  
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IV_OPERA  
Variable name/description  
IV_NO 
Variable Number  
Agenda/Policy (Supportive) 2.01 
No/Weak Countermovement  2.02 
Public Opinion (Favourable) 2.03 
Media attention  2.04 
Political Influence (left/liberalism) 2.05 
State ideology (left/liberal) 2.06 
Support (other actors) 2.07 
Incumbent support 2.08 
 
  
No Variable Direction   Hypothesis   
2.01 Agenda/Policy 
(Supportive) 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, 
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favourable 
policy/agenda on a 
relevant issue is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
2.02 No/Weak 
Countermovement 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, 
no/weak counter-
movement is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
2.03 Public Opinion 
(Favourable) 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, 
favourable public 
opinion is positively 
associated with 
policy change 
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favourable to a 
social movement. 
2.04 Media attention Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, media 
attention is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
2.05 Political Influence 
(left/liberalism) 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
support for 
left/liberal parties is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
2.06 State ideology 
(left/liberal) 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, 
left/liberal state 
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ideology is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
2.07 Support (other 
actors) 
Positive  Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, 
support from private 
actors, like 
corporations, is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
2.08 Incumbent support Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, 
incumbent support is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
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Socio-Economic Opportunity Model 
IV_OPERA  
Variable name/description  
IV_NO 
Variable Number  
Women in Workforce/education 3.01 
Spending (relevant vs other) 3.02 
Domestic Productivity  3.03 
Unemployment  3.04 
Ethnic/Racial Diversity  3.05 
Net Profit  3.06 
% Secondary Industry  3.07 
National Income  3.08 
Population Density  3.09 
Crime Rate (Low) 3.10 
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Ethnic/Racial Equality   3.11 
Poverty 3.12 
Age  3.13 
Personal Income 3.14 
Immigration  3.15 
Budget 3.16 
Education 3.17 
% Primary Industry  3.18 
Cost of Living 3.19 
State Employees 3.20 
Tax rate 3.21 
% Tertiary Industry 3.22 
Land Ownership 3.23 
Industrialisation 3.24 
Religious Population (low) 3.25 
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No Variable Direction   Hypothesis   
3.01 Women in 
Workforce/education 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
levels of women in 
the workfoce and at 
school, are 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.02 Spending (relevant 
vs other) 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
spending on an issue 
relevant to a social 
movement is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
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3.03 Domestic 
Productivity 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
domestic 
productivity is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.04 Unemployment Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
unemployment is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.05 Ethnic/Racial 
Diversity 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
ethnic diversity is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
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favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.06 Net Profit Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
state profit is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.07 % Secondary 
Industry 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
levels of people in 
secondary industry 
are positively 
associated with 
policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.08 National Income Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
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national income is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.09 Population Density Positive  Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, a 
greater population is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.10 Crime Rate (Low) Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, low 
rates of crimes are 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.11 Ethnic/Racial 
Equality 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
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mobilisation, higher 
ethnic equality is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.12 Poverty Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation a 
higher level of 
poverty is positively 
associated with 
policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.13 Age Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
levels of older 
people is positively 
associated with 
policy change 
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favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.14 Personal Income Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
personal income is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.15 Immigration Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
levels of 
immigration are 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.17 Budget Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
state budget is 
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positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.18 Education Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
levels of education 
are positively 
associated with 
policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.19 % Primary Industry Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, 
higher % of people 
in primary industry  
is positively 
associated with 
policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
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3.20 Cost of Living Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
cost of living is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.21 State Employees Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
numbers of state 
employees are 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.22 Tax rate Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, higher 
tax rate is positively 
associated with 
policy change 
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favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.23 % Tertiary Industry Positive  Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, 
higher % tertiary 
industry is positively 
associated with 
policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.24 Land Ownership Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, 
higher % of 
landowners are 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
3.25 Religious Population 
(low) 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, low 
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levels of religious 
individuals are 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
 
 
Legal Opportunity Model  
IV_OPERA  
Variable name/description  
IV_NO 
Variable Number  
Law (supportive) 4.01 
Partisanship of legislators (left) 4.02 
Supportive legislators  4.03 
Court decisions (positive) 4.04 
Court Cases (relevant) 4.05 
Legislative Apportionment 4.06 
Capacity of the Legislature 4.07 
Page 369 of 395 
 
Legislative Process (efficient) 4.08 
Legislative Professionalism 4.09 
 
No Variable Direction   Hypothesis   
4.01 Law (supportive) Positive  Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, the 
existence of a 
supportive law on a 
relevant issue are 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
4.02 Partisanship of 
legislators (left) 
Positive  Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, the 
presence of left-
wing legislators is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
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favourable to a 
social movement. 
4.03 Supportive 
legislators 
Positive  Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, the 
presence of 
supportive 
legislators is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
4.04 Court decisions 
(positive) 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, 
positive court 
decisions are 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
4.05 Court Cases 
(relevant) 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
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mobilisation, 
relevant court cases  
are positively 
associated with 
policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
4.06 Legislative 
Apportionment 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, 
legislative 
apportionment is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
4.07 Legislative Process 
(efficient) 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, an 
efficient legislative 
process is positively 
associated with 
policy change 
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favourable to a 
social movement. 
4.08 Legislative 
Professionalism 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, 
legislative 
professionalism is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
 
Supra-national Opportunity Model  
IV_OPERA  
Variable name/description  
IV_NO 
Variable Number  
War period 5.01 
Supportive Policy/law in neighbouring states  5.02 
Supportive regional or global ideology  5.03 
Regional Diffusion 5.04 
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Geographical Location (Western) 5.05 
International Participation on Issue 5.06 
 
1. Supra-national Opportunity Model  
No Variable Direction   Hypothesis   
5.01 War period Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, war 
period is positively 
associated with 
policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
5.02 Supportive 
Policy/Law in 
neighbouring states  
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, 
existing 
laws/policies 
favourable to a 
social movement in 
neighbouring 
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countries is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
5.03 Supportive regional 
or global ideology  
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, a 
supportive regional 
or global ideology is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
5.04 Regional Diffusion Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, the 
spread of relevant 
policies and values is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
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5.05 Geographical 
Location (Western) 
Positive Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, a 
Western status is 
positively associated 
with policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
5.06 International 
Participation on 
Issue 
 Controlling for 
social movement 
mobilisation, 
international 
participation on an 
issue is positively 
associated with 
policy change 
favourable to a 
social movement. 
 
N.B. Hypotheses related to socio-economic opportunities share the common assumption that 
the more developed a state, the easier it is for it to be responsive to the demands of social 
movements. Moreover, the size of the needy population in a state signals to the state that liberal 
reforms are needed, which works to the advantage of social movements. 
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1.2.Excluded Variables  
 
Table 1 - Political Opportunity Model (Excluded Variables) 
 
Variable  Succes
s (1) 
Failur
e (0) 
Anomal
y (-1) 
Modal 
Categor
y  
Succes
s Rate  
Effec
t size  
P 
valu
e 
Effective 
Policy 
Machinery 
Tests 
(22) 
14 8 0 Success 63.64 .64 *** 
Studie
s (2)  
1 1 0 Failure  50.00 .35 n/a 
Tests 
(6)  
5 1 0 Success  83.33 .83 *** 
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Accessibilit
y of the 
polity  
Studie
s (1) 
1 0 0 Success  100.00 0.83 n/a 
Bureaucratic 
Paternalism  
Tests 
(3) 
3 0 0 Success 100.00 1.00 n/a 
Studie
s (1) 
1 0 0 Success 100.00 1.00 n/a 
State 
centralisatio
n  
Tests 
(3) 
3 0 0 Success 100.00 1.00 n/a 
Studie
s (1) 
1 0 0 Success 100.00 1.00 n/a 
Social 
Corporatism  
Tests 
(3) 
3 0 0 Success 100.00 1.00 n/a 
Studie
s (1) 
1 0 0 Success 100.00 1.00 n/a 
Turnout  Tests 
(3) 
3 0 0 Success 100.00 1.00 n/a 
Studie
s (1) 
1 0 0 Success  100.00 1.00 n/a 
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Political 
Alignment  
Tests 
(3) 
0 3 0 Failure  .00 .00 n/a 
Studie
s (1) 
0 1 0 Failure  .00 .00 n/a 
State 
Founding 
(younger) 
Tests 
(2) 
1 1 0 Failure  50.00 .50 n/a 
Studie
s (1) 
0 1 0 Failure  .00 .50 n/a 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 - Discursive Opportunity Model (Excluded Variables) 
 
Variable Success 
(1) 
Failure 
(0) 
Anomaly 
(-1) 
Modal 
Category  
Success 
Rate  
Effect 
size  
P 
value 
Tests 
(10) 
3 4 3 Failure  30.00 .00 n/a 
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Support 
(Other 
actors) 
Studies 
(2) 
1 1 0 Failure  50.00 -.09 n/a 
Incumbent 
Support  
Tests 
(2) 
0 2 0 Failure  .00 .00 n/a 
Studies 
(1) 
0 1 0 Failure  .00 .00 n/a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 - Legal Opportunity Model (Excluded Variables) 
 
Variable Succes
s (1) 
Failur
e (0) 
Anomal
y (-1) 
Modal 
Categor
y  
Succes
s Rate  
Effec
t size  
P 
valu
e 
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Court Cases 
(relevant) 
Tests 
(6) 
0 6 0 Failure  .00 .00 n/a 
Studie
s (1) 
0 1 0 Failure .00 .00 n/a 
Legislative 
Apportionmen
t 
Tests 
(2) 
0 2 0 Failure  .00 .00 n/a 
Studie
s (2) 
0 2 0 Failure  .00 .00 n/a 
Capacity of 
the Legislature 
Tests 
(6) 
4 2 0 Success  66.67 .67 *** 
Studie
s (1) 
1 0 0 Success 100.00 1.00 n/a 
Legislative 
Process 
(efficient) 
Tests 
(11) 
0 10 1 Failure  .00 -.09 *** 
Studie
s (2) 
0 2 0 Failure  .00 -.07 n/a 
Tests 
(2)  
2 0 0 Success 100.00 1.00 n/a 
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Legislative 
Professionalis
m 
Studie
s (1) 
1 0 0 Success  100.00 1.00 n/a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 - Socio-economic Opportunity Model (Excluded Variables) 
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Variable  Succes
s (1) 
Failur
e (0) 
Anomal
y (-1) 
Modal 
Categor
y  
Succes
s Rate  
Effec
t size  
P 
valu
e 
Personal 
Income 
Tests 
(17) 
6 8 3 Failure  35.29 .18 *** 
Studie
s (2) 
1 1 0 Failure  50.00 .16 n/a 
Immigration  Tests 
(14) 
0 14 0 Failure  .00 .00 n/a 
Studie
s (2) 
0 2 0 Failure .00 .00 n/a 
Budget Tests 
(11) 
1 6 4 Failure 9.09 -.27 *** 
Studie
s (2) 
0 1 1 Anomal
y 
.00 -.40 n/a 
Education  Tests 
(10) 
8 2 0 Success 80.00 .80 *** 
Studie
s (2) 
1 1 0 Failure 50.00 .50 n/a 
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% Primary 
Industry 
Tests 
(8) 
0 8 0 Failure .00 .00 n/a 
Studie
s (1) 
0 1 0 Failure .00 .00 n/a 
Cost of Living  Tests 
(6) 
3 1 2 Success  50.00 .17 *** 
Studie
s (2) 
1 0 1 Anomal
y  
50.00 .17 n/a 
State 
Employees  
Tests 
(5) 
5 0 0 Success 100.00 1.00 n/a 
Studie
s (2) 
2 0 0 Success 100.00 1.00 n/a 
Tax rate  Tests 
(3) 
3 0 0 Success 100.00 1.00 n/a 
Studie
s (1) 
1 0 0 Success 100.00 1.00 n/a 
% Tertiary 
Industry  
Tests 
(2) 
0 2 0 Failure  .00 .00 n/a 
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Studie
s (1) 
0 1 0 Failure  .00 .00 n/a 
Land 
Ownership  
Tests 
(2) 
0 2 0 Failure .00 .00 n/a 
Studie
s (1) 
0 1 0 Failure .00 .00 n/a 
Industrialisatio
n  
Tests 
(1) 
0 1 0 Failure  .00 .00 n/a 
Studie
s (1) 
0 1 0 Failure  .00 .00 n/a 
Religious 
Population 
(low) 
Tests 
(1) 
0 1 0 Failure  .00 .00 n/a 
Studie
s (1) 
0 1 0 Failure  .00 .00 n/a 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 - Supra-national Opportunity Model (Excluded Variables) 
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Variable Succes
s (1) 
Failur
e (0) 
Anomal
y (-1) 
Modal 
Categor
y  
Succes
s Rate  
Effec
t size  
P 
valu
e 
Regional 
Diffusion 
Tests 
(17) 
13 4 0 Success 76.47 .76 *** 
Studie
s (1) 
1 0 0 Success 100.00 .50 n/a 
Geographica
l Location 
(Western) 
Tests 
(2) 
1 0 1 Anomaly 50.00 .00 n/a 
Studie
s (1) 
0 0 1 Anomaly .00 .00 n/a 
International 
Participation 
on Issue  
Tests 
(2) 
1 1 0 Failure  50.00 .50 n/a 
Studie
s (1) 
0 1 0 Failure .00 .50 n/a 
 
 
 
Appendix 2  
 
Page 386 of 395 
 
Table 1: Variables Used  
Dimensi
on 
Variable 
Name 
Variabl
e Label 
Value Labels  Notes  
Claiman
t  
CLAIMANT
_FUN 
Functio
n of 
claiman
t 
International Actors  
1 = Intergovernmental 
Organisation 
2 = International Civil 
Society  
3= Foreign Governments  
 
Domestic Political Actors  
4 = Moroccan government  
5 = Opposition political 
parties 
6 = Parliament 
7 = other politician(s)  
State Actors 
8 = Bureaucracy  
9 = Judiciary 
10 = 
police/security/military 
Social Movements  
11 = Insurgent 
Group/rebels 
If a claim has more 
than one claimant, I 
apply the following 
priority rules, which 
have also been used in 
the Europub project: 
1) actors mentioned as 
leaders/spokespersons
/organisers take 
precedence, 2) 
organisations have 
priority over 
unorganised 
collectivities, 3) active 
actors or speakers 
have priority over 
passive audiences and 
rank and file 
participants. If there 
are several claimants 
and none has priority 
according to these 
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12 = Women's rights 
groups/coalitions 
13 = Other social 
movements 
Civic Groups 
14 = Pressure Group 
15 = Media 
16 = Academics 
17 = general public 
18 = religious actor 
Other  
19 = Central Bank of 
Morocco 
20 = Private Finance  
21 = Other  
criteria, the order with 
which they are 
mentioned in the 
article decides. If one 
actor has two 
functions mentioned, 
the highest level 
capacity in terms of 
the geographical 
scope variable should 
be selected. 
Represe
nted 
Constitu
ency 
OBJECT  Object 
actor 
whose 
interest
s are 
represe
nted by 
the 
claims. 
 0 = No object  
1 = Organised political 
actor  (i.e. political party, 
civil society groups) 
2 = Polity (i.e. Morocco, 
the EU etc) 
3 = Territorial Group (i.e. 
territorial groups not 
referred to as polity such as 
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the Middle East, North 
Africa, humanity) 
4 = Ethnic Majority (i.e. the 
majority or dominant 
ethnic group in the polity 
discussed, Arabs in 
Morocco) 
5 = Ethnic Minority (i.e. 
groups that are ethnic 
minorities such as Blacks 
or Amazighs in Morocco, 
etc) 
6 = Religious Majority (i.e. 
the majority or dominant 
religious group in the polity 
discussed such as Muslims 
in Morocco) 
7 = Religious Minority (i.e. 
the minority religious 
group in the polity 
discussed such as Jews in 
Morocco) 
8 = Elites (i.e. political or 
cultural elites) 
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9 = Citizens (i.e. references 
to ordinary people) 
10 = Workers (i.e. a group 
of people united by lower 
socio-economic class, like 
workers and the poor) 
11 = Owners (i.e.  rich 
people with money or 
private sector activity as 
key characteristic) 
12 = Other Sectoral (i.e. 
groups sharing a certain 
occupation other than 
capitalists and workers) 
13 = Specific Organization 
(i.e. the group is a specific 
named organisation. 
Examples include 
Parliament, the UN, etc) 
14 = Women (i.e this 
includes girls and young 
women). 
15 = other gender 
16 = Generation (i.e. 
children, future 
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generations, pensioners. 
This category is concerned 
with generational groups in 
general).  
17 = Individual (i.e. 
individually-named 
persons). 
18 = family 
19 = society 
20 = specific group of 
women 
21 = other  
Prognos
tic 
Framing  
ADDRESSE
E_FUN 
Functio
n of 
address
ee 
Same as 
CLAIMANT_FUN 
The addressee of the 
claim refers to “the 
actor who is held 
responsible for 
implementing the 
clam or at whom the 
claim is directly 
addressed in the form 
of a call to do or leave 
something” 
(Koopmans 2002: 42).  
Therefore, addressees 
are explicitly 
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mentioned in the 
claim and must be 
concrete actors. An 
addressee is coded 
when a claimant calls 
upon another actor to 
change their position 
on a certain topic. This 
is even done when this 
reference is a form of 
criticism, without an 
explicit call for 
change of position. 
PREFPOLIC
Y  
Policy 
change 
advocat
ed by 
claiman
t(s)  
 
1 = Amendments to the 
content of existing policy  
2 = Amendments to the 
implementation of existing 
policy  
3= new policy 
4= Unclear appraisal of 
policy 
 
 
Diagnost
ic 
Framing  
JUSTIFICA
TION 
First 
justifica
tion or 
0 = None (no argument 
provided) 
 
Page 392 of 395 
 
argume
nt given 
or 
implied 
by the 
subject 
actor 
with 
respect 
to the 
claim 
1 
Instrumental/pragmatic/uti
litarian/goal-oriented 
arguments 
11 =  general or public 
interest  
12 = economic interest  
13 = social-political 
interest  
14 = individual interest  
15 = state effectiveness and 
efficiency  
16 = domestic security  
17 = international security  
18 = procedural/strategic 
argument  
19 = other cost/benefit 
argument  
 
2 arguments about 
collective identity  
21 national identity 
(general) 
      211 = specific national 
traditions  
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      212 = arguments 
related to sub-national 
identity  
22 cultural traditions and 
norms  
      221 = specific norms 
part of indigenous 
community  
      222 = family-related 
norms  
      223 = religious identity 
and norms  
 
3 Arguments about 
universal moral principles 
and rights (including legal 
arguments) 
 
31  human rights  
      311 = individual 
freedom/emancipation  
   312 = freedom of 
expression  
   313 = equal treatment  
   314 = privacy  
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   315 = religious rights  
   316 = sexual (expression) 
rights 
   317 = women’s rights  
32 Moral principles (or 
absence thereof)  
  321 = tolerance (as 
universal principle)  
  322 = good governance 
(i.e. fair procedure) 
  323 = respect for other 
persons and groups  
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Appendix 3 
List of Interviews  
Federation de la Ligue Democratique des Droits des Femmes, Rabat, 1st March 2016 
Federation de la Ligue Democratique des Droits des Femmes, Casablanca, 20th January 2016 
Association Marocaine des Droits des Femmes, Casablanca, 30th March 2016 
Woman Action, Rabat, 18th March 2016 
Jossour, Forum des Femmes Marocaines, Rabat, 2nd March 2016. 
Printemps de la Dignite, Fez, 11th February 2016. 
Association Marocaine des Femmes Progressistes, Casablanca, 5th May 2016 
Forum Az Zahra, Rabat, 27th April 2016 
Solidarite Feminine, Casablanca, 7th March 2016.  
Association Amal, El Hajeb, 26th January 2016. 
Association Mains Libres, Marrakech, 29th April 2016. 
Union Feministe Libre, Rabat, 1st May 2016. 
Mouvement Alternatif pour les Libertes Individuelles, Rabat, 23rd April 2016. 
Collectif Aswat, Rabat, 24th April 2016. 
Conseil National des Droits de l’Homme, Rabat, March 2016 
 
